The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Christmas in the Sahel

How about lunch in the Sahel?

Victor Angelo

 

A few years ago, my wife and I were invited to an unusual Christmas lunch. The invitation came from the Chad presidency and the repast site was about a hundred kilometres north of Fada, a town more than two hours' flight from Ndjamena, already in the area of transition from the Sahel to the Sahara. The plan was to fly to Fada and follow by land to one of the oases of the Mourdi Depression - a set of deep valleys with several lagoons, much in demand by the traders of the numerous camel herds in transit to Libya, where each camel ends up by being sold at meat markets.

We went there. The journey between Fada and the oasis took place in the middle of twenty-something jeeps of a company of elite troops with operational experience of the region. The open-backed pickup trucks - the famous "technicals" - advanced at high speed, in parallel, on a unique front of several hundred meters. The aim was to avoid the dust and the ambushes of lawless groups that were already wandering in those parts of the Sahel.

The set menu was sheep, stuffed with chicken and couscous, roasted in a hole dug in the sand. The animal, well-done, cleaned of ashes and sand, was placed in front of us, whole, from head to feet, staring at us, so that we, the guests, could begin the feast. The protocol was clear. No one would touch any piece of food before we had finished ours. My wife and I looked at each other, and we did not know what to do. The head of the GOE (Portuguese Police Special Operations Group), who were in charge of my personal security, pulled out a pocket folding knife, cut two pieces and we started munching. Slowly, to show appreciation for the delicacy. Two hundred eyes followed our chewing closely. When we gave the signal that we had enough, the military threw themselves at the animal and the accompanying food. They cleaned everything in the blink of an eye.

In telling all this, my intention is not to invite the reader to a similar Christmas lunch. It is a question of taking advantage of the moment to talk about the Sahel, the hunger and food insecurity that define the daily lives of its people, and the violence that is taking place in these lands. It is also a tribute to those who have little more than their personal dignity, a quality that has always defined the way of being of the people of the Sahel. But that dignity is now often violated by those who have power, whether on the side of governments, armed robbers, or terrorists. The Sahel and the adjacent Sahara are experiencing a deep security crisis, which has worsened continuously since 2012, despite a strong European military presence in the region. 

The year now ending has been the most violent. Jihadists and other armed groups, including popular militias formed by the governments that the Europeans support, will have caused over 4,250 deaths and thousands of displaced people. The most dangerous area is the three borders region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. About half of the attacks were directed against civilian populations. In most cases, the violence, even that which wears a mantle of religious radicalism, has as its main objective to extort resources. Communities that make a living from artisanal gold mining or pastoralism, as well as those that run the trade corridors connecting the Sahel with the west coast of Africa, in Benin, Togo and Nigeria, are the most frequent targets. It is difficult to determine where looting ends and fanaticism, ethnic hatred or human rights violations begin. Terrorism is a label that defines a complex reality badly. But it is around. In 2020 we saw many confrontations between or perpetrated by two of the most important groups: the Islamic state in the Greater Sahel and the Al-Qaeda factions. And we are still hearing reports of war crimes committed by the armed forces of countries to which Europe gives military training.

The EU is preparing a new strategy for the region. It may be ready during the Portuguese presidency. To be valid, it must begin by questioning the reasons for the failure of the strategy that has been followed so far. My first indications are that it will be more of the same. It might then be a good idea to organise a lunch in a remote corner of the Sahel for some European leaders.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

Fighting for a changed approach to security in conflict zones

Following what I wrote yesterday about the national armies in some of the Sahelian countries – that their low operational capacity is one of the key problems, on top of their human rights shortcomings and other serious governance issues – I was reminded by a friend of the example of Somalia. The international community, including European resources, have been engaged in the country for a long time with little results. Billions have been spent and many lives lost. However, the terrorists are all over, including in the capital city. And the national army, that we all have trained and keep repeating is essential to solve the insecurity threats, has a fighting capacity that is estimated at 8%. That means that almost everyone in the army is not prepared to fight an asymmetric war and cannot collect the intelligence needed to crush the terrorist cells. Or, there are two fundamental dimensions of any stabilisation project. They are not enough but if they do not happen nothing else can be achieved.

That’s why I keep repeating that we must look at these matters with frankness and be clear about what is going on and what needs to change. If we fail to do it, if we keep pretending and talk niceties, we will keep investing in the sand of those vast deserts. We will be wasting resources and lives. And we will be undermining the credibility of the international institutions and other players that are operating in such contexts. Can’t we find the courage to shift our approach?

The Europeans and the Sahel: a fake dialogue

A ministerial meeting of the International Coalition for the Sahel was held on Friday, 12 June 2020 and co-chaired by Mauritania, the EU and France.

The Sahel is going through enormous challenges. Therefore, an initiative like this conference can only be considered as positive. The problem is, however, that the emphasis was basically placed on the security dimensions, without a proper discussion about the human rights issues and the poor governance that prevails in much of the region. The armed forces of the G5 Sahelian countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – are weak, except for the Chadian ones, and have a questionable record in terms of human rights. The weaknesses are ignored by the European partners and the human rights dimensions are always absent from the debate. Besides that, there has been a proliferation of militia groups, particularly in Burkina Faso. They are supported by the national governments and the experience has shown that they have become part of the problem

The Europeans, led by the French, are not fully sincere when discussing the Sahel situation. Their dialogue with the Sahelian leaders is not frank. It is too formal, full of niceties. It does not touch the root causes of the ongoing conflicts. And without frankness, there is no way the fast deteriorating situation can be addressed. It will continue to worsen.