The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Sudan, the people and the Western interests

Not too long ago, during my time in the Sahel Region, I met regularly with Sudanese community villagers, men and women, as well as with officials. I had also to deal with the security and humanitarian consequences of the Janjaweed militias, the armed groups doing the dirty work in Darfur at the service of Omar al-Bashir. I gained then a lot of admiration for the people of Sudan and felt deeply their aspiration for security and democracy. I also learned how strategic the Khartoum leadership could be, including the intelligence agencies and the generals.

The fall of al-Bashir, following the continued, widespread popular pressure, came to me as good news. But I also knew that the military and security establishment, including the militias, now operating as Rapid Support Forces (RSF), would not let it go too easily. And that is the situation today. More than a hundred people were killed last week in the capital by the military and the militias, many more were wounded or raped. The establishment cannot lose control. They have a heavy hand on the economy – on what remains of it, as most of the economy is in a state of collapse – and they are also afraid to be brought to justice due to past crimes they have been associated with. Therefore, it is the survival of the al-Bashir regime’s elite that is now at stake. They are ready to make al-Bashir and a few others pay the bill. But they do not want it to go beyond that.

The generals, including General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF boss, are closely supported by the Saudis, the Egyptian President and the Military, and the United Arab Emirates leadership. The generals have sent Sudanese armed men to fight the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen, among other things. This is a smart alliance. It protects the Khartoum generals from pressure from the European Union and the US. For the West, the friends of our friends deserve some consideration, no doubt. That explains the relative lack of attention the Sudanese situation has generated in Brussels and other capitals. People’s rights are a beautiful thing as long as they do not interfere with Western interests in the region.

The Chinese have also strong stakes in Sudan, particularly related to the oil pipeline that crosses the country.

All this makes the Sudanese transition to democracy extremely challenging for the people of that great country.

Bashir´s travels

Omar al-Bashir is an old desert snake. He is pretty strategic and astute. And he has also been a key player against the interests of the UN and its image, including in the peacekeeping area.

Once more he has managed to strike another blow against the prestige of the UN. In this case, the loser is the International Criminal Court.

But it is also the South African government. The authorities were caught in a dreadful dilemma: either to arrest Bashir and risk a serious row with Sudan and many other African governments; or let him leave South Africa, notwithstanding the court order, and risk further criticism at home.

They opted for the let-go option. I think in the end that was the only reasonable decision they could take. Politics is about deciding and the lesser evil is quite often the better decision. Now they should have the courage to explain the decision. Politics is also about telling the story in a way that makes sense and considers public opinion as a very serious issue.