No to realpolitik, yes to principles and the International Law

 

Geopolitical Realism: When Might Prevails Over International Law

By Victor Ângelo

I regret having to repeat myself, but criticising the theory of geopolitical realism (realpolitik) does not constitute an exercise in naive idealism. On the contrary, it is a matter of recalling three fundamental dimensions of the relations between States. First, that peace must be the foundational principle of the international order. Second, that the United Nations Charter — even if it lacks updating regarding representation and the functioning of the Security Council — must be scrupulously respected. Third, that the power of military force cannot, and must not, prevail over the force of International Law. The world is not a boxing ring, nor a gladiatorial arena, where the strongest invariably wins.

The central error of so-called "political realism" lies in reducing the State to the role of the sole actor, ignoring democratic practices. Institutions, citizens' associations, economic agents, the media, and intellectuals are devalued or instrumentalised as mere pawns of power. Oppositions are diminished in their rights, despite being normal alternatives in a democracy. In reality, this alleged realism, which is nothing more than a form of political reductionism, opens the doors to absolute and arbitrary power, even in apparently consolidated democracies.

When leaders view the world solely through the lever of force and military aggression, they live anchored in other times; their mental roots are buried in the past. They place themselves outside the law and call it pragmatism. They ignore — or pretend to ignore — that there is a "before" and an "after" 1945, and that the world has changed radically since the end of the Cold War. When they speak of "negotiations", they are actually referring to the submission of the weak to the will of the strong. In the 19th century, such a practice was termed an "ultimatum". Today, it is presented under the cloak of a dense "geopolitical fog". This lack of visibility allows for a game played without clear rules. Diplomacy is captured to buy time, sow confusion — both among adversaries and domestic public opinion — and prepare, in the shadows, the logistics of war. Can we trust such leaders, today or tomorrow?

The war against Iran reminds us that it is imperative and urgent to insist on international ethics and human rights. When brute force becomes the primary criterion, no one is truly safe — not even the most powerful. If human rights are despised, fear becomes the only acceptable truth and the dominant social rule. George Orwell's "Newspeak" is, disturbingly, beginning to be imposed as a linguistic norm when, in certain European capitals, people speak of unusual characters now appearing at the front of the stage.

What is happening today in the Middle East underscores a constant reality: during and at the end of bad decisions and despotism, there is always a vast number of human beings paying the bill. This reality leads me to contend that the only sovereignty that truly counts is that which is based on the protection of life and human dignity. Everything else belongs to the tragic comedy of power, to absurd megalomaniacal ambitions, and to indifference towards people and the world itself. Are we witnessing the definitive decline of humanist concerns?

It is urgent to bring this theme to the table of the Security Council. Portuguese diplomacy, committed to obtaining a seat on the Council for the 2027-2028 biennium, must adopt this vision as its own banner: the banner of peace, dialogue, and tolerance, with humanity above all else. By doing so, Portugal will align itself with the majority of Member States and with the very essence of the UN. We will not be mere passive spectators of the current nihilism and unilateralism, but an active voice capable of proclaiming that great challenges demand collective and multilateral responses.

Our participation in NATO has an objective of peace and does not prevent the building of bridges with regional organisations in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. At a time when some powers are distancing themselves from the UN, or seeking to subordinate and capture it, Portuguese diplomacy can serve as another pillar — in coordination with other States — in building consensus, defending International Law, and supporting institutions of common interest. For example, the international courts based in The Hague and the bodies of the United Nations system, which are vital for billions of people and for the planet.

In June, the General Assembly will vote on the composition of the Council for the next two years. The Portuguese campaign takes place in a demanding and quite delicate context. Our greatest asset must be the intransigent promotion of peace through the reinforcement of the political role of the UN. This is the message that the world wants — and most needs — to hear with clarity.

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Contextual Post-Script (March 6, 2026)

As I review this translation, the events of this week add a sharp layer of irony to the text's call for "institutional ethics" and its critique of "transactional realism":

• The Merz-Trump Dialogue: Just three days ago, on March 3rd, Chancellor Friedrich Merz met with President Trump at the White House. While Trump pushed his "energy dominance" agenda, Merz was forced to navigate the exact "geopolitical fog" you describe. He specifically cited the war in Iran as a disaster for energy prices, urging a swift conclusion to protect German industry.

• The Rosneft "Carve-out": In a classic example of the "transactionalism" you critique, the US Treasury just yesterday (March 5th) lifted sanctions on Rosneft Deutschland. This was the result of intense lobbying by Merz to ensure Germany could continue refining oil through its state-controlled (but Russian-owned) assets. It confirms your fear: the "ideals" of sanctions are being traded for the "pragmatism" of industrial survival.

• The "Empty Shell" Reality: While the UN General Assembly watches from the sidelines, the "Coalition of the Willing" (led by Merz, Macron, and Starmer) met virtually this week to discuss troop deployments to Ukraine if Trump's peace deal fails. The "rescue mission" you envisioned is being led by heads of state, while the UN remains the "passive spectator" you warned against.

Munich and the future of European Security

 

What image will Europe project at the Munich conference?

By Victor Ângelo

My chronicle of January 30th underscored the importance of this year’s Munich conference, given the new reality of international security twelve months into the Trump Administration. The main message of my text was clear enough: international law must say no to brute force!

Now, with the conference running until Sunday, I believe it is important to reflect on security from a European perspective. In Munich, Europe must know how to demonstrate that it is truly willing to resolve and overcome its geopolitical fragility with concrete actions.

This first year of Donald Trump’s presidency has confirmed what the illegal, unjustified, and large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had already revealed: Europe is economically powerful and culturally and normatively influential, but strategically weak. In matters of security, it has depended fundamentally on the US and its vision of the world. With Trump’s arrival to power, Europe’s vulnerability and dependence on Washington regarding defence have become more evident.

In this context, the presence of Marco Rubio in Munich, heading a vast and influential American delegation, takes on a particular significance. At the 2025 conference, American Vice-President JD Vance made a name for himself by stating, among other shocking remarks, that the American commitment to European security was no longer unconditional. That having been said, Washington’s position may no longer need to be quite so disruptive now. Rubio represents a less coarse America, one that does not antagonise Europe in that manner. He merely considers it a fragmented, disoriented geopolitical actor with little weight—practically insignificant.

His speech will likely stick close to the following points: the responsibility for Europe's security is, above all, a European incumbency; European governments must invest more in defence, as committed at the NATO summit in June 2025; the Americans want more strategic clarity from the European side, which, in the US's understanding, would mean unhesitating alignment with the policies defined by Washington and effective engagement in Trump's initiative within the ineffable Peace Council. Rubio will not forget to mention that the Atlantic Alliance will continue to exist as long as its leadership is, in essence, dictated by US interests. He will also explain the alleged Russian-inspired peace plan that the American president wants to impose on Ukraine, including the unrealistic project of holding presidential elections in a country suffering a war of aggression day and night, an electoral process under the sound of Russian drums and missiles.

In truth, I do not believe Rubio will bring anything new from the West. It is the interventions of European leaders that will need to be listened to attentively.

There, I see increasingly clear and significant disagreements, particularly between France and Germany—divergences reflected in the contrasting visions of Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen.

For years, Macron has insisted on the need for a strategically autonomous Europe, capable of organising its own security while considering probable threats. This position was again reflected in the interview he gave this week to Le Monde and other major European newspapers. He does not diminish NATO, but he insists on a balance between the strategic interests of both sides of the Atlantic. For Macron, continued dependence on Washington is a disguised, yet real, form of subordination. Contrary to what others think, I believe Macron’s stance is not aimed at marking territory to eventually replace António Costa as President of the European Council in June 2027. In that area, Macron seems to have little chance.

Von der Leyen follows a more institutional approach, deeply shaped by German strategic choices. Her leadership, closer to Friedrich Merz, has been effective in achieving compromises in the field of defence industries and support for Ukraine. However, the President of the European Commission remains convinced of the need for our complementarity with the United States. For von der Leyen, European autonomy appears more as a reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO than as a parallel political project with hints of independence. It is a decision inspired by the German tradition of recent decades.

Macron thinks of Charles de Gaulle and reflects a Europe that has stopped believing in the American backstop. He bets on unity between the main European powers. Von der Leyen, meanwhile, fears the fractures that might emerge in crisis situations. She considers it indispensable to have an anchor point external to European rivalries. In reality, this may signify an acknowledgement of the fragility of the European project.

I fear that the Munich conference will display these discrepancies and convey an image of weakness to the delegation led by Rubio—and the conviction that the person truly in charge of European security is, after all, in the White House. This would be tragic for our common European project. Faced with Rubio, and through him, Donald Trump, Europe cannot limit itself to promising more spending. It must demonstrate unity, decision-making capacity, and moral strength in a new-old world, now dominated by powers that have once again ceased to value political ethics and international law.

France, Germany and the European Union challenges and responses

 From France to Germany, and across the EU, the risks are enormous and the challenges must be won

Victor Ângelo

France is experiencing a very serious political crisis. The dissolution of the National Assembly, decided on 9 June 2024 by President Emmanuel Macron, was a gamble that surprised the political class and proved to be a mistake. Since then, four prime ministers have already come to power. The latest, Sébastien Lecornu, formed a government on Sunday night and resigned the following morning. An absolute record, which clearly shows the deadlock the country is in.

The political elites are grouped into two extreme camps: Marine Le Pen’s party and a coalition of more or less radical left-wing forces, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the leading figure. What little remains, the centre, is fragmented around half a dozen politicians who cannot agree. Several of these personalities, as well as Le Pen and Mélenchon, are convinced they could succeed Macron as head of state. They want Macron to resign from the presidency of the Republic without delay. Officially, his second term should end in May 2027. Now, due to the seriousness of the crisis, even his political allies are saying that the solution to the deadlock would be for the president to leave office early.

I do not believe this will happen. Macron may not want to admit that his popularity is at rock bottom. This week’s poll found that only 14% of the French support his policies. It is a catastrophic percentage. Macron believes, however, that he has the constitutional legitimacy to continue.

In a deep crisis like the current one, and if Macron were to opt again, in the near future, for early parliamentary elections, it is possible that Marine Le Pen’s far-right could win the most seats. Her party appears, to a significant part of the electorate, as more stable than the left, which is a fragile patchwork of various political opinions.

In any case, whether it is early presidential or new parliamentary elections, France is on the verge of falling into the abyss of deep chaos, caught between two ultra-radical poles. This time, the risk is very serious. The most likely outcome is that France, one of the two pillars of the European Union, will be led by a radical, ultranationalist party, hostile to the European project, xenophobic, and ideologically close to Vladimir Putin.

The other pillar of Europe is Germany. Friedrich Merz, chancellor since May, is in constant decline with public opinion. Only 26% of voters believe in his ability to solve the most pressing problems: the cost of living, housing, immigration, and economic stagnation. The German economy contracted in 2023 and 2024, with sectors such as construction and industry falling back to levels of the mid-2000s. The engine of the economy, the automotive industry, is about a third below its peak 15 years ago and has returned to levels close to the mid-2000s, reflecting a loss of competitiveness and profound structural changes in the sector.

In a recent discussion with German analysts, I was told that the unpopularity of Merz and his coalition is paving the way for the far-right to come to power in 2029 or even earlier. This year, the AfD (Alternative for Germany, a party led by Nazi nostalgists) came second, with almost 21% of the vote. The growing discontent of citizens, competition with the Chinese economy, tariffs and restrictions imposed by the Americans, spending on aid to Ukraine, Donald Trump’s blatant support for German right-wing extremists—who sees the AfD as a way to seriously undermine European unity—, the growing propaganda against foreigners living in Germany, all these are factors that reinforce the electoral base of this racist and Nazi-inspired party. Not to mention that the AfD maintains privileged relations with the Kremlin.

The crossroads in which both France, now, and Germany, in the near future, find themselves represent two enormous challenges for the survival of the EU. They are incomparably more worrying than the consequences of Brexit or the sabotage by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico. They come at a time when the EU faces a series of existential problems of external origin.

The external enemies are well known. Fear and concessions are the worst responses that can be given to them. Enemies and adversaries must be dealt with with great strategic skill and reinforced unity, only achievable if EU leaders can explain and prove to citizens the importance of European unity and cohesion.

The international scene is much bigger than the USA, Russia, or China. The expansion of agreements with Japan, Canada, Mercosur, the African continent, and ASEAN should be given priority attention. This list does not seek to exclude other partners, it only mentions some that are especially important.

The future also requires resolutely reducing excessive dependence on the outside in the areas of defence, technology, digital platforms, energy, and raw materials essential for the energy transition. Debureaucratising, innovating, and promoting the complementarity of European economies is fundamental. All this must be done while combating extremism. To think that extremists will play by democratic rules once in power is a dangerous illusion. Exposing this fiction is now the urgent priority in France, and the constant priority in all Member States, including Portugal.