The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

The Europeans and the Sahel: a fake dialogue

A ministerial meeting of the International Coalition for the Sahel was held on Friday, 12 June 2020 and co-chaired by Mauritania, the EU and France.

The Sahel is going through enormous challenges. Therefore, an initiative like this conference can only be considered as positive. The problem is, however, that the emphasis was basically placed on the security dimensions, without a proper discussion about the human rights issues and the poor governance that prevails in much of the region. The armed forces of the G5 Sahelian countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – are weak, except for the Chadian ones, and have a questionable record in terms of human rights. The weaknesses are ignored by the European partners and the human rights dimensions are always absent from the debate. Besides that, there has been a proliferation of militia groups, particularly in Burkina Faso. They are supported by the national governments and the experience has shown that they have become part of the problem

The Europeans, led by the French, are not fully sincere when discussing the Sahel situation. Their dialogue with the Sahelian leaders is not frank. It is too formal, full of niceties. It does not touch the root causes of the ongoing conflicts. And without frankness, there is no way the fast deteriorating situation can be addressed. It will continue to worsen.

Sahel and the Islamist threat

Another link on the Sahel security situation:

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/

The Sahel is important

https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2019/video/parallel-panel-discussion-security-in-the-sahel-traffick-jam/

The link will bring us to the panel discussion on the situation in the Sahel that took place today at the Munich Security Conference. 

Fighting Boko Haram

The Chibok girls were kidnapped by Boko Haram a year ago. And many other Nigerian girls and women have also been taken hostage by this terrorist group. Everyone condemns these actions. But we should go beyond that and ask loud and clear how can that happen in a country that has one of the largest and better African equipped armies. How is it possible that a terrorist group has been able to capture people and territory? And then, we need to raise another question: where did they get the weaponry from?

Chad and Niger have now been engaged in the fight against Boko Haram, side by side with the Nigerian Army. There have been reports of some serious setbacks for the terrorists. But as of late one gets the impression that the anti-Boko Haram coalition is no longer making any tangible headway. Why is it?

The missing people and the memory of all those who have been executed by the savages under the banner of Boko Haram call for an answer to all the questions. They also call for clarity about the situation. 

Boko Haram requires a powerful and urgent response

At the very beginning of the year my magazine´s editor-in-chief at Visão asked me to write about Africa in 2015. I did. And I spent most of the allocated space focusing on Nigeria, as the country to watch this year. Within Nigeria, the key issue I mentioned was of course Boko Haram. I also said that Boko Haram would be spreading out towards the neighbouring countries. And that´s very much the case today. This terrorist group is not only a major threat to the stability of Nigeria, It is also a serious menace for Niger, Cameron and Chad. As such, it calls for a major international alliance to deal with it. The sooner the international community addresses this very serious problem the better. Nigeria can´t do it. And Chad alone, notwithstanding the strength of its armed forces, is not enough. 

Chadian army ordered to fight Boko Haram

The good news is that the Chadian army has now been ordered to move into the Boko Haram area and fight the terrorists. The Chadians are by far the best army in the region. They certainly can achieve some results.

Now the point is to see if the Nigerian government is prepared to accept such deployment within its territory. I hope they will. And it should be possible because there is already a cooperation framework between Chad, Nigeria and Niger with the aim to fight terrorism around the Lake. But this is a time for elections in Nigeria and some politicians might think that the Chadian intervention might signal to the voters that the national authorities cannot do what the Chadians can. Let´s hope that will not be the official position in Abuja. 

Fighting Boko Haram is a priority

We should not lose sight of Boko Haram. They are a major threat to the populations of the region and to stability in Nigeria and the Lake Chad part of Africa. The government of Nigeria has no capacity to respond to the menace. We should be very clear about it. And engage the authorities in Abuja with an offer of international security assistance that makes sense and cannot be ignored. This has now become a matter of great urgency. Concerted multilateral action and the appropriate pressure on the national authorities of Nigeria should be made as soon as possible, even before the presidential elections of this coming February. Then, just after the elections – which by the way will be pretty messy –deployments should take place. The poor populations of remote North-eastern Nigeria need all help they can get. And this is not neo-colonialism. It´s solidarity and also the recognition that further destabilisation of Central Africa and the Sahel will have a negative impact well beyond the region. 

Nigeria: can we believe there is an agreement with Boko Haram?

Knowing as I know the players, I am afraid the announcement made by the Nigerian presidency regarding an accord with Boko Haram might just be wishful thinking, at best. But it can even be worse than that. It can just be a deceitful statement at a time the electoral fever is about to start.

The next few days will tell. 

Iraq and the great divide

The Iraqi crisis reminds us of how difficult it is to assist a country that is deeply divided along ethnic and cultural lines. The fracture line between Sunnis and Shias cuts the country in two. This is a very high risk divide. It needs to be managed with great balance. Leaders from both sides of the line have to be brought together all the time. Our role, as international community, is to encourage them to cooperate, to help them to build the platforms that bring their interests together, to underline the common ground and look into the future from there.

In many ways, the experience tells us that to intervene in countries that are at the frontier of great divides is not a very easy thing. The best solution is to stay out, as much as possible. If that is not advisable, then the international community must act in a very well informed way, with great prudence and a strong sense of the risks.

That´s true in Iraq as it is also true in Sudan, Mali or Chad, in the Balkans, or any other country that has national communities that are very different, both from a physical point of view and from a religious or cultural perspective. These are countries with a very high risk of falling into major internal conflicts. Outside interventions that are just naive and ill prepared can only accelerate the hatching of the crisis. 

Boko Haram in Paris

Today´s summit on Boko Haram, convened at the Elysée Palace by President François Hollande, should be seen as a constructive initiative. 

The concrete results in terms of fighting the Nigerian terrorist group might be very tiny. But it had some other advantages.

 It kept the pressure on the President of Nigeria. President Goodluck Jonathan must take the issue with a greater degree of seriousness. 

It also showed that the countries in the region – particularly Cameroon and Chad – must be fully engaged and cooperate among themselves. This is lacking. Especially as it concerns Cameroon. North Cameroon – an area I know relatively well – is a forgotten region, when seen from the capital Yaoundé. This has to change. The Cameroonians have to increase their police and armed forces presence in the North. They have also to be prepared to cooperate with Nigeria and Chad. 

The summit has also emphasized that the problem requires international cooperation if it is to be tackled without further delay. France can certainly play a role on the French-speaking side of the region. The UK has to be more involved on the Nigerian side. And French and British intelligence services have to work hand in hand on the ground and be willing to treat the African counterparts as equals.

All this is a bit of an ambition. Not easy to achieve. But it has to be said. And the pressure has to go on.

We will see what progress will be reported as accomplished when the ministers meet for a follow-up conference next month in the UK. 

Boko Haram

At the beginning of the week, the terrorist group Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in Northern Nigeria and kidnapped over 130 student girls. They came with trucks and other vehicles and could move around and leave with the victims, all of this in a State that is supposed to be heavy patrolled by the Nigerian Army. Since then, notwithstanding the fact that the Army launched a major operation, the terrorists and the girls have not been found. This is again raising a number of very fundamental questions about the capacity of the national authorities to address the challenges Boko Haram poses. Something is very wrong in the way the Nigerian leaders are responding to Boko Haram.

The neighbouring countries, particularly Chad, and the friends of Nigeria are getting very worried. The terrorists are just becoming too big a menace. 

The Central African Republic: the coming days can change the situation.

I spent a good deal of the day looking at the new developments in the Central Africa Republic. And I came to the conclusion that the departure from power of Michel Djotodia, the Interim President that rode the March rebellion and subsequently lost control of its own allied rebel forces, the Seleka combatants, opens a window of opportunity for security and reconciliation. The sooner the new Interim President is chosen by the assembly of representatives the better.

Then, the partners of the country should provide enough resources for him to be able to rebuild the national security forces and bring law and order back. This is where the priority should lie. 

Central African Republic: the forgotten crisis

When it comes to political decisions, the Central African Republic remains outside the main radar screens, notwithstanding all the dramatic news about the civil unrest in the country. France is on it alone, playing a complex role that has more to do with gendarmerie and police tasks than with military assignments. But what is on the ground is a military expeditionary force. That is feeling more and more frustrated by the type of challenges they have to face in Bangui, and also because they are so stuck in the capital city that they can´t respond to the problems elsewhere in the country.

This French force should be rapidly complemented by a comprehensive peacekeeping operation, under the overall leadership of the UN. That is not going to happen any time soon. The African Union is very reluctant when it comes to accepting a UN force. They are still convinced, I want to believe, that they will be able to deploy an AU mission and take care of the security situation. It is unrealistic as an approach. The African Union is no measure to put together the required integrated force. They should be confronted with such truth. And they should also cease to play along the interests of the Chadian President, Idriss Déby, who seems to be the key African opponent to a UN presence.

The US is also against a UN mission in CAR. They base their position on the fact that such mission would carry additional financial costs to Washington. And they do not want to put more money, at this stage, on UN peacekeeping operations. OK, I can understand the costs issue. That could be sorted out by drawing down the missions in Haiti, Cote d´Ivoire and Liberia at a much faster pace. These are missions that have long ago achieved their key goals and should only be continued with a much smaller field presence.

By the way, the approval of additional forces in South Sudan, which has a very high budget tag, was accepted by Washington in a matter of hours…

That´s why I say that CAR is the forgotten crisis. It has always been like that. 

CAR and Chad, two neighbours

Since Saturday, two days ago, ten flights have taken place between Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, and N´Djaména, the Chadian capital. These air bridge is evacuating a large number of Chadian citizens, men, women and children, that for a long period had peacefully lived side by side with their neighbours, the Central Africans, but that are now being targeted by violent mobs. The CAR citizens now see the Chadians as Muslims and enemies.

This is indeed a very sad development.

There are still many Chadians camping at Bangui airport. Most of them will be taken out tomorrow.

As this is taking place, there is no real political process taking place to complement the military presence provided by the French and the African contingents. This basically means that the crisis is not being addressed. The soldiers cannot do more that establish some security pockets here and there. It is up to the politicians, to the regional and international leaders, to create a framework that should bring peace back. 

Central Africa and the Sahel

I spent a bit of the day on the news and comments being produced about the dramatic events in the Central African Republic (CAR). And I end up the day very much amazed by the little knowledge people seem to have about the root causes of the current crisis. Then, I wonder how can the external players contribute to a finding a solution to a problem they do not fully understand?

I served in CAR from 1985 to 1989. Then, I came back in 2008 up to 2010, to be deeply involved with the unfolding events.

I vividly remember my discussions with President Bozizé. Including about the role of Muslim armed groups operating in the border areas with Darfur and South-Eastern Chad. And the growing tensions with pastoralists coming from the Sahel. CAR had obviously changed in its social set-up between my first and second stay in the region. And that change was not only a warning of the crisis in the making. It was, in many ways, one of vectors of much deeper and multifaceted transformation that is being imported from the arid lands of the North and moving into the Bantu areas of central tropical Africa. 

Central African Republic

There is increased noise about the possibility of a UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). The friends of that country and of Africa should amplify the noise to make sure the key world leaders understand that such a mission is required. It should actually be on the ground soonest.

However, I am afraid the noise will not be strong enough. My sources tell me there is little chance to be able to find the troops and deploy soon enough. The UN is still struggling with its deployment in Mali. To add CAR to the list would be like adding complication to complexity.

But it has to be done.

And at the same time, it calls for decisions on the rapid phasing out of peacekeeping missions where they are no longer critical. That brings to mind Cote d´Ivoire and Liberia, for instance.

Il also reminds us that the UN Security Council has to be better at defining and monitoring exit strategies. Peacekeeping missions need to be goal oriented and time sensitive. 

Central Africa

The Central African Republic (CAR) is now a failed state.

The capital city, Bangui, is controlled by armed groups of uncertain origin. They are most likely dominated by warlords from Southern Darfur and Eastern Chad. They have little to do with CAR’s main ethnic groups but they are allied to Central Africans from the North-Eastern border areas. These are Muslims in a country that is largely Christian.

Besides the capital, there are other armed groups and several “self-defence” committees. But there is no central authority, no law and order, no administration and no modern economy. It is just chaos and extreme hardship.

The situation can easily spill over into some of neighbouring countries. They are also very fragile. They could become the next prey of the roaming armed men.  

The African Union has pledged to send a peacekeeping force to the country. It will be difficult for the AU to be able to mobilise the force and the resources required. It will also be a very delicate mission because of the religious divide that is now taking place, for the first time in the history of CAR.

The international community should understand that the country needs, urgently, not at the pace the AU can mobilise itself, a very robust international force, with full executive powers.

It is the survival of CAR’s population that is, first and foremost, at stake. But not only. It is an entire region. A region that is already the least stable of Africa. 

France and Mali

France is placing undue pressure on the UN Secretariat regarding the deployment of peacekeepers to the recently approved mission in Mali. It shows very little respect for the UN’s independence when it comes to the selection of the Troop Contributing Countries. For instance, the French want the Chadians to be part of the UN force at any cost, even if N’Djaména does not meet some of the criteria. This is creating, once again, an anti-French wave within the UN Headquarters. Such malaise is being aptly used by some older hands at DPKO and in other departments, who never miss an opportunity to attack the French. 

In politics, you better be your own man (or woman)

During my work with President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic (CAR) – from 2008 to 2010 – I always felt that he was too inclined to indiscriminately follow Idriss Déby’s positions.  For me, and I said it several times, it was not good politics to be so much dependent on the Chadian President.

 First, Chad and CAR are too very different socio-political realities. Even Southern Chad, that at the surface could be considered similar to CAR, is distinct and cannot be easily compared with the reality south of the border.

Second, Déby is a man from the Sahel and his views about Central Africa are not necessarily the most appropriate ones.

Third, the support Bozizé was looking for in N’Djamena had a negative impact on CAR’s domestic politics: leveraged by Chad, Bozizé did not see the critical relevance and urgency of moving faster on the issues of national reconciliation and power-sharing.

But Bozizé had a different view.

Now, things have changed. He has been ousted from power. And from his temporary refuge in Cameroon, today Bozizé accused the President of Chad of being behind the rebels that chased him from the presidency and the country.

As they say, quite often in politics the lessons are learned when it is already too late.