The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

On Mali and the region

 

In today’s Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Notes on Mali

Victor Angelo

 

 

Mali is a fascinating country, diverse in its landscapes and cultures. It is home to great singers and traditional musicians who play the korah, an ancestral instrument made from a large gourd, the Dogon masks and statues, birthplace of the city of Timbuktu, a unique historical reference in Islamic studies. For four centuries, until 1670, Mali was the epicentre of a great empire in West Africa, an empire recognized by Portuguese explorers, who traded extensively with it across the Gambia River. I would also add that I had several Malian colleagues at the UN who proved to be excellent professionals and held important positions in the different multilateral organizations. I write this to fight the summary opinions of those who are in the habit of arranging everything African in a dark corner, in the shadow of the usual prejudices. I am sad, like many others, when I see the country tearing itself apart and becoming insecure, as it continues to do daily.

Mali has made the news again in the last three weeks following the military coup of August 18. It is, for the same reason, the subject of debate, including in European circles. Moreover, some conspiracy theorists have seen Moscow's hand behind the colonels who took power, a hypothesis I consider unlikely. But there are other hands at work in Mali, from France to Saudi Arabia, and with vastly different intentions.

Also, at stake is the role of the United Nations, which has maintained a peace mission in the country since 2013, with more than 15,000 elements. MINUSMA, as the mission is called, has, over time, become a case study because it has not been able to respond to the political and governance issues that are at the heart of Mali's problems. The political direction of the mission resolved, to please the French and out of strategic opportunism, to stick to the president that the coup has now deposed. In New York, at the Security Council, no one had the courage to correct this trajectory. Thus, credibility is lost, and the future is mortgaged. 

Returning to the current debate, it should have emphasized that more than two thirds of Mali's population is under 25 years of age. And that education and the economy are unable to meet the challenges that such an age pyramid entails. When I was in Mali for the first time in 1990, its total population was around eight and a half million. Today, thirty years later, it is close to twenty million. The same happens in the other countries of the region. They all have explosive age pyramids. Demographic pressure has grown throughout the Sahel along with the advance of desertification and poverty. Being young in the Sahel means looking to the future and seeing only a multitude of arid politics, a desert of opportunities and a chaotic and inhumane urban habitat. Thus, hope and social peace are hard to achieve. All that remains is migration to Europe, or else adherence to armed banditry and fanatical rebellions. Fanaticism has grown exponentially over the past decade, thanks in particular to the proliferation of mosques, Wahabist koranic schools and radical preachers, all financed by the Saudis and others of the kind. 

Those who neither emigrate nor join the extremist groups, vegetate in the big cities, where they can observe how social inequalities have become blatant, the fruit of the corruption that prevails in political circles, in the security forces and in the administration of justice. They also see that European countries and other international actors turn a blind eye to the manipulations practiced by the powerful. This is what happened in Mali. After months of popular protest against the indifference of the president and the greed of his own circle of friends, a group of senior officials decided to act. They have popular support, at least for now. It is true that one should not support anti-constitutional coups. But it is also true that one can no longer pretend that one does not see corruption, ineptitude and the failure of territorial administration, with vast areas of national space without any state presence. The mitigation of crises begins with the promotion of probity and the restoration of local power, beyond the treatment of youth issues. This is what we must remind the colonels, the leaders of the region, the UN Security Council and the European partners of Mali, Portugal included. 

 

 

Mali and its blind partners

 The serious political situation Mali is going through raises in my mind some fundamental questions about the political performance of the key external partners of the country. Basically, what I mean is that we cannot keep supporting national leaderships that are not appreciated by the vast majority of their people. We might feel comfortable with them. But what is the value of that if they are not accepted by their own citizens?

In this case, France, other European countries, and the UN have been supporting a regime that has not implemented the peace agreement they have signed with their own rebels and that has closed their eyes in an attempt not to see the rapid deterioration of the security and poverty situations. The partners played the same game.

And now, several years down the line, we have a much graver national crisis, that has grown into a regional one as well. And we see that the image of the external actors has also been seriously damaged. That is a sure way of undermining the role of the UN and of some key Western countries.

 

 

Mali and its deep national crisis

This weekend there was another massacre in Mali. This time, the victims were ethnic Dogon villagers living in the central region of the country. It was another tit-for-tat action by another ethnic group, linked to the pastoralist way of life.

The country is moving into a deeper crisis. It all started in 2012, with jihadist radicals operating in the North. Now, it is a more complex situation that combines violence inspired on religious extremism with inter-community ferocious clashes and all types of banditry. To see it as mere Islam-inspired extremism is completely erroneous.

Confronted with such a grave situation, the international community, both through bilateral arrangements and the presence of UN and EU forces, has put most of the emphasis on military operations. A good number of military and police forces have been sent to Mali. That is, in my opinion, unbalanced as a response. It is a hammer approach to an extremely complex political situation.

The UN Security Council will be discussing Mali in the next few days. My message to the members of the Council is very simple: adopt a more political view of the conflict, not just a military-based line. Explore ways of promoting dialogue and joint projects between the ethnic groups of Mali. Have a hard look at economic development. Look at the way the national government addresses inclusiveness and good governance and be frank with the leaders. As friends, we must tell them, in diplomatic but clear words, that they ought to change the way they govern the country. It is there, in the governance area,  that we can find the beginning of a solution to a crisis that, otherwise, will continue to get worse.

Mali: a matter of serious concern

After a discussion this morning with a Malian friend, who is a former senior UN official, what I retained can be easily summarised in a few words: a failed political process and damaging high level corruption.

Basically, this means that unless the domestic leaders and the international community representatives address these two fundamental issues there will be no peace, stability and economic revival in the foreseeable future. And the country will remain dangerously insecure, dramatically poor and a major source of illegal immigration.

I do not think we can expect much of the current national leadership if we do not discuss the situation frankly with them. This is no time for us, the outside friends of Mali, to be ambiguous. We are required to be frank, courageous but also practice good diplomatic judgement.

Who should take the lead in the policy dialogue, as far as the international community is concerned?

Poverty, drought and neglect in the Sahel

It is with deep sadness that we have learned about the loss of another five peacekeepers deployed in Mali with the UN mission. They were killed yesterday by a group of armed men. The mission has been repeatedly targeted. This time the attack took place in the central region of the country, well outside the troubled areas of Northern Mali. It´s therefore a new development and one should be very concerned. It shows that the insecurity is now reaching other provinces. It also raises a few questions about the dissemination of extremist ideas to different parts of the Malian countryside. Endemic poverty combined with a couple of years of drought and abandonment by the central authorities make some people more attentive to the words of local preachers that have acquired their simplistic views in some faraway places in the Arab Peninsula. 

Anothe lame duck mission in the making

The same day I had a discussion about the frustratingly slow and very incomplete deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA), the Security Council has approved the fielding of a very large mission to the Central African Republic. To be on the safe side, in terms of readiness to deploy, the Council decided that the effective starting date for this new operation will be September 15. But everyone knows that there is very little spare capacity really available for these very large missions. The new one will be struggling for military, police and civilian staff as MINUSMA is doing.

Actually, it is time to think very differently about the peacekeeping operations. We cannot just base ourselves on the old model of extensive military presence for an extremely large duration of time. Things need to be thought in more dynamic terms, shorter and more specialised missions, with a very firm political mandate. 

Mali security sector

The EU Training Mission in Mali is moving in the right direction. The European instructors are now training the third Malian battalion and motivation is high.

As that happens, it is quite clear that the resources available in the donors´ Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali are not sufficient. USD 7 million is little money for the reorganisation of the national armed forces. And the outstanding pledges, for the next steps, are even smaller. It is necessary to call the attention of the international partners to the importance of this matter. The results of the EU training will be lost very quickly if financial resources are not made available to complement them.

The second point here is that Mali needs a mirror training programme for the national police and the gendarmerie. These two institutions are very weak. They have to be fully revamped. That requires trainers from outside and also resources. Both are missing at this stage. 

The need for a cultural change in Mali

I gave a public lecture yesterday in Brussels about the situation in Mali. One of the key issues under discussion was the reconciliation among Malians. A very difficult issue, I knew, as the events of 2012 and the early part of 2013 in the Northern Regions had a major negative impact on trust. Each ethnic group withdrew inside its own identity and became very suspicious of every other ethnicity.

It is an issue that is not moving fast enough, at a time when many other parts of the transition process are gaining momentum. And yesterday, during the discussions that followed my presentation, I came to the conclusion that many Malians are not really ready to reconcile. They tend to look at the Tuareg and other nomadic people from the North of Mali with a certain degree of contempt. And the nomads return the favour and see the black Malians as people that are not really interested in sharing power.

I got the impression that the leadership needs to be talked to into a cultural revolution. They have to change their views. The external partners should help them to do so. This is a priority task. 

Mali needs a much longer political transition

There will be a second donor conference for Mali on 15 May in Brussels. I am afraid it will be another game of smoke and mirrors. Promises, promises, and further promises. The first one, at the end of January in Addis Ababa produced over 450 million dollars of pledges but little –only about a quarter of that amount –has effectively been made available. The humanitarian needs are far from being met. Food vulnerability is widespread in the North. Money for the reform of the armed forces and the security sector has not materialised. The dialogue and reconciliation process is not supported. Public administration is starved of funds and paralysed 

And I am also afraid there will additional pressure on the Transitional Government to move faster on the preparations for the July elections –presidential and legislative –when everybody knows that elections at this early stage are not a solution. The transition phase requires a much longer period of time. 

Mali and a divided UN

Albert Gerard "Bert" Koenders has been the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) in Cote d’Ivoire since August 2011. He is now being shifted from Abidjan to Bamako to lead the new peacekeeping mission in Mali ( MINUSMA). He is very new to peacekeeping and to the African realities, as he spent his time in Dutch politics and as Development Co-operation Minister.

And he has a major job ahead of him. Which will be further complicated because there is a very serious rivalry between two UN departments regarding the Malian agenda: the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) believes that the political transition should be the priority objective, whilst DPKO, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is going to take the lead and push for the military operations and internal security to be at the forefront.

Interesting, isn't it? 

Mali is not moving in the right direction

Mali’s internal situation continues to be very fragile. The key international partners of this country need to coordinate better among themselves and agree on a common strategy in support of the stabilization process and the political transition.  This is a matter of great urgency.

It is also a matter of great concern to see that a country that has played an important role in the history of West Africa and has also been able to produce a large number of fine minds is today politically fragmented. No leader has emerged. Without a clairvoyant leader as a counterpart the external friends of Mali will not be able to succeed. It would be a mistake to forget this evidence.   

Mali and the international community

Mali is still in crisis. The Northern territories are far from being secured and the political situation in the capital and throughout the country is very unstable.  The Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission formally adopted on 6 March 2013 is yet to start working. Many of its Commissioners have not yet been appointed. The UN peace-keeping operation is at the design stage. The Security Council resolution that will approve the mission, under the very strange name of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) – multidimensional needs not to be in the name, if it is an integrated mission – has been drafted but has not yet been finalised. In any case, if it were approved in the next weeks it will take several months to have the peacekeeping forces fully operational. On the other hand, the EU presence that is supposed to train the new Malian military and security personnel is just beginning its deployment.

In view of all this, the elections scheduled for July 2013 – presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative elections on 21 July 2013 – seem pretty premature. I do not see the necessary minimum conditions being in place by July for peaceful and credible elections to take place. Therefore, I can’t understand the reasoning of the key Northern partners of Mali that continue to insist that this calendar should be abided by.