The UN cannot remain silent about the Mediterranean tragedies

Pope Francis has been very clear about the immigration issue, particularly the massive loss of life and the incredible human costs of the illegal crossings of the Mediterranean Sea. We might disagree with the implicit policy proposals that one can guess behind his words, but we have to recognise that he has occupied the moral ground and been a loud voice in a sea of political silences.

We would like to hear some voices from the UN side as well. Not just the spokespersons of agency A or B, but people in leadership positions. They should come up and speak. Make proposals, suggest policy avenues, and offer their goodwill services. Some of them, like the Secretary-General or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, are at the end of their mandates. That should give them more space to call a spade a spade and be daring.

Africa and Europe

I have been asked to think about Africa´s challenges in 2015.

The question is too ambitious. It´s again based on a very common misunderstanding we find in our part of the world: to believe that Africa can be seen as a single entity.

But it is also a good opportunity to keep the African issues on the European agenda. We are in a deeply interlinked world. And Europe´s future is also very much related to developments in Africa. That´s actually the key message I wish to put across. 

Peacekeeping and peace building in Africa

Thoughts on Peacekeeping within an African background

Victor Ângelo

1.       Introduction

On 10 April 2014 the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), to be known as MINUSCA. Resolution 2149 (2014) defines MINUSCA´s contextual parameters and objectives. The starting date for the mission will be 15 September 2014.

With another five months to go, that date looks far away. This is especially the case when the serious turmoil in the CAR since late 2012 is taken into account. And this timeline becomes even more problematic when repeated warnings from senior UN staff are recalled – that the situation was out of control and it was clear that the country was sliding into genocide.

A brief comment on the timing of the resolution that has just been adopted would emphasise the absurdly slow decision-making pace of the Security Council. If the premier international body responsible for peace and security – which basically means safeguarding human life and preventing severe violations of human rights – takes such an incredibly long time to respond to a not-so-complex crisis like the one in the CAR, what can we expect from the Council in more intricate situations?

“Not much indeed”, would be tempting to answer.

However, the issue is more intricate than this reply suggests. The slow response to the situation in CAR shows that there are a number of serious problems related to UN’s peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in an African setting and in a region that is not directly linked to the strategic interests of the major global powers.

This is a very serious issue that requires urgent attention. Peacekeeping must be effective, fast-moving and people-centred. The UN remains the key player in matters of peacekeeping. In the end the security question that is so often raised is the security of the ordinary citizens, in particular the most vulnerable among them.  

There is no other international or inter-governmental institution that is in a position to play a comparable role, not even the African Union (AU), notwithstanding all of efforts the African leaders have made over the last 15 years to strengthen this kind of capacity within their regional organisation. The AU´s African Standby Force (ASF) is still work in progress, even in the East African region, where the preparatory work has gone further. At this stage, it is extremely optimistic to believe that the ASF will be fully operational in 2015, as was recently recommended, in the December 2013 assessment, which further recognised the many delays this undertaking has suffered so far.

Outside Africa, NATO has been mentioned as a possible actor in the areas of peace enforcing and peacekeeping. However, the Atlantic Alliance has no vocation to play an international peacekeeping role. It could, in some cases, be used as a rapid response solution, as an entry force. But in the current circumstances, notably after the Libyan expedition and the deep-rooted tensions with Russia on the Eastern European front, it is highly improbable to have a UN Security Council request addressed to NATO. The same is true as far as the Russia-inspired Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is concerned. CSTO countries already established a peacekeeping architecture at the end of 2010. But the force is yet to be seen on the ground. To date, no operation has been assigned to CSTO. And it is difficult to foresee this organization playing any out-of-area active role in the medium term. However, both NATO and CSTO should be included in the wider debate about the future of peacekeeping.

There should be no doubt at this stage that the way forward is to strengthen the UN´s capacity to respond. As that happens, it should not be forgotten that Africa is the continent where most peacekeeping missions are deployed. Recent missions, in South Sudan, Mali and now in CAR, have been approved in response to African challenges. In this context, as the UN should address some of its key shortcomings in peacekeeping, African leaders should also be encouraged to continue strengthening their own capacities. The goal here, in parallel to the reform of the UN apparatus, is to create an African capacity to respond to violent crises within the continent´s five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In the foreseeable future, the RECs must be able to put together their respective Standby Forces, harmonise operational abilities and develop their regional machinery to deal with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political transitions.

But, at this stage, it is important to focus on some of the key issues related to UN´s peacekeeping, whilst taking into account African experiences and needs. What follows are some brief observations that should be considered in terms of advocating for the urgent need to sharpen the UN´s tools.

2.       Faster deployments 

UN peacekeeping deployments take too long to materialise. This has now been a key issue for the last seven years or so. This is particularly the case in Africa, but is more generally so in non-English speaking countries.

Large scale Troop-Contributing Countries (TTCs) are overcommitted, in view of the demands coming from huge missions that are still in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Cote d´Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and elsewhere. Take the case of Mali, for instance. Only 55% of authorised military personnel have been deployed so far, despite the fact that the mission was established almost a year ago. Many of the troops that were fielded by the preceding African-only mission in the framework of a regional response – in this case ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) troops plus Chadian soldiers who were already on the ground before the UN military presence – could not be re-hatted and transferred to the UN because they did not meet the standards the UN requires for its contingents.

This will certainly be the same in the CAR. The 6,000 MISCA soldiers –troops from neighbouring countries belonging to the Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) – will face the same difficulties in terms of their eventual re-hatting as blue berets. For many months there will be a poorly staffed MINUSCA trying to stretch itself in order to fulfil its mandate. Most likely, when the first period of the mandate comes to an end on 30 April 2015, the number of soldiers will be well below the 10,000 that the UN Security Council resolution 2149 authorised.

The same is valid for the police component. MINUSCA should have 1,800 police personnel, most of them gendarmerie. This component is critical in a mission that basically has to respond to issues of law and order in a society in chaos. However it is unlikely that the UN will be able to mobilize the required numbers. In general, states that participate in peacekeeping operations have no spare police capacity that can be made available. This is one of the big differences between police services and military forces – availability. The number of soldiers waiting for a job is much higher. And only a handful of countries have gendarmerie services. In Africa, this is the case mainly in French-speaking countries. Very often those gendarmerie forces are not fully prepared to serve within a UN mission. Like their military counterparts, their standards of training do not meet the minimum requirements for a UN assignment.

All of this has an impact on the timely fulfilment of operations´ mandates as well as the effectiveness and the image of the UN. As they try to emerge from traumatic crises and find any opportunity to make their living, people in the host nation will see many UN military convoys arriving over a long period of time, a never-ending flow of troops and highly conspicuous equipment. They will contrast this with very low levels of security operations. Before anything else, newly arrived soldiers will be busy with their own installation, building their infrastructure. This actually can easily be exploited by those in the country that are not in favour of an international military presence. Experience has shown that heavy and slow-paced deployments can undermine the political consent, which is critical for the mission.

Any crisis that is followed by a peacekeeping deployment must be able to show quick wins. And the easiest problem to turn around in the initial phase of a deployment has to do with the security environment. It might take long to address its most critical dimensions. But it is possible to improve the popular perception related to the low intensity security threats. This is where the priority should be. It has an immediate impact on the lives of the citizens. Changes to the security situation are among the first expectations. An improved situation is a winner, it terms of gaining people´s support. But doing so requires faster deployments, troops that can hit the ground running. This is not the case today, in most of the situations.

3.       Effectiveness 

The countries providing brigades and vast numbers of police personnel are generally African (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, etc) and South Asian (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). They are oversubscribed in terms of UN peacekeeping commitments. Very often, however, politically they do not want to recognise this, as the international assignments are an important part of their armed forces’ expectations. Rather, they tend to make promises and accept engagements without being sure they will have the capacity to deliver on time and with the necessary standards of quality. Also, the personnel they might be able to mobilise are general purpose infantry troops and street police officers. The force enablers and multipliers as well as air and ground mobility assets are generally insufficient and sometimes inadequate for the terrain in which they have to operate. Without them, the effectiveness of a field presence is very limited or even non-existent.

Complexity calls for more focussed deployments, highly trained men and women and more specialised military personnel. Missions now require many more Special Forces and intelligence officers – both for people-based and signals information collection and analysis – than just sentinels and patrolmen. The Council is still caught up in an approach that tries to respond to generic skills, poor performance and low standards by increasing the numbers of soldiers. This way of doing business needs to change.

For sure, this is an area where developed countries must be more forthcoming. During the last two decades they have been moving away from engaging troops in UN peacekeeping operations, with one or two exceptions, like the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. It is time to see European and North American troops and police officers back in UN missions. The developed world must be a more active part of the peacekeeping equation. They must unequivocally demonstrate that global responsibility for peacekeeping is not shared out along the lines of money: those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace. It also does not take into account that the developed countries would have a greater chance to advocate for their values and interests if their soldiers could be found shoulder to shoulder with uniformed men and women coming from other regions of the world.  Moreover, richer countries have and can spare the specialised personnel so much in demand. They also have the specific, highly efficient logistics capabilities that peacekeeping operations in remote areas around the world require.  

The second move that more developed member states should make concerns training for defence and security personnel. The military training programme the EU is implementing in Mali is a good example and it should be replicated in the CAR. As it has just been decided for Mali, after a long hesitation, it must also include the gendarmerie and the police, not just the armed forces. Investing in the development of human resources and institutions is critical to help a country overcome chronic crisis. Richer nations must be much more committed to security sector reform and the development of defence, police and penal institutions in countries coming out of a deep national crisis. The capacity building packages must also include revamping justice systems –without forgetting the relevance of traditional methods of administering justice – as a means of combating impunity and contributing to national reconciliation and long-term stability.

A cautionary note though. Training national forces and reforming national defence and security institutions in a post-crisis country must be accompanied by a plan for financial sustainability. Experience has shown that African officers trained in the best US and European academies often feel a high degree of professional frustration when they return to their national army corps, because those units are underfunded. Indeed, because of lack of resources, most units are unable to go beyond a collection of “barefooted” armed men, dressed in uniforms of fortune and flea market camouflage. They have no real means to operate. They can easily become the breeding ground for the future wave of discontent and crisis, as we have seen in Mali in 2012. The issue of the financial sustainability of modern armed forces and police services in a number of African countries requires an honest debate.

4.       Strong political mandate

The effectiveness of any UN peacekeeping mission is clearly related to its political mandate. This mandate must be realistically defined.

In terms of the African-based missions, there is now a tendency to attach to mandates an array of concerns and objectives. They are certainly important but they are generally more related to long term development goals than to keeping the peace and creating the conditions for political transition and basic human security. It will be wise to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and the core objectives of peacekeeping. Focus would make the mission stronger. It would therefore increase the chances of success.

Mandates should above all aim at creating the political and security foundations on which peace building and development should rest. Actually, an area that requires greater attention, both in terms of knowledge and identification of the practical lessons learnt so far, is the one related to the connections between peacekeeping and peace building. But those links cannot be a pretext for unworkable mandates.

Next to focus, the political role of head of mission is critical for deep-rooted change, for the move from crisis to institutional, representative democracy. It is therefore indispensable to make sure the mission leadership gets the full political support of the Security Council and the relevant regional organisations (the AU, for instance, and the affected REC).

In addition, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) must be better prepared to exercise their respective backstopping roles. For too long, the state of mind in both departments has been inspired by the arrogant attitude and detachment that comes from working at headquarters and too far away from the realities of the daily life in the field. In particular DPKO has shown, on many occasions, to lack the skills and field experience necessary to provide the right type of advice to the missions that fall under its responsibility and to serve as a permanent channel between the field and the key countries in the Security Council. The rotation of staff between headquarters and field needs to be effectively implemented.

Leadership issues are crucial in all complex situations, particularly in countries that have gone through major national upheavals. Those issues are not only about the quality of the mission leadership or the sorts of diplomatic interventions carried out by regional leaders. Leadership is fundamentally about daring to create the domestic conditions for a renewal of the national political elites in the post-crisis situation and allowing for the right type of leaders to emerge, including at the local level. New times call for new leaders grounded on accepted political practise. Leaders with legitimacy. In this context, proper electoral processes, at the presidential, national and local levels, are critical elements of an exit strategy. They call for continued support by the best technical teams available within the international peace machinery. But they should not be considered the absolute benchmarks. To complete successful elections cannot be seen as the indicator that the mission has done its job and can leave. Nonetheless, fair elections do make the transition process more sustainable and open the door for an earlier exit of the international presence.

The emphasis on national and local political leadership cannot ignore the role of civil society. A strong the civil society is essential for stability, reconciliation and democracy. Peacekeeping missions must give the example and fully accept civil society as a critical partner in the transition process. That will send a clear message to the new political elite that will emerge after the crisis. Expertise on civil society relations must be part of the mission´s skills.

5.       Reducing costs

UN peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours. A mission like the one just approved for the CAR might require a billion US dollars a year. This is undoubtedly a lot of money. Its financing is mandatory for the UN member states once the mission has been authorised by the Council. At a time of continued cost restraint and belt tightening, governments in key capitals, those that carry the main budgetary burden for UN operations, become very hesitant when it comes to this level of expenditures. This is a basic reason why approval of the resolution on CAR was delayed. Finance ministries have the first word when it comes to deciding about new international operations. Moreover, the Council knows when a mission will begin but has no clear idea about when it will end.  

It is therefore critically important to look at ways of containing costs. Not only should the mission objectives be clearly articulated, they should also be attainable within a reasonable amount of time. It is also imperative to build the national capacity to take over as soon as possible. The ultimate responsibility for peace and security in a country rests within its national borders, with its authorities and its citizens. Financial considerations make this principle more present than ever.

A further cost related question pertains to the exit strategy of the mission, which should be incorporated from the very beginning as a primary component of the mission design. It is essential that the Security Council asks DPKO and the head of the field mission to devise a reasonably defined plan focused on the gradual but steady transfer of responsibilities to the national and sub-regional authorities as soon as it is feasible to do so. Feasible means that peace can be sustained without direct intervention by the international community. A plan that would be both a road map to guide the peace keeping mission and serve as a blueprint for its exit strategy.

6.       Moving ahead

UN peacekeeping has achieved some notable results in the past. Sierra Leone, in Africa, and East Timor in the South Pacific, are just two recent examples of major successes in the recent past. UN peacekeeping has also changed a lot for the better over the last decade. Those who saw peacekeeping in the Balkans during the 1990s and then observe today´s operations notice that the UN has come a long way in terms of integration of different dimensions and creating a balance between the military and the civilian components of missions. There is now much greater emphasis on law and order and policing, justice, local administration and conflict resolution at the community level, as well as on gender equality and human rights. The UN has also accumulated extensive experience in terms of logistics supply and sustainment, air and ground mobility and support to humanitarian emergencies. 

But times keep changing. Conflicts are increasingly about basic natural resources and survival, differences in religious practices and faith-based behaviours, terrorism, wide spread banditry and criminality, and the collapse or limitations of state administration, living vast areas ungoverned. At the same time, violent conflicts tend to have deep and complex root causes, which necessitate time to be resolved. But the attention span of the international community has become shorter. And so many of us have acquired the fever of impatience, we live at the speed of the TV screen or even the social media, shaped by the 140-character approach. We want to see results before too long, if not immediately. Protracted conflicts tend to disappear from the public eye if they become too static or nothing happens. As they lose prominence, they receive less political and financial support. Their prolonged budgetary costs become more difficult to justify.

Sixteen missions are deployed in different parts of the world, nine of them in Africa. The defence sector has also been under review in several key developed countries, prompted by the need to adapt to contemporary threats and be prepared to respond to new international settings. This is therefore the moment to reflect again about the peacekeeping challenges as it was done almost 15 years ago, when the Brahimi report was issued.  Time and circumstances make it advisable to review and update the recommendations of that important and influential report.

It is also the time for the EU and the AU to reflect, in house and in their joint consultations, on what can be reasonably done by both parties to complement the UN peacekeeping work. This is a debate that should take place without further delay. It should be linked to the next evaluation of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) and its transformation into an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Africa, the doubling of APF resources over the next three years, recently decided at the IV EU-Africa Summit, is encouraging and certainly appreciated. But there is a need to go beyond resources, as important as they are, and look at the substance of what really needs to be funded and how that can be integrated in a long-term strategy of greater African self-reliance. This about Africa´s capacity to sort out its own conflicts.

This debate would also benefit from the long experience the Norwegians have acquired in the implementation of their Training for Peace programme (TfP). The programme, funded by the government of Norway since 1995 and managed by African institutions, has been able to evolve over time. It is now particularly attentive to training in the areas of African civilian capacities and police personnel for peacekeeping, as well as focused on the need to support applied research. In this, the EU has a good source of inspiration when designing the new generation of training missions. Such missions should take advantage of the Malian experience – the EU Training Mission –, be civilian led and as inclusive as possible.  

The way forward should further consider the experience of coalitions of the willing and the role of small groupings of countries as suppliers of peace enforcing and peacekeeping tasks. But this is a discussion for another time. However, it cannot be brushed aside and ignored. Nor should China´s ambitions to support peace and security operations in Africa be forgotten. Here, the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, approved in 2012, is worth noting.

All this calls for a very direct question: Who is going to lead the debate on renovating peacekeeping? It must be an institution that is in a position to bring all of the stakeholders together, including the EU, for sure, but above all, the African institutions that have the responsibility for peace and security throughout the continent.

The answer seems obvious.

April 2014

Africa´s population growth

Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing very fast. From less than a billion today, SSA will be home to

close to 2 billion people by 2050. This rate of population growth is a major challenge with a tremendous,
multidimensional impact in the Continent and globally. By mid-century, there will be in average two
Africans out of nine human beings and almost three times more Africans than Europeans.

The most immediate demographic challenge, that needs to be addressed today, is how to help Africa to
stabilise its overall population at the level of two billion. If we do not act now, the population in SSA will
continue to grow beyond 2050, well above the level that could be considered as sustainable. For that, the
demographic transition, as technically defined by the demographers, needs to be accelerated through
expanded free access to contraception and related health services, girls’ education and women’s political
empowerment. Currently less than 20% of African women use modern contraceptive methods, whilst in
Latin America and Asia the prevalence rate is well over 60% in average. But evidence as shown that access
to family planning services and proactive population policies are incomplete and lack effectiveness if they
are not accompanied by widespread campaigns to get girls to schools. Furthermore, for both issues –
contraceptive access and girl’s education - to get high on the national priorities, more women need to
occupy positions of political authority, as this type of development agenda is only genuinely implemented
if driven by women leaders. I would hasten to add here that men’s adherence is critical for the
demographic transition and the adoption of modern family life, but the change only takes place if women
are truly empowered and in a position to fight for their rights.

Boko Haram

At the beginning of the week, the terrorist group Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in Northern Nigeria and kidnapped over 130 student girls. They came with trucks and other vehicles and could move around and leave with the victims, all of this in a State that is supposed to be heavy patrolled by the Nigerian Army. Since then, notwithstanding the fact that the Army launched a major operation, the terrorists and the girls have not been found. This is again raising a number of very fundamental questions about the capacity of the national authorities to address the challenges Boko Haram poses. Something is very wrong in the way the Nigerian leaders are responding to Boko Haram.

The neighbouring countries, particularly Chad, and the friends of Nigeria are getting very worried. The terrorists are just becoming too big a menace. 

Dilma in Africa

Dilma Roussef, the President of Brazil, is back in Africa, to attend the AU Summit. This is her third visit to the Continent this year.

Brazil, which is ranked the seventh economy in the world, has understood that a stronger footing in Africa is good for its long term interests. More and more Brazilian corporations are looking for new investment opportunities in Africa, particularly in minerals and other natural resources. In many ways, Brazil sees itself competing with fellow BRICS countries –China and South Africa –, which are also deeply keen to expand their economic ties with many African states.

During her current visit, Dilma announced that Brazil will cancel or restructure almost $900m worth of debt with Africa. This is a wise decision, with a wide political impact, and little financial costs for an economy as big as the Brazilian. It serves her country’s interests well and helps the 12 African countries concerned. 

Africa's Day

Today is Africa’s Day! This blog wants to associate itself to the celebrations. Having spent 29 years working in many corners of Africa, I feel I have shared a good part of my life with many people in the Continent –I worked in some many countries. I felt the distress that came out of conflicts, oppression and corruption. But I have also celebrated a number of times, when progress took roots, democracy and human rights were put in place, or when cooperation between neighbouring states gained ground.

Africa is diverse. Some regions have done better than others. Central Africa remains behind and requires special attention. But, in general terms, 50 years on there is plenty to be happy about.

There are also major challenges. The most daunting one is very often ignored. It has to do with the extremely rapid rate of population growth. Africa needs to address its demographic transition without further delays. And that goes through a number of avenues, the most important of which is the empowerment of the African women. 

Mozambique needs to enhance the domestic political dialogue

On Saturday about twenty armed men attacked a police station in a rural area of central Mozambique. The attackers could be linked to former rebels of Renamo, an organization that fought the Frelimo-led government during the eighties and early years of the nineties. That was at the time a very ugly civil war.

Today, Renamo has changed itself in to a political movement. As a party, it sits in Parliament and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, is given the status of Opposition leader. But the old tensions between the two sides are still very much part of Mozambique’s political life. The Saturday incident is only a remote reminder of the widespread, deep animosity that defines the relations between Renamo and the party in power, Frelimo.  

 Mozambique’s Human Rights League (LDH) has just called the attention of those who want to see the reality that civil war could come back. And it appeals for statesmanship, tolerance and political consultations. Particularly at a time when local elections are being prepared and national legislative elections are scheduled for 2014.

During the last twenty years the donor community has invested heavily in the country.  They have become major partners in the peace building process. They should make use of their leverage to push both political sides to dialogue. It would be a serious mistake – which the key international players cannot afford – to pretend that there is no problem. 

In politics, you better be your own man (or woman)

During my work with President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic (CAR) – from 2008 to 2010 – I always felt that he was too inclined to indiscriminately follow Idriss Déby’s positions.  For me, and I said it several times, it was not good politics to be so much dependent on the Chadian President.

 First, Chad and CAR are too very different socio-political realities. Even Southern Chad, that at the surface could be considered similar to CAR, is distinct and cannot be easily compared with the reality south of the border.

Second, Déby is a man from the Sahel and his views about Central Africa are not necessarily the most appropriate ones.

Third, the support Bozizé was looking for in N’Djamena had a negative impact on CAR’s domestic politics: leveraged by Chad, Bozizé did not see the critical relevance and urgency of moving faster on the issues of national reconciliation and power-sharing.

But Bozizé had a different view.

Now, things have changed. He has been ousted from power. And from his temporary refuge in Cameroon, today Bozizé accused the President of Chad of being behind the rebels that chased him from the presidency and the country.

As they say, quite often in politics the lessons are learned when it is already too late. 

Congratulations to all Kenyans

Kenya’s presidential results have now been confirmed. And one should note the maturity shown this time by the political elite, particularly by Raila Odinga, who challenged the results through the courts and has now accepted the final verdict. This is a sea change compared with the tragic events that occurred after the last elections in 2007. It is another demonstration that many countries in Africa are moving in the right direction. 

The African Ellipse of Instability

I was asked by the media a number of questions about the recent developments in the Central African Republic (CAR). I have advised them to read the research paper I published last year, under the sponsorship of NUPI – the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs –about the instability in that region of Africa. I mentioned, in particular, the “ellipse of instability”, an expression I coined to describe the security risks that exist in a vast no-man’s land along the borders of Chad, Sudan, CAR, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The paper is available at the following link:

http://english.nupi.no/content/download/308614/1068211/version/1/file/NUPI+Report-SIP-7-Angelo-McGuinness.pdf

I suggest the reader to have a look at it.

CAR and its rebels

François Bozizé, who has been the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) for the last ten years, has now fled out of the country. He just crossed the Oubangui River and found himself on the DRC bank, just opposite Bangui. From here to the capital of DRC, Kinshasa, is a very long, tough trek.

The rebels from Séléka are now in control. They are basically young men from the North-eastern regions of the country, many of them with a Muslim background. But this not a religious inspired rebellion. It is once more ethnicity and regionalism taking hold in a country that has never been able to find the right balance between its different ethnic groups.

The UN has a number of personnel on the ground. Many of them are political officers. This presence is related to the fact that the UN member states have decided, some seven years ago, to include CAR in the priority list for peace building efforts. I sincerely believe that the new developments would require the UN Security Council to think hard about the future of the UN mission in CAR. 

Europe and Africa

Europe –Africa: From Indifference to Interdependence[1]

Victor Angelo

Introduction

Examining the future of the relations between Europe (EU) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), I can foresee a clear trend of mutual growing indifference, as if both regions were moving apart and becoming less interested in building a privileged partnership.

The current generation of European leaders is no longer emotionally connected with Africa. It is a depart from the attitudes of past generations, who had kept a close interest in Africa, through colonial ties and related business interests. The historical links appear now lost in the vague memories of the past. Today, the empirical observation leads to the conclusion that there is lack of understanding on the importance of co-operating with SSA. This is especially evident at present with the leaders ‘attention focused on the EU’s internal crisis, including its own new poor, the developments in the immediate neighbourhood of North Africa and Middle East and the economic and political threats China’s expansion poses.

In the current context of the international relations, Africa is perceived by many European opinion-makers at best as a distant and modest player, with little relevance to the future of Europe. For others, the stereotype is clear: Africa spells poverty, uncertainty and conflict, and undemocratic regimes. These views are not new, of course. What is new is the leverage they seem to have gained on decision making.

If one observes the relationship from an African perspective, one notices that recent studies and well publicised schools of thought question the way the EU provides development assistance, as being donor driven, arrogant and too conditional. Besides, some African political and academic personalities have extensively criticised the role of aid, as creating dependency, being ineffective and favouring the elites in the recipient countries. In addition, several political leaders throughout the Continent have decided to look towards China, India and other non-traditional partners of Africa, such as Qatar and other Gulf States, and entice new economic investments and different forms of development aid from those countries.

As a result, the following questions could be raised, from the European perspective:

·         Is it in the strategic interest of Europe to ignore the formidable challenges – high impact population dynamics, human insecurity and poor governance – that Africa will face in next decades?  And, looking at the other side of the question, is it good strategy to disregard the huge potential Africa possesses?

·         What should be the priorities for a renewed partnership between Europe and Africa? More specifically, how relevant are the SSA’s demographic challenges in the shaping of a new development co-operation agenda? The subsidiary question would be: What efforts must be made to regain the political initiative in the EU in order to bring Africa back to the top of the development agenda?

·         Who sets the agenda? Who speaks on behalf of the African populations?

Key future African challenges

Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing very fast. From less than a billion today, SSA will be home to close to 2 billion people by 2050. This rate of population growth is a major challenge with a tremendous, multidimensional impact in the Continent and globally. By mid-century, there will be in average two Africans out of nine human beings and almost three times more Africans than Europeans.

The most immediate demographic challenge, that needs to be addressed today, is how to help Africa to stabilise its overall population at the level of two billion. If we do not act now, the population in SSA will continue to grow beyond 2050, well above the level that could be considered as sustainable. For that, the demographic transition, as technically defined by the demographers, needs to be accelerated through expanded free access to contraception and related health services, girls’ education and women’s political empowerment.  Currently less than 20% of African women use modern contraceptive methods, whilst in Latin America and Asia the prevalence rate is well over 60% in average. But evidence as shown that access to family planning services and proactive population policies are incomplete and lack effectiveness if they are not accompanied by widespread campaigns to get girls to schools. Furthermore, for both issues – contraceptive access and girl’s education - to get high on the national priorities, more women need to occupy positions of political authority, as this type of development agenda is only genuinely implemented if driven by women leaders. I would hasten to add here that men’s adherence is critical for the demographic transition and the adoption of modern family life, but the change only takes place if women are truly empowered and in a position to fight for their rights.

The rapid population growth outpaces Africa’s capacity to produce its own food. Food insecurity is widespread. SSA is the region of the world with the highest rate of undernourishment: it is estimated that at least 30% of Africa’s population suffers from chronic hunger and malnutrition. As we look into the coming decades, we can forecast more widespread food insecurity that could be further aggravated by Africa’s lack of financial resources to pay for imported food combined with greater scarcity of the international supply of grains, as the consumption of cereals augments in other parts of the world, including in China, India and the Arab world. The investment in agriculture – including some kind of green revolution adapted to the region’s conditions and consumption habits – is a priority. It has however to take into account that there is water insecurity in some parts of the Continent, as there is also an expansion of the arid lands and desertification. The agricultural revolution will have to take all these factors into account and be based on seeds and technologies that will have little water demands, short production cycles and be pest resistant.

There will be in addition very serious competition for vital natural resources, such as land, rangeland, water, firewood and other forest related supplies, as well as minerals. In some cases, this competition will take violent forms, including disputes between countries, in-country armed rebellions, civil conflicts, and ethnic strife.  In other cases, it will open the door for undemocratic, corrupt governments, which will try to remain in power by force and through favouring their ethnic base’s access to scarce resources against the interests of the rest of the population.

Urbanization is the other side of the population growth coin. SSA’s cities will expand fast and chaotically. In the next decades many more urban centres like today’s Lagos and Kinshasa will spread all over Africa. These will be unmanageable, sprawling conurbations, with few job opportunities, short on social infrastructure and blind on humanity. Urban violence could easily become a trademark of the new megalopolis. Furthermore, for many young people, especially for the young men, the big city will be a temporary stop before joining the emigration flow, as they will be looking for opportunities to settle and find a better life outside the Continent. Indeed, one can foresee that the current youth unemployment rates – which can be estimated at 40% and in some cases can be as high as 2/3 of the total population under the age of 35 years (the UNDP estimate of 28% is too conservative and is more inspired by a politically correct approach than by data) – will continue to prevail in the future.

The above described conundrums are not inspired by either a pessimistic or a fatalist view of the future. They represent key issues, based on real facts. They come out of any serious projection of the present trends into the foreseeable future. For Europe, they represent two major challenges. One is related to our system of ethics: how can we contribute to mitigate and respond to the critical harsh demands that many in SSA will be facing? As fellow human beings and as a Continent that has benefitted for very long from African resources and an unequal relationship, we cannot ignore the plight of those living next door and to whom we have been linked by history.  The second challenge is related to our own stability and security. It will be a serious mistake full of dramatic consequences to believe that Europe can raise enough barriers and frontiers that would isolate it from the problems experienced by people in desperation and who would look at our region as a possible destination for their exodus.

There is however an optimistic side to the future of SSA. The region offers vast investment opportunities, in terms of resources, and labour, with high rates of return. It is also a growing market for many goods and services. Private sector expansion is an indispensable avenue to a better future. Public development assistance policies have to create space and conditions for the entrepreneurs. Private sector co-operation is a must. Investors should be guided by European institutions, as well as by their bilateral co-operation agencies, and encouraged to look south, and partner with potential counterparts in SSA. 

The priorities of a renewed development co-operation agenda

Seen from the European side of the equation, the first priority should focus on changing the mind-set of the EU leaders. They have to look at Africa as a moral engagement and also as a Continent with huge risks and opportunities. The decisive objective is to bring Africa back to Europe’s priority list of external partners. The concept of neighbourhood has to include Africa, because of vicinity and impact, as well as our historical ties with that Continent.     

Firstly, it is a question of moral values. International relations and aid assistance have to be based in ethic principles, such as solidarity, promotion of people’s dignity and human rights, as well as protecting lives. Better off Europe has the duty to assist Africa’s disenfranchised populations. Secondly, it is a matter of Europe’s interest.  Our security is linked to human security in SSA. Additionally, Africa’s development and democratic stability could make the region a major economic partner of ours. The challenge is to cooperate with Africa to turn this potential into reality.

For the EU leaders to change their approach it is necessary to mobilise the public opinion. Members of national parliaments, as well as MEPs sitting in Brussels, are called to play a critical role in terms of changing the perceptions and the substance of the debate. Thereafter, the new policies would follow. The European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development is a major step in the right direction. It needs, however, to have a comprehensive view of the issues, linked to strategic goals and human security concerns. It also requires well-defined priorities and a close link with academic and media circles as well as with key NGOs.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain the indispensable frame of reference for development co-operation. The key challenges identified in the previous section of this paper are very much in line with the Goals. They should constitute the starting points when it comes to defining the aid agenda.  In view of the specific context of SSA, particular attention needs to be given to maternal health, gender equality, and hunger. HIV is also a major issue: annually, over 70% of HIV-related deaths occur in SSA.  Furthermore, the plight of urban youth deserves exceptional attention and resources. Recent experience has shown that youth employment programmes lack substance, appropriate expertise and measurable results. They are also very much oblivious of the political dimensions: lack of democratic access to power by young people in societies where the young are the majority but the political control is kept by older politicians. Empirical evidence has shown that these old men are by and large disconnected from the aspirations of the younger generations.

International migrations are not the solution to the employment issue. It is true that we live in a more globalised world and that many will move to foreign lands in search of job opportunities. But there are limitations to these movements. Many of those who have migrated from Africa to Europe are the best educated. Africa’s future needs their talent, skills and know-how. It cannot continue to lose valuable human resources.  Also, there is a limit to the number of foreign persons Europe can absorb without compromising its own social stability. This is a very sensitive issue but it cannot be minimized: it requires more research about impact and absorptive capacities of European societies and a better understanding of its long term consequences. In the meantime, aid programmes should aim at creating the conditions for young people to be able to settle in their own countries and lead meaningful lives where their roots belong.

In addition to official aid programmes and strategic issues related to peace and security, the renewed partnership between Europe and SSA has to be built on shared economic interests. The facilitation of private sector investments should be encouraged, to expand mutual beneficial ventures, long term commercial and productive projects, and ensure capital protection, corporate social responsibility and resource sustainability.

Who sets the agenda?

The partnership between Europe and SSA has to result from a balanced dialogue between the two sides. Money cannot dictate the priorities. Europe should not set the agenda. The donor-recipient relationship should be something of the past. Only a balanced approach is acceptable in today’s circumstances.

There is a tendency within the EU to think that a number of African political leaders do not represent the interests and aspirations of their own populations. This view is very much related to considering Africa as a land of poor governance and unrepresentative politicians. The same people also see many of the African intellectuals as distant from the masses, disconnected from their roots, and unable or unwilling to influence the political elites. They therefore conclude that the agenda should be decided in Brussels and other European capitals. They also tend to blindly consider the NGO community has more genuine interlocutors. The proliferation of NGOs is, in many ways, an unintended consequence of this approach. Whilst recognising the importance of voluntary and community based worked, one should also consider that many African NGOs have little or no impact on people’s lives and a number of them are simply as unconnected as many other players.

Europe has to engage the existing leaders and maintain with them a credible, robust and frank dialogue. This is the only way we can build an effective partnership and, if necessary, contribute to the democratization of political life in Africa and a new type of relationship. At the same time, Europe should avoid show off meetings, formal gatherings void of substantive exchanges, as it is often the case between the two Commissions: the European and the African.  And, above all, Europe should abstain from double standard approaches towards African leaders and their governance systems. Values and principles are the same, for friends and foes alike.

13 Dec. 2012

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[1] Communication delivered to the International Conference “Building the Africa-Europe partnership: What Next?”- Lisbon, Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian, 13-14 December 2012 

Chad on its own

This evening I had a brief discussion with the Chadian leadership. They think the international community is not doing enough to assist the country on the road to peace and progress. They also believe Chad has been a barrier against the expansion of religious fundamentalism in the Sahel but that role is not fully appreciated by the key donor countries in the West.

Chad is again at a critical juncture, with the situation in South Sudan having an impact on the fragile relations between Chadians, Northerners and Southerners. Furthermore, the country is preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections, which should take place within the first semester of 2011. The preparatory work is of poor quality and nobody seems to link that with the potential for troubles down the line. On top of everything, one cannot forget that the democratisation process is still an infant.

The donors are not properly represented in N'Djaména and the dialogue between them and the government is not productive. There has been no real dialogue with Brussels either.

France, the key Western partner, has been without a proper ambassador for several months. The outgoing envoy said good bye at the beginning of summer and then, after a short while in Paris, came back, in a very strange diplomatic situation. He is around but as a weakened player.

The EC has been represented by someone who has little sense of diplomacy and a very unique way of looking at strategy. He was supposed to leave long back, but has delayed his departure. He is not happy with the parking lot that waits for him in Brussels. And the new lady keeps waiting somewhere in the clouds of EU bureaucracy.

The US had a good ambassador in N'Djaména. But he has been sick since the beginning of the year. The new ambassador has only recently been confirmed. The interim chargé d'affaires did a good job, but it is not the same as being the susbtantive head of mission.

And that's very much it, on the side of Western missions in Chad.

The question is then obvious: Are we sure we have our African priorities right?