Russia and Ukraine: War or Diplomacy?

 

G7 and Ukraine: More War or Investing in Diplomacy?

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 19 Jun 2026

The 2026 G7 summit in Évian once again placed Ukraine at the centre of the agenda. And it followed, essentially, a line already known since 2022: the reaffirmation of support for Kyiv, the condemnation of the Russian Federation, and promises of more weaponry. But this time, the final declaration sounded more like a ritual than a strategy. It was reduced to vague phrases. Behind the façade of cohesion, sanctions, and military commitments, the central question remained unanswered: how to transform support for Ukraine into a strategy that leads to the end of the brutal Russian aggression?

The leaders present praised Ukrainian resilience and promised to bolster arms production, vital for Ukraine's defence, especially air defence. However, the absence of a serious commitment to diplomacy was glaring. A clear statement was missing: peace is not merely a strategic necessity. Diplomacy is the only way out to prevent the situation from worsening and to revive hope in International Law and multilateral mechanisms.

Continuing the conflict indefinitely benefits no one. It drains resources that should be allocated to other urgent challenges and entails tragic human costs, alongside growing material expenditures that are increasingly difficult to mobilize.

The Toll on Nations

• For Ukraine: It is, above all, a threat to the very survival of the State. Each additional day of aggression means a further shattered economy, newly destroyed civilian infrastructure, and less tax revenue to sustain basic services—not to mention the most intolerable cost of all: the continuous loss of human lives. The longer the war drags on, the more difficult the rebuilding of the country becomes.

• For Russia: The continuation of its mistake exacerbates the erosion of its economy and society. The flight of skilled professionals and capital, technological shortages, and the rest, are all hidden behind a "war economy" whose logic is imperialist in nature. Ultimately, it is about ensuring the regime's survival, not the country's security. Industries and services linked to the war and the militarization of the economy have become the engines of GDP and employment. And Russian human losses are incalculable.

• For Europe: The cost is not abstract. The conflict has exposed our external dependencies regarding energy, cybernetics, security, and defence. And it is causing increasing budgetary pressure. Financing our sovereignty and supporting Ukraine's legitimate defence does not come cheap. Extraordinary funds must be found, competing with other priorities, while instability and inflation fuel a growing political fatigue. It is this fatigue that threatens to test the Western bloc's cohesion in the coming years—especially if public opinion begins to ask, quite rightly, what the plans and the timetable are.

The Risk of Escalation

There is yet another cost that rarely enters this accounting: the risk of an uncontrollable escalation. The longer the war drags on, the greater the likelihood of an isolated incident—a disproportionate response—dragging other actors into the conflict. It is precisely this risk that has been exposed in recent days.

While the Évian summit was taking place, a Russian frigate fired warning shots at a British yacht crossing the English Channel. The motive should not be dramatized—the vessel was sailing at a short distance from the frigate, and the shots can be justified as a warning signal to navigation. What matters is the symbolic significance. The incident with the frigate, which is navigating those waters in a back-and-forth manoeuvre intended to provide military protection to the phantom tankers seeking to bypass sanctions, highlights that the Russian frontline can easily expand to Western Europe.

Beyond the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Arctic, the English Channel has become one of the most sensitive points of strategic friction between the West and Russia. It is the most congested maritime highway on the planet, where any Russian military manoeuvre inevitably intersects with civilian traffic. It now receives coordinated attention from the British and French navies, as well as NATO's naval deployments—but a miscalculation carries a high level of probability. In recent months, alongside NATO, the British and French navies have escalated their alert levels in the Channel in the face of Moscow's provocations: espionage by the Yantar ship in November, submarines in April, and the interception of vessels from the Russian phantom tanker fleet.

The Crossroads

Doubt remains as to whether the summit recognized that the Russian war in Ukraine has reached a crossroads: either it gives way to a negotiation process or it enters a spiral, a self-sustaining cycle where each side interprets the other's actions as a justification to escalate its own response.

Defending peace cannot mean Ukraine's capitulation, nor accepting a vague armistice that would merely freeze the aggression today until an inevitable new Russian invasion tomorrow. Rather, it demands the political courage to create the conditions for a verifiable ceasefire, with security guarantees, international monitoring mechanisms, and a political process capable of leading to a lasting peace.

This mechanism should function as an antechamber for genuine multilateral mediation. For this to be possible, we must articulate a narrative that has hitherto not existed—the clear guarantee that this is not about deciding Russia's internal destiny, but rather about reaffirming the primacy of International Law as the foundation of relations between States.

I must reiterate that diplomacy remains the only alternative to achieve peace. Therefore, I highlight the memorandum of understanding signed this Wednesday between the United States and Iran. It is a positive example, even bearing in mind that its implementation faces a minefield of obstacles:

• The ambiguous dimension of some points in the memorandum;

• US political instability;

• The interests of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which blatantly profits from the parallel economy created by the sanctions and resists any opening;

• The opposition of regional powers such as Israel, a country that views any concession to Iran as an existential threat.

But the memorandum and the negotiations that ought to follow can be seen as an example by the conflicting parties in Ukraine. Namely, they remind us that time is of the essence: without a concrete plan—a UN mandate, a verification mission, a reconstruction fund, and a timetable for negotiations—we risk perpetuating a conflict that no one can endure indefinitely.

The Bear Meets the Big Brother, the Dragon: Putin and Xi Jinping

 

An Alliance Between Unequal Powers: Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

Op-ed published in Diário de Notícias on 22/05/2026

 

When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet—as happened once again this week—we witness a highly choreographed geopolitical display, rich in symbolism. They speak of a multipolar world and toast to a ‘new era’ and a ‘no limits’ partnership—the celebrated expression coined during their February 2022 meeting, just days before the launch of Russia’s inadmissible war of aggression against Ukraine. The messages they seek to send to the rest of the planet, particularly to Europe, are highly explicit, and they were repeated this week. First, that China and Russia are bound by an unbreakable alliance, indispensable for constructing the new world order they deem necessary. Second, they intend for this order to differ from the one established in recent decades by the Western world, especially since the era of the Reagan-Thatcher tandem and the period following the end of the Cold War. We are clearly facing a Sino-Russian project to reorder international relations in their own fashion.

 

It is, however, a flawed partnership, an unequal relationship—from an economic perspective, for instance. China is undisputedly the centre of gravity and the primary axis of its neighbour’s economy. It now accounts for between 40% and 45% of Russian imports. This is an overwhelming dependency. Conversely, barely more than 4% of China’s foreign trade is conducted with Russia, according to Bloomberg data. This is an insignificant percentage when compared to the volume of trade between China and other economies, be they the US, the EU, or ASEAN. Furthermore, the Chinese currency, the yuan, is the predominant tender in Moscow’s financial market. The yuan has virtually replaced the majority of transactions previously executed in US dollars, with the remainder settled in roubles.

 

Political inequality compounds this economic disparity. This is the most significant dimension of the asymmetry between the two countries. A tacit hierarchy exists that places the Chinese president at the top. One might say that Xi envisions, proposes, and makes things happen. Putin follows when he can, provided he sees that it does not jeopardise his domestic political image, where he still dictates the law.

 

Xi Jinping intends to be the architect of the new international structure, built with calmness, firmness, and time. He plays without unnecessary haste. He is entirely convinced that, before long, his country will be a rival on an equal footing with the US, and that global challenges will place China at the heart of multilateral responses.

 

Vladimir Putin, for his part, mistook pompous parades for military capability. He ended up bogged down in an intensely draining war, which he made the blunder of initiating with utter disregard for international law and with armed forces that recall the highly doubtful legend of Potemkin villages. Putin continues to believe he is a strategic giant, when in reality Ukraine is laying bare his feet of clay. Putin is likewise a stain on Xi Jinping’s international reputation. Xi finds himself forced to defend him in various political arenas, even though he knows this entails reputational costs for his regime, which wishes to be seen as the champion of peace and multilateral cooperation.

 

Xi’s strategic objectives are essentially twofold. On the one hand, to ensure Chinese dominance in the region defined by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On the other, to gain the lead regarding the technologies that are shaping the twenty-first century. Achieving this requires time, and it requires China’s main rival powers to remain distracted by other matters.

 

This is where Putin’s political blunders prove to be of immeasurable value to China. Though it is seldom considered, the endless war in Ukraine keeps a significant portion of the strategic capabilities, military resources, and diplomatic attention of China’s main rivals far removed from potential criticism and measures against Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Every crisis meeting at NATO headquarters or in EU capitals represents a tactical distraction for Washington and creates rifts between Europe and the US. All of this allows President Xi to continue the process of economically and politically subordinating Russia, while modernising the People’s Liberation Army and shielding China’s economy against potential Western sanctions. Putin is thus an excellent political distraction.

 

Xi’s greatest anxiety regarding Russia concerns the martial philosophy that continues to prevail in the Kremlin. When Moscow hinted that it might use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it was Beijing—and not just Washington—that also silently but firmly drew a red line before Putin’s intentions. Xi needs a prolonged and draining conflict that bleeds the West, but he cannot afford to permit or promote an apocalyptic escalation that would destroy the global order upon which China’s rise depends.

 

Consequently, Xi’s support for Russia has strict, albeit undeclared, limits. That is the reality, despite public assertions. China buys Russian oil and gas at a discount, in yuan, and within limits—there was no agreement on the new trans-Siberian pipeline, which deeply disappointed the delegation from Moscow. And it supplies Moscow with ‘dual-use’ goods, including military-applicable items like microchips and drone components. It does so discreetly, but in vast quantities. It denies, however, any accusation of direct lethal military aid. Why? To avoid secondary Western sanctions against its economy, which relies heavily on foreign trade. The ‘architect’ knows that a direct confrontation with the West at this juncture would derail his ambitions and imperil the authority of the Chinese Communist Party.

 

The essential thing is to understand the true nature of the relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and to respond to the serious risks it poses. Note the various agreements signed during this visit—for example, in the fields of atomic energy, space, and AI. These matters do not allow for simplistic analysis. China and Russia do not represent the same type of challenge. Yet, despite the asymmetries, a dangerous strategic convergence exists between both regimes.

Security in Munich 2026: a complex debate

The Munich Security Conference is set to take place from the 13th to the 15th of February. It remains a watershed moment in global political discourse; one need only recall the fractious intervention of the American Vice President, JD Vance, at last year’s gathering to grasp the weight of the meeting.

We find ourselves now in an even more precarious phase. As the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, remarked recently in Davos, we are in a state of "permanent rupture"—an era of "brute reality" where Great Powers wield trade and force as instruments of coercion. He is, in large measure, correct. Indeed, his observation is one I have touched upon in recent writings.

I must reiterate, however, that we cannot permit ourselves to be overcome by pessimism, nor by the irrationality and violence of autocrats. To fold one's arms is no solution. The world is not fated to be ruled by narcissists, dictators, or the deranged. Mahatma Gandhi once reminded us that there have always been tyrants and murderers, and for a time they may seem invincible, but in the end, they always fall—always.

The speeches to be delivered in Munich are currently being drafted. It seems to me, therefore, an opportune moment to share a series of thoughts on themes I consider paramount.

I shall begin by quoting Kofi Annan, with whom I worked for several years: "Our mission is to place the human being at the centre of everything we do. No wall is high enough to keep out global problems, and no country is strong enough to solve them alone." Long before him, Martin Luther King Jr. observed that we are "caught in an inescapable network of mutuality" that ensnares us all.

The messages of both men are plain to understand: either we commit to solidarity between peoples, or our societies and the planet, as we know them, can only draw closer to the abyss.

I observe with concern the apologia for "useful subordination," which some term political realism. This so-called realism, to which the Great Powers seek to subjugate us—and which certain theorists and leaders champion—must be regarded as a perilous anachronism. It is a sort of "survival guide" that, under the guise of accepting force as the defining factor in international relations, proposes the abandonment of universal principles in exchange for an illusory stability. This political vision being sold to us stems from the exhausted and dangerous premise of accepting "spheres of influence." In other words, they draw inspiration from the suzerainties and vassalages of yore, claiming them to be the best means of ensuring peace. There must be those in Munich prepared to dismantle this fallacy.

The true strength of a State does not reside solely in its military arsenal. It rests equally upon its legitimacy and the courage of its people. To invest in an atmosphere of fear is the preferred pursuit of dictators and populists. When we allow them to wield that weapon, we march toward perdition. This is happening even amongst us. A climate of dread is developing in Europe. The paralysis engendered by fear is the true weakness of a nation. It is vital that it be said in Munich: we are ready to overcome this terror, from wherever it may come. Audacity, anchored in values, is the answer.

Ukraine serves as a testament to this. Her people know it well. Ukrainian resistance is an act of moral courage proving that a people of free spirit is invincible, even when confronted by an imperial philosophy that views the world through a nineteenth-century lens. Zelensky’s address in Davos was a plea for reflection, though it was somewhat eclipsed by Carney’s speech. Zelensky openly criticised Europe, describing it as a "fragmented kaleidoscope of small and medium powers"—hesitant, dependent on the United States, and lost in internal squabbles while Russian aggression persists and Putin’s oil flows freely along European coasts. He proposed that this oil be seized and the proceeds used to fund the legitimate defence of Ukraine and, by extension, our continent.

It is true that the financial assistance provided to Ukraine by the EU since the illegal Russian invasion of 2022 already exceeds 193 billion euros—a considerable sum, surpassing even that of the Americans. Zelensky may, perhaps, have gone too far in his rhetoric. He did, however, have the merit of underlining that without fierce determination, financial means (including those necessary to procure arms), imagination, and political steadfastness, it will be impossible to withstand Russia’s unjustifiable violence.

It would be well for Zelensky to deliver a similar speech in Munich, but to replace criticisms with proposals. And democratic Europe must respond by showing it grasps the danger that the intentions of Putin—and others—represent. The hybrid war against Europe is already underway; and while the greatest threat emerges from the East, we must not lose sight of threats arriving from other quarters.

All of this reminds us that national sovereignty is an inalienable right which we have a responsibility to protect. This is enshrined in the world's commitment to the Charter of the United Nations. Munich must underscore this, while simultaneously placing the reform of the United Nations on the agenda. This is among the most urgent priorities on the international stage. Those countries that cherish the rule of law, the equality of rights between all States, and peace, have here a standard around which to rally. And a priority.

Reflecting about the new international rules: business and might

The New International Order: Business and Brute Force

By Victor Ângelo

I have many doubts about the footballing abilities—and others—of President Donald Trump, especially now that he has started the New Year with two own goals.

The first own goal was the intervention in Venezuela. It resulted in the deterioration of his country’s international image and handed points on a silver platter to Russia and China.

The UN Security Council meeting revealed the gravity of the American adventure in Venezuela. The Secretary-General, who out of prudence did not attend the meeting in person, had a statement read out which underlined that Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity had been violated. In that communication, he referred to the US military operation as a “dangerous precedent”, which seemed strange to several governments and analysts, considering that the history of the Latin American region is littered with similar interventions—Harvard University historians have inventoried more than forty extraconstitutional ruptures organised with the support or at the instigation of Washington. The most famous occurred in 1973, when President Salvador Allende of Chile was assassinated thanks to the organisational skills of the CIA.

The great difference between the military intervention of a few days ago and previous ones lies in President Trump’s admission that the current one aimed at the usurpation of the oil resources of the attacked country. Past interferences were presented with another level of subtlety, without direct references to expropriations or looting.

I note an additional point regarding Guterres’ communication. Many at the United Nations compared the statement he made following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with this one now, carried out by the USA. Guterres condemned Russia directly and was himself present at the Security Council meeting for that purpose. He addressed Vladimir Putin unambiguously, in the name of peace and political ethics. In the case of the USA, he used only generic arguments about the international order and the violation of the Charter, without mentioning Trump’s name. Let this be noted, and let it serve as an invitation to reflection.

The first own goal was favourable to the Russian Federation and China. The repeated references in Washington to the theory of spheres of influence made it more difficult to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Someone circulating in the corridors of the Kremlin sent me a provocative message, albeit with some wit and a touch of diplomacy in the style learned from old Soviet manuals. It said they were sure I would condemn, in this week’s chronicle, the unjustified aggression against the Venezuelan power and demand that the European Union impose sanctions against the mastermind of the kidnappings. A Putin's faithful joker. One might say that the Russian leaders feel happy and content with what happened in Venezuela.

As for China, which was in fact the most indirectly targeted country—Washington does not want China to gain a presence in the area of influence that the Americans consider their own—there was a kind of validation of its claims regarding Taiwan. This does not mean that Beijing is thinking of launching a military operation against Taipei in the very near future. China knows that such an offensive, should it happen, would carry high costs. But it has now received an indication from the Trump Administration that it can increase political-military pressure on the island. And use more bellicose language, which is indeed happening this week after a Taiwanese MP proposed an amendment to the “Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, a law adopted by Taipei in 1992. According to the proposal, the statute would be renamed the “Act on Relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China”. The new name and content are seen by Beijing as yet another attempt to separate the two parts and promote Taiwan's independence—something that is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

The second own goal resulted from statements by Trump and those around him, such as Stephen Miller—a hawk who serves as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff—regarding Greenland. Trump is preparing to annex Greenland, which is a territory of the European space through its connection to Denmark. The reason invoked—to create a security barrier against Russia and China—makes no sense. The USA has a military base in Greenland and can count on full Danish cooperation. It should be noted that during the Cold War, the base housed around 10,000 American military personnel. Now, it has around 150. This evolution does not reveal great geopolitical fears on the part of the USA. Not forgetting that there are several treaties between the USA and Denmark that recognise Danish sovereignty regarding Greenland.

Trump has his eyes fixed on the territory’s natural riches, on the maritime corridors that climate change will make navigable the Arctic zone, on the airspace controlled by Greenland—which has enormous strategic value—and on History: he wants to see his name added to the list of presidents who augmented the American territorial area.

He should also think about the impact that the annexation will have on the future of NATO. But for him, NATO serves to buy weaponry from the American industry. And that will continue to happen for many years, whether there is NATO or not. The Europeans are captive customers. The new reality is evident: in our day, business and brute force are triumphing over diplomacy and the international order, thanks to Trump, Putin, and others alike.

Published in Portuguese language in today's edition (09/01/2026) of Diário de Notícias. 

Europe must keep engaged with China

Europe, China, and the US: a turbulent triangle

Victor Ângelo

 

European policy towards China requires a smart balance between respect for democratic values and economic interests. It is a complex issue that touches the daily lives of European citizens. You only have to look at the map of rail connections - 5,000 freight train journeys are expected in 2021 - or at the sea charts showing the routes of cargo ships to understand the interdependence between Europe and China. We need to import what we do not produce - or have stopped producing. The Chinese need our markets to ensure important levels of economic growth, one of the pillars of internal stability and regime continuity.

This interdependence has increased spectacularly since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. It is part of his strategy. And the trend is for it to accentuate in the coming years. In addition to mutual investments and the increasing purchase by Westerners of Chinese stocks and treasury bonds, note that the economic corridor is more and more diverse. Some lines pass through Russian Siberia, others through Kazakhstan. Later, there will be a land link via Iran and Turkey, not forgetting the sea routes, which rely mainly on the ports of France, Italy and the Netherlands. The smooth functioning of this vast transit area requires a permanent political dialogue between the countries, which will have to be based on an understanding of mutual interests and perceptive pragmatism. To facilitate this dialogue and open a wider door, Europe should take the initiative to propose the creation of a consultative platform for the Eurasian corridor. Any disruption of traffic, for political or security reasons, would have a dramatic impact on the economy and people's lives, particularly in the European area. This tangle of relationships stems from the process of globalisation that began more than two decades ago. Anyone who thinks that the way in which the international economy is now organised can be significantly reversed is dreaming politics without having their feet firmly planted in reality.

The disruptions currently occurring here in Europe in the supply chains for raw materials or finished products produced in China and the escalating cost of transporting a container from a Chinese port to a European one already give us a bitter taste of what could happen if there were a serious disruption due to disagreement between the parties or the imposition of ill-considered sanctions. For example, before the pandemic, transporting a 40-foot container by sea from Shanghai to Europe could cost between $2,000 and $4,000. Now it has reached $17,000 and the waiting time can be up to several months. And this is despite the fact that Chinese container production accounts for more than 85% of the world's total. These problems may be temporary, the result of an acceleration of economic recovery in the more developed parts of the world and the pressure they put on shipping. Any European importer who needs made-in-China goods or components to maintain their manufacturing activities will be well able to explain the importance of a trade relationship without unnecessary hindrance. The more informed will also stress the need to avoid a further escalation of tensions in Taiwan and the South China Sea. This also applies to the Chinese side, which should not continue to pursue an escalation of offensive actions in these sensitive areas.

In a deeply interconnected world, one cannot think geopolitically and make strategic decisions following past models or seeing the world as a black and white scenario. The Americans have chosen a path of confrontation. On this side of the Atlantic, that option appears to be a dangerous choice and contrary to our interests. This is why Europe cannot and must not copy Washington.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Our strategic fragility: a key example

Taiwan so close

Victor Ângelo 

Taiwan is part of our everyday life. This is because the company that produces almost all of the chips used in electronics, mobile phones, robots and cars is Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). An omnipresent but discreet colossus, worth twice the GDP of Portugal on the stock exchange. And it is pertinent to write about it this week, when there is so much talk about China.

Since TSMC produces over 90% of the latest generation of microprocessors and is located in Taiwan, it is at the centre of the Sino-American rivalry. This is a major critical point. If there were a conflict over Taiwan tomorrow, the worldwide availability of chips would plummet. This would mean the immediate paralysis of motor vehicle factories, computers, mobile phones, highly sophisticated financial operations, and everything related to the use of micro and nano transistors. In other words, it would be economic and social chaos.

Analysts looking at these things say that TSMC is the invisible shield protecting Taiwan. It may be, to some extent. And TSMC is betting on it: it plans to invest, over the next three years, $100 billion in expanding its scientific and technological capacity. More chips, infinitely tiny and of an extraordinarily more powerful artificial intelligence. The figures give an idea of what is at stake. They also show that national defence policy involves the development of an ultra-modern economy that creates strategic dependencies in other parts of the world. 

It is therefore neither in the interest of Beijing nor of others to destabilise Taiwan. At least not for the next seven to ten years. But this absolute dependence on a single company is also the greatest exponent of the fragility of the major global balances. It is the result of decades of ultraliberalism and the relocation of production, all of which is out of step with what should be geostrategic concerns. The prevailing philosophy led us to believe that commercial interdependence would erase the rivalries between the great blocs of nations. We now know that this is an illusion. The biggest wars of the last 100 years were started by self-centred madmen who did not take into account the economic - nor the human - impact of their decisions. I do not think Xi Jinping falls into that category, despite the words and tone he used yesterday about Taiwan at the Chinese Communist Party's centenary celebration. But it is also true that it would only take a highly sophisticated hacker attack against one section of TSMC to bring thousands of production chains that are dependent on the availability of chips to a halt.

Joe Biden understands that the United States cannot, in this vital area, remain totally dependent on Taiwan and on one company alone. The industrial plan he has just proposed envisages an investment of $50 billion to stimulate domestic chip production. To that will be added many billions from the private sector. The truth is that much of the scientific design work in this field is done by world-renowned American companies - for example, Intel Corp, Nvidia Corp, Qualcomm or Cisco Systems Inc. But separating design from production has led to extreme vulnerability. It is a bit like designing highly effective weapons and asking others to manufacture them and then supply us.

The European Union must follow a similar path. One of the starting points should be to build on what ASML Holding NV already represents. This Dutch company is dominant in the production of the machinery needed to manufacture semiconductors. The ambition is to produce in Europe as early as 2030, in addition to the machines, at least 20% of the new generation of semiconductors. This is a modest target, but it will still require huge investments in Europe's digital industries. The amount currently foreseen - around €150 billion - is insufficient when compared to what TSMC and South Korea's Samsung - the second largest chip producer - have in the pipeline. However, European sovereignty, including its defence, requires a decisive presence in the industries linked to digitalisation. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

The future of Europe requires a thorough debate

Europe and the Coming Turbulence

Victor Ângelo

 

The launch of the Conference on the Future of Europe took place this week in Strasbourg, at the official seat of the European Parliament. The symbolism of Strasbourg is enormous. It represents reconciliation, peace, democracy, and solidarity among Europeans. These four desiderata are still as relevant today as they have been during the last seven decades, a period of continued construction  of the European political edifice. It is therefore important to remind ourselves of that, to recognize where we have come from and to define where we want to go in the next decade.

That is the aim of this initiative, which is due to be completed in March 2022. It would be a mistake to make a cynical assessment of the conference. However subtle it may seem, cynicism is the knife of the bitter and the downbeat. What is called for is a citizen's reflection that combines realism with idealism, that is a critical but constructive view. It is a matter of going beyond the rhetoric or the usual elucubrations.

The conference is a different test, which will allow us to measure the strength of citizenship movements. In fact, the biggest challenge facing the EU is precisely that which stems from the gap of ignorance or indifference between politics and the European institutions on the one hand, and people's daily lives on the other. Even in Brussels, people who live a few blocks away from the European district seem to be as disconnected from the EU as any family living in a small village in Portugal. A political project that is not understood by ordinary mortals is fragile. It can easily be jeopardized by its enemies.

The nine axes for reflection about the future ignore this disconnection. The topics are important: climate change and the environment; health; the economy, employment, and social justice; the EU's role in the world; rights and security; digital transformation; democracy; migration; and education, culture, sport, and youth. But it is a mistake to take citizens' support for the European project for granted. This is a fundamental issue. After an absolutely exceptional year, we find in European societies a lot of frustration, confusion, impatience, and a more pronounced individualism. We also have a set of internal and external enemies ready to exploit vulnerabilities and bring down the EU. That is why the discussion about the path to 2030 must begin with an analysis of weaknesses and threats.

A forward-looking assessment of the coming years shows us that we will be impacted by three major shock waves. The first comes from the accelerating use of cybernetics, in particular artificial intelligence, which will turn many Europeans into digital illiterates and redundant labour. If not properly addressed, it will further exacerbate social inequalities and job insecurity.

The second will result from new waves of uncontrolled immigration and the exploitation of this phenomenon by certain forces. It will not only be Viktor Orbán or Jarosław Kaczyński, or even Sebastian Kurz, who will divide Europe on this issue. The chances of Marine Le Pen gaining power in 2022 or of Italy being ruled by a coalition of ultranationalists in 2023 - in an alliance of Matteo Salvini with neo-fascist leader Georgia Meloni, whose Fratelli d'Italia party already mobilizes 18% of the national electorate - must be reckoned with. A front that brings together such politicians in several member states would cause a potentially fatal fracture for the continuation of Europe.

The third strategic shock - something to be avoided at all costs - could come from a possible armed conflict between the United States and China. Such a confrontation, which can by no means be excluded from the prospective scenarios, would have a devastating effect. European stability and prosperity would go down the drain.

The message, now that the debate has been opened, is that there can be no taboo subjects and no incomplete scenarios that do not consider the internal and external complexity in which we will move. Already, one fact is certain. There are years of great upheaval ahead of us.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

 

Comments on this week's G7 meeting

A Very Combative G7

Victor Ângelo

 

The G7 brings together the largest liberal economies, that is, in descending order of size, the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada. Together they represent about 50% of the world economy. The leadership of the G7 in 2021 falls to the British, who held a meeting of foreign ministers this week in preparation for the summit scheduled for June.

They have gone two years without meeting. The pandemic and the malaise caused by Donald Trump's presidency explain the long hiatus. Now the realities are different. Control of the pandemic seems possible, thanks to vaccination campaigns. And the policies pursued in Washington are no longer unpredictable. Still, it was necessary to decide between a face-to-face meeting or not. After a year of virtual conferences, it was concluded that when it comes to diplomacy, face-to-face contact is by far the most productive. Many of the videoconferences held between politicians during the pandemic turned out to be a mere formal exercise in which each one read the text in front of him  or her, without an exchange of ideas, an analysis of options or a personal commitment. We are now safely back to face-to-face discussions.

Another aspect concerns the list of countries outside the G7 but invited to the meeting. It was limited to South Africa, Australia, South Korea, and India, as well as two supranational organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. The political reading of this choice is easy to make. There is a clear preference here, and not just from the British. The economic and geopolitical focus is on Asia, on strengthening relations with countries that can stand up to competition from China.  Latin America and the Middle East were simply ignored.

China was in fact a dominant concern. The consultations among the ministers started there. The US is pursuing a very complex policy line in relation to China. They seek, in the main, to combine antagonism with cooperation. Hostility in general and agreement, in certain concrete matters, for example in the area of climate change or on Iran. This line will not work. The message received in Beijing from Washington can be summed up in one word - confrontation. And the Chinese will respond to that perception club in equivalent currency.

The Europeans themselves - and this has been shown in the statements made by Germany and France - think that the American position with regard to China is excessive. They agree with Washington when it comes to human rights, Hong Kong or Xinjiang, or the protection of intellectual property. But they believe that Europe has much to gain if the relationship with China is based on respect for established rules and the pursuit of mutual advantages. Japan prefers to follow a policy similar to Europe's, despite pressure from the Biden administration.

Russia was also high on the agenda. The Kremlin is now seen as a threat to the European and American democracies. In this matter, the harmony between the two sides of the Atlantic is clearer. The issue of defending democratic regimes, including the fight against the spread of false or biased information, was a major theme.

The American Secretary of State went to London to propose a new strategic approach. Antony Blinken argues that the group cannot just be a coordination mechanism for the big capitalist economies. It must become a platform for political intervention by the most influential democracies. This is an expression of a belief prevalent in the current American administration that the US has a mission - that of saving the democracies. For some of us here in Europe, such a proposition generates three kinds of uneasiness. One, related to the increasing marginalization of the UN's political role. The other, with the worsening polarization of international relations. The third, with the weight that a phantom named Trump may yet exert in American politics.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Europe: looking ahead

European horizons and balances

Victor Ângelo

 

We live in a time of uncertainty. The pandemic is still at the centre of all worries. The different mutations of the virus and the immensity of the vaccination campaigns show that we are far from the exit of the tunnel. And the economic, social, and psychological impacts are yet to be determined. They will certainly be huge and long term. In Europe, for the time being, we are helping ourselves to the oxygen balloons that the central bank and political expedients are making available. In reality, we are living on reputation and the pledge of the future. Meanwhile, we are lagging when compared to China or the United States. And we will receive a share of the problems of a neighbourhood – to the south and to the east – which was already poor, and which will see its future difficulties increase uncontrollably. None of this is pessimism, just an announced puzzle.

To these challenges are added the geopolitical ones. We find ourselves drawn into disputes that are not necessarily our own. The Anchorage meeting, which brought two high-level delegations – one American and one Chinese – face to face late last week, revealed that the rivalries between these countries have reached an acute stage of antagonism. For the first time, neither one side nor the other sought to disguise the degree of hostility that exists. Journalists were even invited to stay in the room to take note of the mutual accusations that were made from the very beginning. Only then did the delegations move on to the quiet and substance of the bilateral discussions.

Two issues became clear. The Chinese leadership emerged strengthened from the session of the National People's Assembly held earlier this month. It now has a much more assertive mandate, internally and externally. For example, the deputies ratified a motion that opens the possibility of military intervention in Taiwan if the island's authorities take a path that could strengthen the independence thrust. This is an incredibly significant change in language. Even more telling is the new posture toward foreign governments that criticize Beijing. China has decided to advance to the geopolitical duel without a mask and with a tactical marking.

We have entered a risky cycle that could lead to a confrontation between these powers. And the new vision that the United States is proposing for Europe, through the document NATO 2030, puts the Europeans in this conflict. What is on the table, as seen at this week's NATO ministerial meeting, is an expansion of the alliance's theatre of operations in order to legitimize Washington's geopolitical ambitions in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. These regions are far outside the areas that are of direct concern to us. What is more, an extension to the far reaches will certainly weaken European capabilities in the geographies that really matter to us, which are on Europe's immediate borders.

You may retort that China is an economic and cyber threat. But these things are solved through negotiations, through trade measures and countermeasures, through the strengthening and protection of our economies, and through increasing the capacity of our intelligence services to act. In short, they require a more cohesive Europe.

The redefinition of NATO's role is necessary. The horizon we face is quite different from the past. We should, however, ask ourselves what our priority area of defence should actually be. We also need to discuss what is the balance between a Europe looking towards a Euro-Asian future and the history of our Euro-Atlantic engagement. I see two variables here that need to be addressed. One has to do with our long-term relationship with Russia. Vladimir Putin is not eternal. Russia is part of our strategic neighbourhood, our economic complementarities, and our cultural references. The other concerns the EU's defence and security autonomy. It must be permanently reinforced, without, however, jeopardizing our historic commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. Uncertain times demand that we clearly know which balances to maintain, and which path to choose. It is a question of combining courage with vision.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

Comments on the Quad summit

Change course to avoid a collision

Victor Ângelo

 

The first Quad Summit, a new platform for strategic consultations between the United States, Australia, India and Japan, takes place today. Quad is short for quadrilateral. Since 2007, the foreign ministers of these countries have met sporadically to discuss the security of the Indo-Pacific region. This time, the meeting is at the highest level, albeit virtually, with Joe Biden and the prime ministers of the three other states.

The US President and Scott Morrison of Australia are the real instigators of this project. Narendra Modi and Yoshihide Suga were more reticent. They did not want the meeting to look like what it actually is: an avenue to discuss how to curb China's growing influence in the Indian and Pacific regions. So, the official agenda registers only three items - fighting the pandemic; economic cooperation and responding to climate change. This list thus hides the dominant concern, China's increasingly resolute power in both oceans and with the riparian states. China already has the world's largest armed fleet, with battleships, amphibious assault ships, logistics ships, aircraft carriers, polar icebreakers, and submarines. In the last 20 years, its naval capacity has grown threefold. It has more vessels than the United States and its ambition for the current five-year period (2021-2025) focuses on accelerating the production of means of ensuring presence and visibility, increasing missile capacity of distinct types and expanding nuclear weapons.  

The scale of these military investments and President Xi Jinping's very incisive foreign policy alarm many US strategists. It is in this context that the Quad summit should be seen. There are even those who think that, in time, Washington's objective is to create a defence alliance covering the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, in an arrangement that would be inspired by what exists in the North Atlantic, that is, the creation of a NATO of the East.

It will not be easy. India, notwithstanding the many border issues it has with China, does not want to be seen by Beijing as a hostile neighbour. It seeks, despite existing disputes, to maintain a certain diplomatic balance with the Chinese to moderate the latter’s support for Pakistan, which Indian leaders see as their number one enemy. Moreover, New Delhi wants to appear, not only to the Chinese but also to the Russians, as an autonomous defence power. Modi is a nationalist who knows a lot about geopolitics and international power play.

Japan, for distinct reasons, does not wish to enter into an open confrontation with China either. It will seek to continue to benefit from the American military umbrella, but without going beyond a prudent policy towards Beijing. Tokyo is banking more on mutual interests than on rivalry. And as long as Beijing does not try to capture the Japanese islands of Senkaku, long the object of diplomatic dispute between the two countries, Tokyo is unlikely to change its position.

However, the American strategy in this part of Asia is to create a containment front vis-à-vis China. If the Quad initiative does not work, they will turn to Europe, starting with NATO. This is where all this has to do with our security. I do not defend the idea of an alliance stretched to the ends of the earth, no matter how much Europeans see China as an unfair economic competitor or a state that does not follow the values we consider essential - democracy, freedom, and human rights.

The risk of an armed confrontation in that part of the world is growing. Europe's role must be to call for moderation, respect for international norms and effective dialogue between the American and Chinese leaders. The global challenges that the world faces today are already too many and require the building of a cooperation agenda between the great powers. And there, yes, they should be able to count on Europe's commitment.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)