Reflecting about the New Global Order: moving fast and full of complexities

 

A World of Converging Uncertainties: An Analysis of the Post-Cold War Global Order

Executive Summary

Victor Ângelo's texts and public interventions are based on a compelling synthesis of the major trends shaping the contemporary global landscape. Its central thesis posits that the international system is at a critical inflection point, moving beyond the post-Cold War era of cooperation into a new, more fragmented, and perilous phase. This transition is defined by the convergence of three primary trends: the resurgence of great power competition, driven by the erosion of traditional strategic safeguards and the emergence of new geopolitical theaters; a profound crisis of multilateralism, as international institutions struggle with financial shortfalls and a loss of consensus; and a fundamental shift in United States foreign policy toward a transactional, "America First" model. His analysises demonstrate that these elements are not isolated issues but are causally linked in a "polycrisis" where a breakdown in one area exacerbates vulnerabilities in others. It is his view that the world is now navigating a complex and uncertain period where old frameworks are no longer sufficient to understand, lead and manage new, multifaceted challenges.

1. The Resurgence of Geopolitical Competition

The defining feature of the present global order is the return of great power rivalry, both through traditional means and by making use of the rapidly evolving digital instruments. This dynamic is manifesting not only in the breakdown of long-standing agreements but also in the militarization of new strategic regions and the employment of new forms of diplomacy that bypass traditional norms. The use of A.I. reinforces the race and creates a narrative that is most disturbing. 

1.1 The Erosion of Strategic Stability and Arms Control

The post-Cold War era saw a concerted effort to build a web of arms control treaties aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. Today, this system is in a state of selective decay, creating new risks and highlighting a shift in strategic priorities.

The precarious status of the New START Treaty is a central element of this instability. Officially known as the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, New START is currently the only major remaining arms control agreement between the two nations. The treaty places verifiable limits on strategic offensive weapons, including deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Both sides are obligated to remain at or below specific aggregate limits: 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, 1,550 nuclear warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. This treaty is particularly important as it constrains the development of new Russian long-range nuclear weapons like the Avangard and Sarmat that are capable of reaching the U.S. homeland.

The treaty's verification and transparency measures are critical for U.S. national security. These provisions include up to 18 on-site inspections per year, biannual data exchanges, and regular notifications on strategic exercises and new weapon systems. These measures provide a vital window into Russian intercontinental-range nuclear forces and operations, giving the U.S. crucial intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable. Without them, U.S. knowledge and confidence in its assessments of Russia's nuclear forces would decrease, complicating decisions about its own force structure. The treaty was initially in force for 10 years and was extended through February 4, 2026. The maintenance of this treaty, despite a deeply adversarial relationship, suggests that its verifiable limits on the most direct and existential threats are considered too important to abandon.

In stark contrast, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has completely dissolved, a development that signifies a new, more confrontational era of open rearmament. Signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the INF Treaty banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It was hailed as a major arms control achievement that ended a dangerous chapter of the Cold War and served as a crucial "firebreak" against escalation. The treaty's collapse began when the U.S. formally withdrew in 2019 under President Donald Trump, citing Russia's violation of the terms by developing and deploying the 9M729 (SSC-8) missile system. Russia, for its part, officially abandoned its self-imposed moratorium on the treaty in the wake of deploying the Oreshnik missile, a weapon with a range that violates the defunct treaty, and after nuclear threats were issued by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. This breakdown has led to a reciprocal military buildup. The U.S. plans "episodic deployments" of intermediate-range missiles to Germany and has already deployed Typhon missile launchers in the Philippines, while Russia has confirmed the deployment of the nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile to Belarus, which borders three NATO members.

The divergent fates of these two treaties illuminate a fundamental shift in strategic logic. While New START, with its focus on verifiable limitations of intercontinental threats to the U.S. homeland, remains in force, the INF, with its broader scope and perceived vulnerabilities, has been discarded. The dissolution of the INF Treaty has been accompanied by a dangerous escalation in nuclear rhetoric from both sides, increasing the risk of miscalculation in an era with fewer safeguards. This rearmament and the increasingly adversarial posture reflect a strategic worldview articulated by Vladimir Putin, whose foreign policy has long been aimed at bolstering Russia's status as a world player and countering what he perceives as Western dominance. This situation is often referred to as a "Cold War II," where renewed competition is once again the defining feature of great power relations.

1.2 The Arctic as a New Front

The Arctic, once envisioned as a zone of peace and cooperation, is rapidly transforming into a new theater for strategic competition. This shift is driven by the interconnected forces of climate change, vast economic potential, and a history of military importance.

The primary catalyst for this transformation is climate change. The Arctic, previously covered in permanent pack ice, is becoming far more accessible, making fabled sea routes—such as the North Sea Route and the Northwest Passage—a realistic prospect for global shipping. These routes could reduce transit times by as much as a third, opening up new avenues for commerce. The region also holds significant economic riches, with estimates of approximately $1 trillion in minerals, 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas reserves, and 13% of its undiscovered oil.

The region's historical importance as a Cold War theater for intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers is now being revisited in a new context of strategic competition. Today, the Arctic is a territory for competition among Russia, the United States, and China, serving as a "critical ancillary theater that enables strategic outcomes elsewhere". Russia holds a significant military advantage in the region, having modernized its Arctic military bases, deployed defense missiles, and upgraded its submarine fleet over the past decade. Russia and China combined operate around 45 icebreakers, a stark contrast to the United States, which faces a significant "icebreaker gap" with only two aging icebreakers and one commercially procured vessel in its fleet.

The United States Air Force Arctic Strategy acknowledges that the region’s capacity as a strategic buffer is eroding, which has a direct effect on global military strategy. By securing NATO's northern flank and limiting Russian naval operations in the Arctic, the U.S. can reduce the risk of a two-front maritime conflict, thereby freeing up forces to maintain pressure on China in the Indo-Pacific region. This demonstrates a clear and interconnected strategic link between events in the Arctic and the broader competition in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the breakdown of cooperation between Russia and the seven other Arctic states within the Arctic Council has prompted Russia to pivot eastward, doubling down on collaboration with non-Arctic strategic competitors like China. This strategic realignment is a direct consequence of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, showing that Russia is adapting by seeking new partners for technology and investment from nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.

1.3 The Trump-Putin Summit in Alaska: An Exercise in Transactional Diplomacy

The recent summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska is a central feature of the new, uncertain international environment. This event is a defining moment for the Trump administration's foreign policy and a significant test of the established international order.

The summit took place on August 15, 2025, in Alaska, with the primary objective of negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. The meeting was set against a backdrop of deeply conflicting peace proposals. Russia has reportedly floated a ceasefire plan that would involve Ukraine ceding significant territory in the Donbas region—Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—in exchange for an end to the fighting and U.S. assistance in securing international recognition of these annexations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, has consistently rejected any territorial concessions, and the Ukrainian constitution requires a national referendum for any territorial changes.

By meeting directly with Putin and sidelining European nations and Ukraine, the U.S. implicitly validated Russia's strategy of bypassing established international norms and alliances. This approach creates a precedent for resolving international disputes through coercion rather than consensus. The exclusion of Ukraine is not merely a diplomatic snub; it is a core element of Putin’s strategy to secure a deal with Trump that can be presented to Kyiv and other European capitals as a fait accompli.

The choice of Alaska as the venue carries its own symbolic and strategic significance. Some voices in Russia view it as a reminder of "annexed Russian land" and a symbol of a trade relationship Moscow hopes to revive with Washington. It is also seen as a practical arena for cooperation on future economic ventures in the Arctic, a region where the economic interests of both countries intersect. Both leaders are entering the talks under significant domestic pressure. For Trump, the aim was to bolster his image as a global leader. For Putin, the war has created mounting economic challenges as a result of the sanctions. 

1.4 The A.I. as a critical instrument in the superpower competition

AI is not just a technology—it is an economic multiplier. Nations that effectively integrate AI into their economies gain advantages in productivity, innovation, and global influence. The race for AI supremacy is, therefore, a race for future economic leadership, with profound implications for global trade, employment, and national power.

The competition in artificial intelligence (AI) between the United States and China is widely viewed as a critical component of their broader geopolitical rivalry. This contest is seen as an international struggle for power that will significantly shape global power dynamics in the coming decades . The race for AI dominance is often framed as a direct competition between these two superpowers, which some believe will define the future of global power . This technological race intersects with geopolitics, inevitably contributing to future conflicts. .

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Ainda sobre os BRICS

O artigo **"Os BRICS ainda têm pés de barro"**, de **Victor Ângelo**, publicado no Diário de Notícias de 11 de Julho de 2025, oferece uma análise crítica e reflexiva sobre a atual relevância geopolítica do bloco dos BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China, África do Sul), destacando tanto as suas ambições quanto as suas fragilidades estruturais. A seguir, apresento uma síntese e análise do texto, seguida de comentários sobre seus principais argumentos.

### **Síntese do Artigo**

Victor Ângelo parte da mais recente cimeira dos BRICS no Rio de Janeiro para refletir sobre as transformações no sistema internacional. Ele identifica dois momentos-chave da descolonização:

1. **A primeira descolonização**, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, que levou à independência de muitas nações asiáticas e africanas e ao crescimento da ONU — de 51 membros em 1945 para 144 em 1975.

2. **A "segunda descolonização"**, um processo contemporâneo de desconexão política e econômica entre os países desenvolvidos (especialmente EUA e Europa) e o que ele chama de "antigas colônias", impulsionado por uma nova busca por autonomia geopolítica.

Nesse contexto, a China, sob a liderança de Xi Jinping, emerge como um ator central. Em 2013, lança a **Iniciativa do Cinturão e da Rota (BRI)**, um projeto de infraestrutura global que visa ampliar sua influência econômica e militar. No entanto, faltava à China uma dimensão política multilateral — algo que os **BRICS** poderiam oferecer.

O bloco, inicialmente concebido na década de 2000 como contraponto ao G7, ganhou novo impulso com o envolvimento estratégico da China. Os BRICS passaram a ser vistos como um possível **alternativa ao sistema ocidental dominado pelos EUA**, com potencial para criar uma nova arquitetura internacional baseada em cooperação digital, exploração espacial, novas moedas e comércio sem o dólar.

Contudo, o autor argumenta que os BRICS têm **"pés de barro"** — ou seja, apesar das ambições, sofrem de fragilidades profundas:

- Falta de **imparcialidade política**, evidenciada pela incapacidade de condenar a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia.

- **Rivalidades internas**, especialmente entre Índia e China, e entre Brasil e China (no que diz respeito a aspirações de assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU).

- Ausência de compromisso com **direitos humanos** e **regras do direito internacional** entre seus membros.

- Caráter de **aliança de conveniência**, não de integração ideológica ou estratégica.

O resultado, segundo Ângelo, é um bloco que pode contribuir para o **equilíbrio do sistema internacional**, mas que corre o risco de se tornar **problemático** se suas contradições internas não forem reconhecidas.

### **Análise dos Principais Argumentos**

#### 1. **A "segunda descolonização"**

A ideia de uma segunda descolonização é provocadora e útil. Ela vai além da independência formal e toca na **busca por autonomia estratégica**, especialmente em áreas como:

- Moedas próprias (desdolarização)

- Bancos de desenvolvimento alternativos (como o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento dos BRICS)

- Redes de comércio e tecnologia fora do controle ocidental

Essa leitura captura bem o desejo de países do Sul Global de **reconfigurar o poder global**, não apenas em termos econômicos, mas simbólicos.

#### 2. **O papel central da China**

Xi Jinping é apresentado como o estrategista que viu nos BRICS uma oportunidade de **legitimar globalmente a China** como potência alternativa. A BRI e os BRICS são dois braços complementares: um econômico-infrastructurel, outro político-diplomático.

No entanto, o autor lembra que o projeto chinês também serve a **interesses internos**: fortalecer o nacionalismo, garantir prosperidade e consolidar o poder do Partido Comunista.

#### 3. **Fragilidades dos BRICS**

O ponto mais forte do artigo é a crítica à **falta de coesão e legitimidade moral** do bloco:

- A **omissão sobre a Ucrânia** mostra que os BRICS não conseguem agir como mediadores neutros — exatamente como o Conselho de Segurança da ONU, paralisado por interesses de potências.

- As **rivalidades bilaterais**, como entre Índia e China (com conflitos de fronteira e competição regional), minam a unidade.

- O Brasil e a Índia veem os BRICS como **moeda de troca** para ganhar assento no Conselho de Segurança da ONU — mas a China tem interesse em **bloquear isso**, para não ter que ceder espaço à Índia.

Isso revela que os BRICS são, acima de tudo, um **espaço de negociação de interesses nacionais**, não uma comunidade de valores.

#### 4. **Questões éticas e de governança**

O autor não poupa críticas ao perfil autoritário de vários membros do bloco:

- China: repressão em Xinjiang, Hong Kong

- Rússia: guerra na Ucrânia, regime de Putin

- Índia: deriva nacionalista de Modi

- Brasil: Bolsonaro (no passado), mas também desafios democráticos.

Essa falta de compromisso com **democracia e direitos humanos** enfraquece a pretensão dos BRICS de oferecer uma "nova ordem" mais justa.

### **Conclusão: BRICS — promessa e limites**

Victor Ângelo conclui com uma visão realista: os BRICS **podem contribuir para um mundo multipolar**, mas não são uma alternativa sólida ou coesa ao sistema ocidental. São uma **aliança frágil**, baseada em interesses convergentes momentâneos, mas minada por rivalidades profundas e ausência de princípios comuns.

A metáfora dos **"pés de barro"** é precisa: o bloco pode parecer forte à superfície, mas repousa sobre fundamentos instáveis.

### **Reflexão Final**

O artigo é um convite à **humildade estratégica**. Enquanto o Ocidente enfrenta desgaste de hegemonia, o Sul Global busca novos caminhos — mas não há garantia de que esses novos arranjos sejam mais justos, democráticos ou estáveis. A verdadeira transformação do sistema internacional exigirá mais do que cooperação interestatal: exigirá **compromisso com regras, transparência e valores universais**.

Os BRICS podem ser parte desse futuro — mas, por enquanto, ainda estão longe de ser seu alicerce.

**Em uma frase**:  

*Os BRICS refletem o desejo de um mundo multipolar, mas sua falta de coesão, imparcialidade e valores comuns mostra que ainda têm muito chão a percorrer antes de se tornarem uma verdadeira alternativa global.*

Europe and the digital race

Europe out of the Digital Olympics

Victor Ângelo

 

The progress of the digital age, which has accelerated over the last decade, will be even faster, deeper and more pervasive in the coming years. Major transformations in information processing and use are coming, with amazing advances in artificial intelligence, 5G networks, new generations of microprocessors, 3D printing techniques, and in protecting cyber systems from hostile attacks. These transformations will have an enormous impact on the exercise of political power, on the economy and functioning of societies, on individual attitudes, as well as on international relations. 

Digital mega-investments are taking place today in the United States, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. The latter three produce 60% of the semiconductors and are moving at a rapid pace towards faster, more efficient processors, and much less gluttonous in terms of energy consumption. 

Where will Europe stand in this new technological framework? Ursula von der Leyen last week defined the digital domain as a priority. The EU currently produces about 10 percent of the world's semiconductors. It has lost a lot of ground in the last 30 years. In 1990, it accounted for 44 percent of global transistor production.  The ambition defined by the President of the European Commission is to reach 20% in 2030. For this, it will be necessary to mobilize public and private investments in the region of 160 billion US dollars. It won't be easy. It is a lot of money, but insufficient when compared with the plans of others. South Korea, for example, is ready to invest 450 billion dollars. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world's number one chipmaker, will invest $100 billion over the next three years to expand its capacity. Interestingly, part of this investment will take place in China, across the strait, and part in the United States. Thus, strategic interdependencies are created.

Europe is lagging not only in the field of processors. We are out of the league of champions when it comes to technology platforms. When you look at the top 10, you notice that six are American and four are Chinese. The platforms we know, in this part of the world where we are, such as Facebook, Twitter, Netflix, Google or even Uber, Airbnb or Booking, all have one or more Chinese competitors (Tencent, Weibo, WeChat, Baidu, iQuiyi and more).

Our picture is also not the best when it comes to the so-called unicorns. Many of the new applications and technologies are developed by newly established companies that the capital market values above $1 billion and calls unicorns. These companies are very important creative agents in the areas of artificial intelligence, financial software, e-commerce, and e-logistics. Digital giants follow them closely and eventually acquire the most innovative ones. Today, the inventory of unicorns totals 827 companies. Of these, only 57 are based in the EU area, with France and Germany at an absolute advantage in the tiny European share.

Given this, what does digital sovereignty mean in the EU? The question is even more pertinent if one takes into account the correlation between defence and artificial intelligence (AI). A recent report by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, a US commission, shows that the major defence competition with China is primarily about AI. Whoever wins that race will have a critical advantage over the other side. The EU is out of this championship.

Many other questions remain, concerning the protection of people's rights, the fight against information manipulation, or even the meaning of democracy in robotic times.  All of them are important. But for us Europeans, the fundamental challenge is to clearly define a plan that allows the EU to leap from the periphery to the centre of the digital issue.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 24 September 2021)

Comments on the Quad summit

Change course to avoid a collision

Victor Ângelo

 

The first Quad Summit, a new platform for strategic consultations between the United States, Australia, India and Japan, takes place today. Quad is short for quadrilateral. Since 2007, the foreign ministers of these countries have met sporadically to discuss the security of the Indo-Pacific region. This time, the meeting is at the highest level, albeit virtually, with Joe Biden and the prime ministers of the three other states.

The US President and Scott Morrison of Australia are the real instigators of this project. Narendra Modi and Yoshihide Suga were more reticent. They did not want the meeting to look like what it actually is: an avenue to discuss how to curb China's growing influence in the Indian and Pacific regions. So, the official agenda registers only three items - fighting the pandemic; economic cooperation and responding to climate change. This list thus hides the dominant concern, China's increasingly resolute power in both oceans and with the riparian states. China already has the world's largest armed fleet, with battleships, amphibious assault ships, logistics ships, aircraft carriers, polar icebreakers, and submarines. In the last 20 years, its naval capacity has grown threefold. It has more vessels than the United States and its ambition for the current five-year period (2021-2025) focuses on accelerating the production of means of ensuring presence and visibility, increasing missile capacity of distinct types and expanding nuclear weapons.  

The scale of these military investments and President Xi Jinping's very incisive foreign policy alarm many US strategists. It is in this context that the Quad summit should be seen. There are even those who think that, in time, Washington's objective is to create a defence alliance covering the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, in an arrangement that would be inspired by what exists in the North Atlantic, that is, the creation of a NATO of the East.

It will not be easy. India, notwithstanding the many border issues it has with China, does not want to be seen by Beijing as a hostile neighbour. It seeks, despite existing disputes, to maintain a certain diplomatic balance with the Chinese to moderate the latter’s support for Pakistan, which Indian leaders see as their number one enemy. Moreover, New Delhi wants to appear, not only to the Chinese but also to the Russians, as an autonomous defence power. Modi is a nationalist who knows a lot about geopolitics and international power play.

Japan, for distinct reasons, does not wish to enter into an open confrontation with China either. It will seek to continue to benefit from the American military umbrella, but without going beyond a prudent policy towards Beijing. Tokyo is banking more on mutual interests than on rivalry. And as long as Beijing does not try to capture the Japanese islands of Senkaku, long the object of diplomatic dispute between the two countries, Tokyo is unlikely to change its position.

However, the American strategy in this part of Asia is to create a containment front vis-à-vis China. If the Quad initiative does not work, they will turn to Europe, starting with NATO. This is where all this has to do with our security. I do not defend the idea of an alliance stretched to the ends of the earth, no matter how much Europeans see China as an unfair economic competitor or a state that does not follow the values we consider essential - democracy, freedom, and human rights.

The risk of an armed confrontation in that part of the world is growing. Europe's role must be to call for moderation, respect for international norms and effective dialogue between the American and Chinese leaders. The global challenges that the world faces today are already too many and require the building of a cooperation agenda between the great powers. And there, yes, they should be able to count on Europe's commitment.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

  

Europe in the middle of a big fight

Translation of today’s opinion piece I publish in Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

I do not want to start this regular dialogue with the reader without having the pandemic as the first topic. It is true that it is a beaten subject, with many people reflecting on what the world could be like once the virus has been defeated. A good part of these reflections is inspired by the principle of the crystal ball, a technique that has been perfected over time by all sorts of fortune-tellers. Other thinkers see in the unfolding of the pandemic the confirmation of their ideological obsessions. They take the opportunity to attack left and right. For them, the pandemic confirms the death of neoliberalism or globalization, even of capitalism, they warm up by pointing out the climatic causes, they greet in advance the end of American hegemony or the failure of the European project and so on. For many of these intellectuals, futurism seems to rhyme with unrealism.

It is indeed fundamental to know how to look to the future. We are aware that the great transformations came from those who could see beyond the horizon. One hundred years after the misnamed "Spanish flu", the coronavirus pandemic is the biggest shock after World War II. It is like a global tsunami. The world is working in slow motion or even still, in some cases. What was until March a global village has become an archipelago of isolated islands. The drawbridges are all raised, in fear of the contagion that might come from the neighbour. We live in a time of anxieties and fears. However, despite the uncertainties, it is not unreasonable to predict that tomorrow's world order will be vastly different from the one we have been building until the beginning of this year. Without getting into the crystal ball game, I predict that the issues of mass poverty, as it exists in certain parts of the globe, social inequalities, in the most developed societies, the deterioration of the environment and competition among superpowers will dominate the agenda of the future.

Each of these issues brings with it a web of other questions, which show the complexity of what lies ahead. On the other hand, it is necessary to overcome the social indifference that has taken hold of people. Presently, each one is concerned only with dealing with himself. One closes oneself in one's shell to the difficulties of others. Many political leaders then draw the conclusion that what is important is what happens in the domestic space, as if it were possible to stop the problems at the doorstep of the nation, with the lowering of a border barrier. From there to the crisis of the multilateral system is a dwarf's step, made easier the more timid or confused those at the head of the international institutions are.

The competition between the superpowers worries me. I see the United States and China taking a dangerous route. The pandemic has accelerated the conflict, particularly on the American side. New tensions and constant accusations against the opponent could lead to a false step, which would have profoundly serious consequences for all of us. Meanwhile, both sides are seeking to increase the number of their supporters in the international arena. Allies is not the exact word. What each of them wants is to create a circle of vassal states, which follow the political line defined in Washington or Beijing and limit the access given to the other side. This is the growing trend in the American relationship with Europe. They are succeeding with Boris Johnson, who has just made a political U-turn regarding Huawei. And they are continuing to press other European governments in the same direction and on several other issues as well. The only strategic response, however, is to maintain a certain distance between the two opposing parties by strengthening European sovereignty. The pandemic has taught us the term social distance'. Europe now needs to learn the practice of political distance.