Responding to a critique of my BRICS Summit text

My text about the BRICS Summit, available in this blog, was written the day before the meeting in New Delhi.

A preview is not a verdict smuggled in before the evidence. It is a thesis offered for the meeting to test. New Delhi was the test. 

The meeting happened. The record is public. It does not do the work you want it to do.Start with what you treat as refutation. Iran and the UAE held their highest-level contact since the war began. That is true, and it is not trivial. It is also not BRICS acting as a strategic unit. It is two members, sitting on opposite sides of a shooting war, using the host’s rooms to talk.

The same two members had already blocked a foreign ministers’ text in May.

The leaders’ declaration exists because Indian diplomats spent days sanding the language until nobody had to name the United States, Israel, Iran, or the strikes on Gulf territory. “Maximum restraint” and “deep concern,” with national positions recalled in a subordinate clause, is not the cure for tactical paralysis. It is paralysis transcribed into 140 paragraphs. Consensus by omission is still consensus. It is not capacity.

The same holds for the other bilaterals. Modi and Xi discussed border stability. Modi and Putin set a $100 billion trade target for 2030. Those meetings matter. They would have mattered in a hotel corridor without a BRICS logo on the backdrop. 

Present trade is in the region of $65 billion, and the Indian side has been explicit that most of that is Russian oil. A target weighted toward energy shipments is a bilateral energy relationship, not a new payments order. 

When the institution’s value is the corridor, the plenary is the spectacle.

You then enlarge the declaration into a programme. It covers tariffs, coercive measures, the Middle East, terrorism, AI, quantum, digital public infrastructure, a grain exchange, local-currency settlement, NDB lending in local currency, a startup fund under consideration. Listing topics is not the same as moving them. The approved text does not name Ukraine. It does not name the United States on tariffs. It condemns unilateral coercive measures in the abstract and then goes home. 

Whether any of the technical work proceeds is, as you say, a fair question. Calling a document that cannot mention the two largest wars involving its members a strategic coming of age is not.

On payments you accuse me of scoring a test nobody sat. Fine: nobody in New Delhi tabled the yuan as a global reserve currency. India and Brazil would not wear it, for the capital-control reason everyone in the room understands. The live project is interoperability — UPI, Pix, the digital renminbi — plus settlement in national currencies. That work is real, slow, and worth doing. It is also not what the political advertising of this grouping has been for years. The public claim has been an alternative to dollar dominance.

Measuring the summit against the claim its members make when they speak to their own audiences is not a trick. It is taking them at their word.The AIIB point is narrower, and here you land a hit. The bank has a shareholder list that includes Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Australia. London joined as a founder against Washington’s advice. That institution is not a BRICS vehicle, and folding it into the New Delhi story as if it were was a category error. I should not have done it. The error does not rescue the rest of the architecture argument. It simply means the AIIB should be debated as a China-led multilateral with Western capital in it, which is a different and more interesting fight than the one you want.

The NDB is the opposite of a gotcha. The bank halted new business in Russia because American secondary sanctions made the alternative too expensive to operate. You present this as proof that the institution is not Beijing’s political instrument. I presented it as proof that the instrument cannot do the job advertised for it: shelter a founding member from the system it was created to dilute. Both sentences can be true. Only one of them answers the question my column asked. If the “parallel” bank does what Washington requires when the choice is real, the parallelism is conditional. Fragility is the right word for that. Loyalty to Beijing is a separate accusation, and not the one that matters here.

Then the frame. Yes, the criticism of Bretton Woods is legitimate. Quota review has been stuck for a decade. The Fund’s leadership conventions are a Wester relic. An American blocking minority over major IMF decisions is a political fact. None of that converts every communiqué in New Delhi into a working substitute. You set up a closed circuit: reform is vetoed, therefore the alternative must be treated as architecture, and if the alternative is called thin, the critic has left the victims of the veto with “patience.” That is not an argument. It is a demand that disappointment with the IMF be honoured by inflating BRICS. 

States in that position have ordinary options: coalition-building inside the Fund, bilateral swap lines, payment links, commodity trade in local currency. They are already doing some of them. They do not become a new order by being stapled to a 45-page text that cannot say “Ukraine.”

As for the adjectives: they are judgments. The declaration’s silence on a war fought by a founding member is not “abyssal” because a columnist likes the word. It is the measurable gap between the group’s census — eleven members, a large share of population and output — and its ability to describe the world it inhabits. If that register reminds you of agitprop, the remedy is a counter-list: a named loan book that replaced sanctioned finance at scale, a settlement system that cleared Russian or Iranian trade without dollar reach, a Middle East paragraph that could survive contact with the members who were shooting at each other.

You have the talks, the target, and the text. Produce the rest.

Xi skipping the General Assembly is a minor exhibit and I will not lean on it. Leaders skip that General Assembly week. But Xi is a keyn speaker for multilateralism. He should be in New York to show its attachment to the top multilateral organisation. 

You might think that atttendance is a weak test of multilateral sincerity. The stronger test is whether a grouping built to contest the existing order can, when it meets, name the conflicts that divide it and fund the alternatives it announces. 

New Delhi named almost nothing and funded nothing new. That is not a prediction written in the future tense. It is in the minutes.

The BRICS New Delhi Summit

 A Dysfunctional Coalition in the Shadow of Beijing: The BRICS+

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 11 Sept 2026, 02:34

The BRICS+ Summit, taking place in New Delhi on the 12th and 13th of September, will essentially be yet another spectacle of geopolitical illusions. The grouping, which began as a platform of financial convenience initiated by Vladimir Putin (with its inaugural summit in 2009), has been successively instrumentalised. Initially, it served Russia as a means to project power and circumvent its isolation; today, it is additionally the principal vehicle for China's hegemonic ambition in the so-called Global South.

Moscow originally viewed the BRICS as a further instrument to force the narrative of a multipolar world in which Russia would maintain the status of an indispensable superpower. Particularly following the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, the bloc was envisaged as a diplomatic shield and a financial alternative capable of neutralising Western sanctions. However, harsh economic reality and prolonged isolation have dictated new rules: the Russia of today, increasingly reliant on the export of hydrocarbons at discounted prices to Asia and the importation of critical technology, has been reduced to the status of a subaltern partner to Beijing's colossal economic machine.

It is China that now wields the baton and sets the strategic compass of the grouping. Xi Jinping has grasped that, to challenge the Euro-Atlantic order consolidated since 1945, Chinese economic and military might was insufficient; it was imperative to constitute and lead a coalition that would serve as a counterbalance to the Western bloc.

The 2024 expansion, with the entry of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, along with the integration of Indonesia in 2025, aimed to serve this ambition. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain. From the outset, the desire to promote the yuan as a reserve currency, replacing the US dollar, is hindered by a structural contradiction: Beijing refuses to relinquish its stringent capital controls. So long as these controls remain in place, the yuan will struggle to become a credible global reserve currency.

The bloc's discourse regarding the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, however, rests upon criticisms that ought not to be dismissed. For decades, the IMF and the World Bank have been legitimate targets of contestation: the quota review, ratified only in 2016, left China and India under-represented relative to their share of global GDP. The United States preserves a de facto veto over structural decisions, and Europe maintains a monopoly over the leadership of the IMF, reflecting an overarching governance still tethered to the geopolitics of 1944.

Although this Western inertia presents the BRICS+ with a genuine and unifying rallying cry, there is an abyssal difference between reforming multilateral institutions and constructing parallel architectures. China has unequivocally opted for the latter course. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) did not merely emerge to rectify systemic deficiencies for the sake of global equity. They were also conceived to allow Beijing to finance strategic projects, more or less aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative. These are political projects, not merely developmental ones. By failing to incorporate robust requirements for transparency, debt sustainability, and good governance, they frequently serve to establish a supremacy built upon fragile foundations.

The enlargement of the BRICS has exponentially increased its demographic weight, yet it has fatally diluted its cohesion. By housing democracies and autocracies under the same roof, alongside economies highly integrated into global markets and regimes asphyxiated by sanctions, the group has become chronically dysfunctional.

An organisation that attempts to harmonise the interests of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, or that harbours the border, technological, and military rivalry between India and China, is condemned to tactical paralysis. The NDB itself illustrates this fragility: with subscribed capital insufficient for the colossal needs of the Global South, the bank found itself compelled to suspend its operations in Russia, faced with the threat of American secondary sanctions.

In this landscape of precarious balances, Narendra Modi, the summit's host, will focus on immediate pragmatism, ensuring that India is not dragged into an anti-Western crusade. Modi will restrict the agenda to the realm of the possible: fostering intra-bloc trade (which continues to be eclipsed by these countries' exchanges with the G7); developing interoperable cross-border payment systems outside the SWIFT network; cooperating in the digital and Artificial Intelligence sectors; and promoting bilateral trade in local currencies (yuan, rupees, reais, roubles), albeit always with the underlying concern of averting the replacement of a dependence on the dollar with a new submission to the yuan.

India and Brazil draw the principal dividing line within the bloc here: both advocate for a reform of multilateral systems, but neither supports the radicalisation of the BRICS+. For India, the grouping is merely one of several options for its strategic autonomy. Modi plays simultaneously with Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo within the framework of the QUAD, well aware that the true threat to Indian sovereignty and territorial integrity emanates from across the Himalayan borders and from the naval hegemony of its neighbouring Asian superpower, rather than from Washington.

The final image that the New Delhi Summit will endeavour to project will be one of unity and cooperation. However, the true metric of global geopolitical priorities will reveal itself the following week, during the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Xi Jinping, who at the BRICS will mount his customary ideological defence of inclusive multilateralism, does not plan to travel to the United Nations headquarters to participate in the General Assembly. Instead, on the 24th, a stone's throw from New York, he has scheduled a bilateral meeting at the White House with Donald Trump. The choice exposes the chasm between Chinese rhetoric and its practical interests: political narratives may marshal followers, but the grand decisions concerning the world order continue to be negotiated, above all else, in the bilateral arena of the superpowers.

Ainda sobre os BRICS

O artigo **"Os BRICS ainda têm pés de barro"**, de **Victor Ângelo**, publicado no Diário de Notícias de 11 de Julho de 2025, oferece uma análise crítica e reflexiva sobre a atual relevância geopolítica do bloco dos BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China, África do Sul), destacando tanto as suas ambições quanto as suas fragilidades estruturais. A seguir, apresento uma síntese e análise do texto, seguida de comentários sobre seus principais argumentos.

### **Síntese do Artigo**

Victor Ângelo parte da mais recente cimeira dos BRICS no Rio de Janeiro para refletir sobre as transformações no sistema internacional. Ele identifica dois momentos-chave da descolonização:

1. **A primeira descolonização**, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, que levou à independência de muitas nações asiáticas e africanas e ao crescimento da ONU — de 51 membros em 1945 para 144 em 1975.

2. **A "segunda descolonização"**, um processo contemporâneo de desconexão política e econômica entre os países desenvolvidos (especialmente EUA e Europa) e o que ele chama de "antigas colônias", impulsionado por uma nova busca por autonomia geopolítica.

Nesse contexto, a China, sob a liderança de Xi Jinping, emerge como um ator central. Em 2013, lança a **Iniciativa do Cinturão e da Rota (BRI)**, um projeto de infraestrutura global que visa ampliar sua influência econômica e militar. No entanto, faltava à China uma dimensão política multilateral — algo que os **BRICS** poderiam oferecer.

O bloco, inicialmente concebido na década de 2000 como contraponto ao G7, ganhou novo impulso com o envolvimento estratégico da China. Os BRICS passaram a ser vistos como um possível **alternativa ao sistema ocidental dominado pelos EUA**, com potencial para criar uma nova arquitetura internacional baseada em cooperação digital, exploração espacial, novas moedas e comércio sem o dólar.

Contudo, o autor argumenta que os BRICS têm **"pés de barro"** — ou seja, apesar das ambições, sofrem de fragilidades profundas:

- Falta de **imparcialidade política**, evidenciada pela incapacidade de condenar a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia.

- **Rivalidades internas**, especialmente entre Índia e China, e entre Brasil e China (no que diz respeito a aspirações de assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU).

- Ausência de compromisso com **direitos humanos** e **regras do direito internacional** entre seus membros.

- Caráter de **aliança de conveniência**, não de integração ideológica ou estratégica.

O resultado, segundo Ângelo, é um bloco que pode contribuir para o **equilíbrio do sistema internacional**, mas que corre o risco de se tornar **problemático** se suas contradições internas não forem reconhecidas.

### **Análise dos Principais Argumentos**

#### 1. **A "segunda descolonização"**

A ideia de uma segunda descolonização é provocadora e útil. Ela vai além da independência formal e toca na **busca por autonomia estratégica**, especialmente em áreas como:

- Moedas próprias (desdolarização)

- Bancos de desenvolvimento alternativos (como o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento dos BRICS)

- Redes de comércio e tecnologia fora do controle ocidental

Essa leitura captura bem o desejo de países do Sul Global de **reconfigurar o poder global**, não apenas em termos econômicos, mas simbólicos.

#### 2. **O papel central da China**

Xi Jinping é apresentado como o estrategista que viu nos BRICS uma oportunidade de **legitimar globalmente a China** como potência alternativa. A BRI e os BRICS são dois braços complementares: um econômico-infrastructurel, outro político-diplomático.

No entanto, o autor lembra que o projeto chinês também serve a **interesses internos**: fortalecer o nacionalismo, garantir prosperidade e consolidar o poder do Partido Comunista.

#### 3. **Fragilidades dos BRICS**

O ponto mais forte do artigo é a crítica à **falta de coesão e legitimidade moral** do bloco:

- A **omissão sobre a Ucrânia** mostra que os BRICS não conseguem agir como mediadores neutros — exatamente como o Conselho de Segurança da ONU, paralisado por interesses de potências.

- As **rivalidades bilaterais**, como entre Índia e China (com conflitos de fronteira e competição regional), minam a unidade.

- O Brasil e a Índia veem os BRICS como **moeda de troca** para ganhar assento no Conselho de Segurança da ONU — mas a China tem interesse em **bloquear isso**, para não ter que ceder espaço à Índia.

Isso revela que os BRICS são, acima de tudo, um **espaço de negociação de interesses nacionais**, não uma comunidade de valores.

#### 4. **Questões éticas e de governança**

O autor não poupa críticas ao perfil autoritário de vários membros do bloco:

- China: repressão em Xinjiang, Hong Kong

- Rússia: guerra na Ucrânia, regime de Putin

- Índia: deriva nacionalista de Modi

- Brasil: Bolsonaro (no passado), mas também desafios democráticos.

Essa falta de compromisso com **democracia e direitos humanos** enfraquece a pretensão dos BRICS de oferecer uma "nova ordem" mais justa.

### **Conclusão: BRICS — promessa e limites**

Victor Ângelo conclui com uma visão realista: os BRICS **podem contribuir para um mundo multipolar**, mas não são uma alternativa sólida ou coesa ao sistema ocidental. São uma **aliança frágil**, baseada em interesses convergentes momentâneos, mas minada por rivalidades profundas e ausência de princípios comuns.

A metáfora dos **"pés de barro"** é precisa: o bloco pode parecer forte à superfície, mas repousa sobre fundamentos instáveis.

### **Reflexão Final**

O artigo é um convite à **humildade estratégica**. Enquanto o Ocidente enfrenta desgaste de hegemonia, o Sul Global busca novos caminhos — mas não há garantia de que esses novos arranjos sejam mais justos, democráticos ou estáveis. A verdadeira transformação do sistema internacional exigirá mais do que cooperação interestatal: exigirá **compromisso com regras, transparência e valores universais**.

Os BRICS podem ser parte desse futuro — mas, por enquanto, ainda estão longe de ser seu alicerce.

**Em uma frase**:  

*Os BRICS refletem o desejo de um mundo multipolar, mas sua falta de coesão, imparcialidade e valores comuns mostra que ainda têm muito chão a percorrer antes de se tornarem uma verdadeira alternativa global.*

Are we getting closer to a big war?

The world smells dangerously like gunpowder 

Victor Angelo

The Munich Security Conference, an annual event now celebrating its 60th edition, begins today and runs until Sunday. As has become customary, it is a high-level meeting. This time, it will feature the participation of around 50 Heads of State and Government, another hundred ministers and a good number of leaders of international organizations, academics, thinkers and journalists of international importance.

The report that serves as the basis for this year's conference makes a diagnosis of the main ongoing conflicts and, in summary, suggests two conclusions. First, geopolitical competition continues to worsen, now reaching a level of intensity and complexity unprecedented since the creation of the United Nations. Second, the reestablishment of international cooperation must be seen as an absolute priority. Only in this way will it be possible to resolve the most dangerous challenges, which in reality know no borders and have an impact that cannot be ignored. It is a positive recommendation, in a report that is, in essence, pessimistic.

When reflecting on 2024, the rapporteurs particularly draw attention to the growing risks in four regions of the globe. We are told that the international scene has more fires than firefighters, that there is an accumulation of serious crises to be resolved and an international system that is no longer respected. It's a clear question: instead of all of us winning, would we all rather lose?

One of these regions is Eastern Europe. The geopolitical vision that prevails in the Kremlin is a threat that must be taken seriously. It consists of increasing arrogance and aggressiveness, based on ancient practices of first inventing conflicts with neighbors seen as rivals, and then trying to resolve them with swordplay. My reading of this region is familiar: either Russia withdraws and recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine, or what is now happening in that country will end up spreading to others in the region. A crisis of this kind would bring immense problems to the unity of NATO and the major countries of the Western world. In democratic contexts, these alliances are more fragile than they might seem.

In the Middle East, that's a powder keg. It is a region of great fractures, where xenophobia and the absurdity of decisions taken in the 20th century are added to cultural and religious hatred, and a multiplicity of borders that do not respect historical identities and give way to nations without homogeneity and without resources, to in addition to oil and gas.

What is conventionally called the Indo-Pacific is another problematic area. It demands increasing attention, as it could be the theater of a major conflict surrounding the issue of Taiwan and beyond. Xi Jinping has just been reappointed for the third time as leader of the single party and as President of China, for new five-year terms. At the end of these terms, he will be 74 years old and no one knows if the conditions will exist for him to be re-elected again. Now, in my opinion, Xi wants to go down in history as the leader who managed to subdue the Taiwanese rebellion. If that is indeed his ultimate ambition, it is very likely that military action against Taiwan will take place before 2027. And if Trump is in the White House, distracted by pursuing his internal adversaries, starting with the Biden family, Xi could conclude that The time has come to step forward and inscribe your name at the top of the list of heroes of communist China.

The Sahel forms the fourth region of deep insecurity. At the moment, the list of absolutely unsafe countries includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It must also include Sudan, which is plunged into a merciless civil war and a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions. But Sudan has been excluded from media headlines in an unacceptable way. The crises in the Sahel have all the conditions to spread, as is already happening on a large scale in Nigeria and now in Senegal, due to the political confusion created by the president. In the same Senegal that had always been considered an example of stability and democracy.

Three other major themes are also discussed in this year's report: the growing disparities and economic rivalries between different blocs around the world, including with regard to what could happen with the development of the BRICS; the consequences of climate change on international relations, including migration; and the impact of the technological and digital revolution.

The report describes a world evolving in a worrying direction. And it would be even worse if the spectre that roams the corridors of Munich, silently, were re-elected in November, as no one likes to talk about evil spirits. But November is still a long way away and until then anything can happen.

A.I: translation of my opinion text published on 16 February 2024 in the Lisbon daily newspaper Diário de Notícias. 

New Year: Get Russia out of Ukraine without further delay

Diário de Notícias, Lisboa, 12 Jan 2024

My opinion piece of 12 Jan 2024: translation to English made by AI

New Year: Get Russia out of Ukraine without further delay

Victor Angelo

Vladimir Putin started the year with violence: he launched day and night without stopping a large number of missiles and drones over multiple Ukrainian locations. Contrary to what some analysts claim, he thus implied that he is in a hurry to force Ukraine's surrender. And he reminded us that dictators don't respect red lines. Believing that you can negotiate with despots is an expensive illusion.

Russia presides over the BRICS group this year. You will want to show that you are capable of successfully leading and expanding an organization that you consider to be a possible alternative to the current world order. As part of the Russian presidency, a series of international meetings are planned, which should culminate in a summit in October, in the emblematic city of Kazan. To be able to attract those who are hesitant, Russia must appear as a victorious, powerful, but peaceful country, after having re-established dominance over territories to which it claims rights in the light of an imperialist past. In other words, after robbing Ukraine of sovereignty over the four eastern provinces and keeping Crimea, usurped in 2014. To international law and treaties, Putin contrasts an archaic and absurd historical narrative, to try to justify hostility, aggression and border wars against neighbouring countries.

At the beginning of the year, five new countries joined the BRICS: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran. The group now has 10 members, most of whom have a dubious democratic reputation. Putin would like to reach the end of his year of presidency with at least twice as many countries as members of the BRICS. He mentioned a few days ago that there are around 30 countries interested in joining. I consider this statement to be little more than mere propaganda. It reveals, however, the intention to fracture the international community and destroy the norms of cooperation that have been built, within the framework of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, since 1945.

It is not up to democratic Europe or other allied states to intervene in the accession, policies and practices of the BRICS, if all this occurs in accordance with international standards. For example, if Brazil feels that it is better supported in an alliance with Russia or Iran, rather than in a close relationship with the G7, the choice is yours. It cannot, however, at the same time expect preferential treatment from countries in the G7 or EU orbit. Not even from the CPLP, which should not offer sun on the threshing floor and rain on the eaves, if one day it is to be led with the necessary courage.

But the fundamental issue, at the beginning of the year, is different: Russia must leave Ukraine, without further delay, and respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This should be the number one concern of the EU and its allies.

The most recent evidence appears to show that both parties in the US are close to an understanding on this matter and ready to renew assistance to Ukraine. The EU is missing. Europe's leaders talk a lot and well, but they don't act as expected. It is a conversational leadership, fuelled by fear of Russia. The Member State that has helped the most and counts the most – Germany – is afraid of taking the necessary decision that would significantly modify the existing scenario: the supply of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. This is equipment that will make it possible to strike the Russian invader with weight and depth, and isolate Crimea from the rest of Russia. When I decided to write this text, I thought I would highlight the indecision shown so far by Olaf Scholz. Meanwhile, the chancellor this week made an exhortation to other European partners and a declaration of agreement with the EU's 50 billion aid plan for Ukraine, which is expected to be approved at the European Summit on February 1.

In a Europe without clear leadership, Scholz's words are encouraging. But they know little and late. There is urgency. It is necessary to advance with the Taurus, with more ammunition, with new anti-aircraft defence systems, with combat drones and an air defence force based on the F16. And accompany all this aid with new political decisions, which once and for all accentuate the financial and diplomatic isolation of the Putin regime. Constantly explaining to European citizens what Ukrainian heroism has been, the advances in the Black Sea, in the ports of Crimea, in the attacks on the Russian naval fleet and in terms of defence in the face of brutality.

I also thought about criticizing the leaders of France, Italy and Spain: they are major economies that have been minor players when compared to Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Baltics, not forgetting the United Kingdom. But we'll see how they behave in the near future, faced with Scholz's challenge. Whether or not they realize that it also depends on them to prevent Putin from continuing to be a threat to stability and peace in Europe.

G20: is it a better forum?

The G20 as a model for tomorrow's Security Council

Victor Ângelo

 

Today I am not writing about Ukraine, although I recognise that it is fundamental to keep the subject at the top of the public communication agenda. That is, by the way, one of the great risks of this crisis: the Putinists, their neo-Stalinist and neo-fascist relatives, not to mention the useful idiots who spout off in the media and cackle from their perches, would like to see the Russian invasion disappear from the headlines. In this day and age, what comes off the front page is easily ignored. These people think it is convenient to forget the aggression decided by Vladimir Putin, which, moreover, has nothing geopolitical about it - if it did, the autocrat would have a different position on the candidacies of Finland and Sweden for NATO membership, not to mention the Baltics. It is now clear that Putin is dreaming up the old wives' tale of the historical destiny of Mother Russia.

I will not discuss the subject of NATO this time either. That will be the subject of future chronicles. Even knowing what has been written around, including a full-page article in a well-known weekly newspaper - a flood that shows at least two flaws: that the author does not know how the NATO budget is constructed; and that he gives an importance to the Secretary-General of the organisation that he does not have. Jens Stoltenberg is a skilful facilitator, well presented, prudent with his words, a balancer who makes a virtue of his weak oratory skills. But the power does not belong to him. It resides in some member states, starting with the USA, but not only there. Take countries like Poland and Latvia, for example, and not forgetting the example of Turkey. To claim, without hesitation, that Stoltenberg is the boss of Europe, or the West, is the idle talk of someone who says a lot about something he knows little or nothing about.  

Someone suggested I write about the recent BRICS summit in Beijing on 23 June, this being the year of the Chinese presidency. It was clear that China is seeking to transform the BRICS into a political and economic bloc capable of being an alternative to the G7. And for this, it is trying to introduce a new format, which would include, besides Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, other emerging countries, Argentina in Latin America, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal in Africa, and others, such as Thailand, Indonesia or even Kazakhstan. Here I would make two observations, after recognising the economic dynamism of China and the relative weight of the other members in the world economy. First, the BRICS, like the G7, speak of cooperation and multilateralism, but in reality constitute blocs inspired by rivalry and hegemony. Second, if I had to choose between the democracy and human security practised in the BRICS or in the G7, I would certainly prefer the Japanese model, for example, to that of neighbouring China. The values of freedoms and human rights are fundamental criteria.

Indeed, my purpose is to underline the potential that exists at G20 level. This is the only organisation outside the United Nations system that can bring together the powerful North and South. It should therefore be seen as a good bet for international political and economic collaboration. And today it is essential to talk again about cooperation and complementarity, given the challenges we all face. Leaders must get out of merely antagonistic speeches.

The G20 foreign ministers have been meeting since yesterday in Bali, Indonesia. Despite the tense atmosphere, none have missed the call, not even Antony Blinken and Sergei Lavrov. No bilateral discussions are expected between the two. The hostility between Russia and the US is too great, unfortunately leaving no room for a meeting at that level. But Blinken met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and was positive. He showed that the G20 offers opportunities, that it is a platform that should be maintained and strengthened. Its composition prefigures to some extent what would be a modern version of the UN Security Council.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 8 July 2022)

 

 

 

BRICS and the cyber disputes

As the BRICS summit comes to an end, one could see that “internet governance” was a major issue very much present in the informal discussions. 

Russia is particularly concerned by the fact that the Domain Name System (DNS) is entirely managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN. This Corporation is a US-based entity and it therefore follows the North-American legal rules. For Vladimir Putin this is seen as a strategic risk. 

He was very much counting on India´s support to gradually create an alternative system, but Prime Minister Modi is not ready for a move that would jeopardise his relations with Washington. India wants to be a key player in the world´s digital economy but in very clear terms: India sees itself as a service centre for customers all over the planet. And they know that the US can become the most important market for the Indian expertise.

The BRICS summit

Today´s BRICS summit has more or less escaped the attention of the mainstream media. It is true that a meeting in Ufa, a far-flung city in the middle of vast Russian steppe, is not easy to cover. But it is also true that Greece and the Chinese stock exchange crisis are taking a lot of headline space. And they are much easier for international reporters to access.

Within the BRICS, the trend is for a deepening of the economic cooperation between the three big ones: China, India and Russia. These countries, contrary to Brazil and South Africa, can take advantage of their geographic proximity. Their political relations are also rather friendly and that adds leverage to their economic exchanges.

Besides that, one should recognise that every one of these five countries have the same concern: they want to get a stronger voice in international affairs. And that´s the cement that brings them together. 

Dilma in Africa

Dilma Roussef, the President of Brazil, is back in Africa, to attend the AU Summit. This is her third visit to the Continent this year.

Brazil, which is ranked the seventh economy in the world, has understood that a stronger footing in Africa is good for its long term interests. More and more Brazilian corporations are looking for new investment opportunities in Africa, particularly in minerals and other natural resources. In many ways, Brazil sees itself competing with fellow BRICS countries –China and South Africa –, which are also deeply keen to expand their economic ties with many African states.

During her current visit, Dilma announced that Brazil will cancel or restructure almost $900m worth of debt with Africa. This is a wise decision, with a wide political impact, and little financial costs for an economy as big as the Brazilian. It serves her country’s interests well and helps the 12 African countries concerned.