The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Discussing security and governance in the Sahel

In the Sahel, a lot of military and little politics

Victor Angelo

 

The call came from Bamako. On the other end of the line was a former colleague, now back home after a brilliant career in the United Nations. The essence of his conversation was against the massive presence of foreign troops in his country. There are more and more of them, both in the framework of the UN mission - known by the acronym MINUSMA - and due to calls by France. Contrary to recent statements by Emmanuel Macron, who said that the war against terrorism in the Sahel was being won, my friend told me about the deterioration of the situation in Mali and in neighbouring countries. In other words, there are more military personnel but, paradoxically, less security.

Let us look at the latest statistics from the International Organization for Migration. They count about 1.7 million displaced persons due to instability and armed actions in this part of the Sahel, especially in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - a region known as Liptako. It is estimated, on the other hand, that about seven thousand lives were lost in the last twelve months due to acts of terrorism and counterterrorist prevention and response operations. These are figures well above the average of previous years. What is more, a recent United Nations investigation shows that war crimes and atrocities have been committed in Mali since 2013. The report, which in addition to pointing the finger at terrorists calls into question the armed forces of certain states, has fallen into a deep hole in the Security Council and awaits debate at the Greek calends. 

Liptako is a vast territory, with an area where Portugal could fit three times over. The Fulas, as nomadic herdsmen and itinerant traders in long caravans, have traditionally shared these dry, harsh expanses with other ethnic groups. But ways of life have changed. Accelerated population growth in recent decades, coupled with enormous pressure from cattle rearing - a multiplication of herds -, increasingly irregular and scarce rainfall due to climate change, poverty and the absence of effective state administration have contributed to a widespread environment of social instability, rebellion and conflict. The rush for gold, which began to be exploited intensively on an artisanal basis some twenty years ago, has also attracted new waves of violence. This is the framework in which various armed gangs move and operate under the confused banners of the terrorist network of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) or, further north, on the way to the border with Algeria, the people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Religious fanaticism serves as an excuse or muddles along with banditry. For many young people, the Kalashnikov has replaced the shepherd's stick or the farmer's hoe in a context that is becoming progressively more arid, unpredictable, and dangerous. Someone from the region told me that joining an armed group is for many an act of self-protection.

There is a huge problem here that fundamentally requires two types of approach: one will be political and the other will be to combat desertification and poverty. I will mention only the political part, which requires the inclusion of all, without discrimination on ethnic grounds. It also means publicly showing a firm hand against corruption, in military institutions and state administrations. Inclusion and probity are two fundamental issues, which must be resolved by national elites.

 The European partners have closed their eyes and pretended not to see these problems. For example, they have been training officers in the Malian armed forces for years, knowing fully well that these officers have kept a tribal mentality and systematically divert resources intended for the country's stabilisation effort to their own advantage. We need to change the way we act in the Sahel. Dialogue with the countries in the region must be respectful. The future that is at stake is theirs, independently of the external dimensions. We cannot take the direction of the process away from them. Being more papist than the Pope in other people's land is a practice that must be put away once and for all, in a drawer of the past. But it must be a frank dialogue.

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Christmas in the Sahel

How about lunch in the Sahel?

Victor Angelo

 

A few years ago, my wife and I were invited to an unusual Christmas lunch. The invitation came from the Chad presidency and the repast site was about a hundred kilometres north of Fada, a town more than two hours' flight from Ndjamena, already in the area of transition from the Sahel to the Sahara. The plan was to fly to Fada and follow by land to one of the oases of the Mourdi Depression - a set of deep valleys with several lagoons, much in demand by the traders of the numerous camel herds in transit to Libya, where each camel ends up by being sold at meat markets.

We went there. The journey between Fada and the oasis took place in the middle of twenty-something jeeps of a company of elite troops with operational experience of the region. The open-backed pickup trucks - the famous "technicals" - advanced at high speed, in parallel, on a unique front of several hundred meters. The aim was to avoid the dust and the ambushes of lawless groups that were already wandering in those parts of the Sahel.

The set menu was sheep, stuffed with chicken and couscous, roasted in a hole dug in the sand. The animal, well-done, cleaned of ashes and sand, was placed in front of us, whole, from head to feet, staring at us, so that we, the guests, could begin the feast. The protocol was clear. No one would touch any piece of food before we had finished ours. My wife and I looked at each other, and we did not know what to do. The head of the GOE (Portuguese Police Special Operations Group), who were in charge of my personal security, pulled out a pocket folding knife, cut two pieces and we started munching. Slowly, to show appreciation for the delicacy. Two hundred eyes followed our chewing closely. When we gave the signal that we had enough, the military threw themselves at the animal and the accompanying food. They cleaned everything in the blink of an eye.

In telling all this, my intention is not to invite the reader to a similar Christmas lunch. It is a question of taking advantage of the moment to talk about the Sahel, the hunger and food insecurity that define the daily lives of its people, and the violence that is taking place in these lands. It is also a tribute to those who have little more than their personal dignity, a quality that has always defined the way of being of the people of the Sahel. But that dignity is now often violated by those who have power, whether on the side of governments, armed robbers, or terrorists. The Sahel and the adjacent Sahara are experiencing a deep security crisis, which has worsened continuously since 2012, despite a strong European military presence in the region. 

The year now ending has been the most violent. Jihadists and other armed groups, including popular militias formed by the governments that the Europeans support, will have caused over 4,250 deaths and thousands of displaced people. The most dangerous area is the three borders region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. About half of the attacks were directed against civilian populations. In most cases, the violence, even that which wears a mantle of religious radicalism, has as its main objective to extort resources. Communities that make a living from artisanal gold mining or pastoralism, as well as those that run the trade corridors connecting the Sahel with the west coast of Africa, in Benin, Togo and Nigeria, are the most frequent targets. It is difficult to determine where looting ends and fanaticism, ethnic hatred or human rights violations begin. Terrorism is a label that defines a complex reality badly. But it is around. In 2020 we saw many confrontations between or perpetrated by two of the most important groups: the Islamic state in the Greater Sahel and the Al-Qaeda factions. And we are still hearing reports of war crimes committed by the armed forces of countries to which Europe gives military training.

The EU is preparing a new strategy for the region. It may be ready during the Portuguese presidency. To be valid, it must begin by questioning the reasons for the failure of the strategy that has been followed so far. My first indications are that it will be more of the same. It might then be a good idea to organise a lunch in a remote corner of the Sahel for some European leaders.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

The Europeans and the Sahel: a fake dialogue

A ministerial meeting of the International Coalition for the Sahel was held on Friday, 12 June 2020 and co-chaired by Mauritania, the EU and France.

The Sahel is going through enormous challenges. Therefore, an initiative like this conference can only be considered as positive. The problem is, however, that the emphasis was basically placed on the security dimensions, without a proper discussion about the human rights issues and the poor governance that prevails in much of the region. The armed forces of the G5 Sahelian countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – are weak, except for the Chadian ones, and have a questionable record in terms of human rights. The weaknesses are ignored by the European partners and the human rights dimensions are always absent from the debate. Besides that, there has been a proliferation of militia groups, particularly in Burkina Faso. They are supported by the national governments and the experience has shown that they have become part of the problem

The Europeans, led by the French, are not fully sincere when discussing the Sahel situation. Their dialogue with the Sahelian leaders is not frank. It is too formal, full of niceties. It does not touch the root causes of the ongoing conflicts. And without frankness, there is no way the fast deteriorating situation can be addressed. It will continue to worsen.

Sahel and the Islamist threat

Another link on the Sahel security situation:

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/

The Sahel is important

https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2019/video/parallel-panel-discussion-security-in-the-sahel-traffick-jam/

The link will bring us to the panel discussion on the situation in the Sahel that took place today at the Munich Security Conference. 

Fighting Boko Haram

The Chibok girls were kidnapped by Boko Haram a year ago. And many other Nigerian girls and women have also been taken hostage by this terrorist group. Everyone condemns these actions. But we should go beyond that and ask loud and clear how can that happen in a country that has one of the largest and better African equipped armies. How is it possible that a terrorist group has been able to capture people and territory? And then, we need to raise another question: where did they get the weaponry from?

Chad and Niger have now been engaged in the fight against Boko Haram, side by side with the Nigerian Army. There have been reports of some serious setbacks for the terrorists. But as of late one gets the impression that the anti-Boko Haram coalition is no longer making any tangible headway. Why is it?

The missing people and the memory of all those who have been executed by the savages under the banner of Boko Haram call for an answer to all the questions. They also call for clarity about the situation. 

Boko Haram requires a powerful and urgent response

At the very beginning of the year my magazine´s editor-in-chief at Visão asked me to write about Africa in 2015. I did. And I spent most of the allocated space focusing on Nigeria, as the country to watch this year. Within Nigeria, the key issue I mentioned was of course Boko Haram. I also said that Boko Haram would be spreading out towards the neighbouring countries. And that´s very much the case today. This terrorist group is not only a major threat to the stability of Nigeria, It is also a serious menace for Niger, Cameron and Chad. As such, it calls for a major international alliance to deal with it. The sooner the international community addresses this very serious problem the better. Nigeria can´t do it. And Chad alone, notwithstanding the strength of its armed forces, is not enough. 

AQMI and Boko Haram should be wiped out soonest

Besides other places, there is concern in Burkina Faso and Niger that Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also known as AQMI, are trying to establish a logistics and safety corridor between them. The authorities in these countries think the threat is serious enough. It should not either be ignored or treated lightly.

I am not sure about the link between the two organizations. But I for sure think that fighting both of them is a matter of great urgency. They call for decisive action. They should be smashed. We have been too slow in responding to these terrorist groups. And when we hesitate they take it as a licence to expand and bring instability and death to new areas of influence.

Again, I think we have to mobilize a coalition of states, including some from outside the region, to fight these crazy and dangerous fellows. I would like to see more voices repeating this message. 

Fighting Boko Haram is a priority

We should not lose sight of Boko Haram. They are a major threat to the populations of the region and to stability in Nigeria and the Lake Chad part of Africa. The government of Nigeria has no capacity to respond to the menace. We should be very clear about it. And engage the authorities in Abuja with an offer of international security assistance that makes sense and cannot be ignored. This has now become a matter of great urgency. Concerted multilateral action and the appropriate pressure on the national authorities of Nigeria should be made as soon as possible, even before the presidential elections of this coming February. Then, just after the elections – which by the way will be pretty messy –deployments should take place. The poor populations of remote North-eastern Nigeria need all help they can get. And this is not neo-colonialism. It´s solidarity and also the recognition that further destabilisation of Central Africa and the Sahel will have a negative impact well beyond the region. 

Boko Haram in Paris

Today´s summit on Boko Haram, convened at the Elysée Palace by President François Hollande, should be seen as a constructive initiative. 

The concrete results in terms of fighting the Nigerian terrorist group might be very tiny. But it had some other advantages.

 It kept the pressure on the President of Nigeria. President Goodluck Jonathan must take the issue with a greater degree of seriousness. 

It also showed that the countries in the region – particularly Cameroon and Chad – must be fully engaged and cooperate among themselves. This is lacking. Especially as it concerns Cameroon. North Cameroon – an area I know relatively well – is a forgotten region, when seen from the capital Yaoundé. This has to change. The Cameroonians have to increase their police and armed forces presence in the North. They have also to be prepared to cooperate with Nigeria and Chad. 

The summit has also emphasized that the problem requires international cooperation if it is to be tackled without further delay. France can certainly play a role on the French-speaking side of the region. The UK has to be more involved on the Nigerian side. And French and British intelligence services have to work hand in hand on the ground and be willing to treat the African counterparts as equals.

All this is a bit of an ambition. Not easy to achieve. But it has to be said. And the pressure has to go on.

We will see what progress will be reported as accomplished when the ministers meet for a follow-up conference next month in the UK. 

Boko Haram

At the beginning of the week, the terrorist group Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in Northern Nigeria and kidnapped over 130 student girls. They came with trucks and other vehicles and could move around and leave with the victims, all of this in a State that is supposed to be heavy patrolled by the Nigerian Army. Since then, notwithstanding the fact that the Army launched a major operation, the terrorists and the girls have not been found. This is again raising a number of very fundamental questions about the capacity of the national authorities to address the challenges Boko Haram poses. Something is very wrong in the way the Nigerian leaders are responding to Boko Haram.

The neighbouring countries, particularly Chad, and the friends of Nigeria are getting very worried. The terrorists are just becoming too big a menace. 

To pay or not to pay?

A couple of days ago four Frenchmen that had been kidnapped in Niger three or so years ago were released by their captors. 

Kidnapping of Europeans became, a few years ago, a new business line for the many bandits that operate in the vast and lonely sands of the Sahel and Sahara.

I was, at a given time, involved in combatting that type of crimes. And it was said, already then, that the French are always ready to pay ransom money. Therefore, for the armed bandits to kidnap a French citizen was the best move. There was good money at the end of the line.

And this time again, there has been a payment. €20 million is a good sum. It was paid by a private company, we are told. But for the fellows out there, money is money, be it from the State or from a deep private pocket.

In the end, the question that matters is clear: should ransom money be paid to get kidnapped persons released? The answer is not that simple. At least, for some.