The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Central African Republic: the forgotten crisis

When it comes to political decisions, the Central African Republic remains outside the main radar screens, notwithstanding all the dramatic news about the civil unrest in the country. France is on it alone, playing a complex role that has more to do with gendarmerie and police tasks than with military assignments. But what is on the ground is a military expeditionary force. That is feeling more and more frustrated by the type of challenges they have to face in Bangui, and also because they are so stuck in the capital city that they can´t respond to the problems elsewhere in the country.

This French force should be rapidly complemented by a comprehensive peacekeeping operation, under the overall leadership of the UN. That is not going to happen any time soon. The African Union is very reluctant when it comes to accepting a UN force. They are still convinced, I want to believe, that they will be able to deploy an AU mission and take care of the security situation. It is unrealistic as an approach. The African Union is no measure to put together the required integrated force. They should be confronted with such truth. And they should also cease to play along the interests of the Chadian President, Idriss Déby, who seems to be the key African opponent to a UN presence.

The US is also against a UN mission in CAR. They base their position on the fact that such mission would carry additional financial costs to Washington. And they do not want to put more money, at this stage, on UN peacekeeping operations. OK, I can understand the costs issue. That could be sorted out by drawing down the missions in Haiti, Cote d´Ivoire and Liberia at a much faster pace. These are missions that have long ago achieved their key goals and should only be continued with a much smaller field presence.

By the way, the approval of additional forces in South Sudan, which has a very high budget tag, was accepted by Washington in a matter of hours…

That´s why I say that CAR is the forgotten crisis. It has always been like that. 

In politics, you better be your own man (or woman)

During my work with President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic (CAR) – from 2008 to 2010 – I always felt that he was too inclined to indiscriminately follow Idriss Déby’s positions.  For me, and I said it several times, it was not good politics to be so much dependent on the Chadian President.

 First, Chad and CAR are too very different socio-political realities. Even Southern Chad, that at the surface could be considered similar to CAR, is distinct and cannot be easily compared with the reality south of the border.

Second, Déby is a man from the Sahel and his views about Central Africa are not necessarily the most appropriate ones.

Third, the support Bozizé was looking for in N’Djamena had a negative impact on CAR’s domestic politics: leveraged by Chad, Bozizé did not see the critical relevance and urgency of moving faster on the issues of national reconciliation and power-sharing.

But Bozizé had a different view.

Now, things have changed. He has been ousted from power. And from his temporary refuge in Cameroon, today Bozizé accused the President of Chad of being behind the rebels that chased him from the presidency and the country.

As they say, quite often in politics the lessons are learned when it is already too late. 

Chadian army in Mali

Chad has sent an initial military contingent to join the West African force that will be deployed in Mali. The Chadian Foreign Minister, Moussa Faki, has also announced that his government would be ready to make available up to 2,000 soldiers for the Malian campaign, if necessary. That would make the Chadian contribution the largest. In any case, it is good news. The National Army of Chad (ANT) is probably the most capable in the region. Only Nigeria compares to it.

ANT was a ragtag assortment of armed men up to 2008. After the rebel incursion of January-February 2008, that brought the Sudanese-sponsored guerrilla groups up the doors of the presidential palace in N’Djamena and has shaken deeply the regime, President Idriss Déby decided to extensively re-organise the armed forces. Some very tough decisions in terms of command and control, discipline and training were taken then. The truth of the matter is that by May 2009 the forces had changed. They could then easily contain another rebel incursion and show a degree of professionalism that was unknown.

In addition, ANT is very much used to operating in terrains that are very similar to Northern Mali. They will feel at home.

The real challenge will be their coordination with the other forces. The Nigerian general that will be the overall operations commander of the West African intervention will have to show serious leadership qualities.