Showing posts with label African Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label African Union. Show all posts

Monday, 11 September 2023

Commenting on the G20 Final Communiqué

 I share the frustration expressed by many regarding the outcome of the G20 just held.

The final statement reiterates many of the commitments made elsewhere. Particularly, in many United Nations meetings. As I said in the Portuguese media, the main issue is that promises are made but their implementation lacks far behind or never happens. That is the best way to undermine the leadership, be it at the county level or in the global arena. It explains why the credibility of the international leaders is so low.  

This said, it was important to bring back to the final communiqué all those points that are being discussed in the key international conferences. That includes the SDG, the climate discussions, the gender issues, the inequality problems, the respect for the UN Charter and for people’s rights. And the matters of peace and war. 


The point on the reform of the World Bank is also a wise play.  


Words and statement most be seen as significant, even when we know that human rights or any other key issues are not respected in the country whose leader has pledged to. It gives those who care and who fight for those rights a leverage point. Strength, I would say.

 

Regarding the African Union, I agree it is a crucial move. It is also a smart move for South Africa, that has now a reason to say no to Nigeria or Egypt in the G20.  


In the end, I think we should see India and others encouraging multilateral approaches and multilateralism but planning to play in small groupings and betting as much as possible in bilateral relations and pure and tough national interests.  

Saturday, 19 February 2022

Looking for a serious partnership: Europe and Africa

Europe and Africa: a very complex relationship

Victor Ângelo

 

The sixth summit between the European Union and the African Union started yesterday and continues today in Brussels. I take the opportunity to share some personal thoughts on the relationship between Europe and a continent that has absorbed more than three decades of my professional life, including as Director for Africa of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) operations.

A chessboard that covers 82 countries and around 1.7 billion people can only be quite complex. This complexity is compounded by the imbalances that history has caused and the disparities in development that exist between the two continents. Therefore, establishing partnerships of equals must be the absolute priority for both parties. This is an extremely sensitive issue. European leaders have not always shown sufficient political tact. There is still a logic that sees donors on one side and needy on the other. Or, worse still, that sees Africa as an area of instability, which, combined with unparalleled demographic pressure, will eventually lead to mass migrations to the EU. For those who think like this, Africa appears as a money drain and a threat.

The summit, scheduled for 2020, has been repeatedly postponed because of the pandemic. Now it is being held under the co-presidency of France and Senegal, because they are currently in charge of their respective regions. It is not the best coincidence. There is now an anti-French feeling in West and Central Africa. And the Senegalese president, Macky Sall, and even Dakar and its elite, are seen as the Parisians of sub-Saharan Africa. This has given rise to talk that this is yet another Elysée-inspired summit. Moreover, the impression has been given that not enough attention has been paid during the preparatory work to the concerns of the Anglophone and Lusophone countries.

The truth is that the African continent is very diverse. Each sub-region has specific characteristics and even deep-rooted prejudices towards the others. It is enough to listen, as I have often heard, to what a Southern African politician says about the situation in certain West or Central African states to understand that the façade hides many cracks.

Stability and prosperity sum up the aspirations of the participants.

Stability requires competent governance, in tune with the wishes of the people and capable of protecting their security and rights. This is an area which requires a frank dialogue between the partners to define everyone's responsibilities. Drawing up plans in Brussels and then landing to implement them in the Sahel, or elsewhere, ends up leading to the rejection of these initiatives and leaves room for slippage, as is happening in Mali and the Central African Republic. Nor can one accept a military junta in Chad and say no to another in Burkina Faso, for example. Such ambiguities only serve to discredit cooperation from Europe. Moreover, in the fight against terrorism it is imperative to obtain visible results without delay. The continuing deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel and beyond calls for an analysis of the reasons for failure and, on the basis of lessons learned, a different approach.

Prosperity must rest on five pillars. First, the fight against corruption. Second, the electrification of the continent. Brussels tells us that 50% of Africa's population has no access to electricity. That figure is obviously underestimated. We all know that electricity grids only work when they work, meaning that the cuts are longer than the supply. Third, in a green revolution, which modernises agriculture and livestock. Fourth, industrialisation, local processing of raw materials and agricultural products. Fifth, in the effective abolition of customs barriers between African countries. Trade between these countries represents no more than 15% of the continent's foreign trade. This is far too little.

So let us wait for the results of the summit. And to battle on with optimism.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 18 February 2022)


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Saturday, 10 October 2020

Europe, Africa and China

Artificial Intelligence translation of my opinion piece published today in the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias.

Europe and Africa: searching for a common future

Victor Angelo

The sixth summit between the European Union and the African Union was due to take place later this month in Brussels. The pandemic has ruined the plan. Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa's head of state and current president in office of the AU, tried his best to have the meeting held later this year before the end of his mandate. But he did not get enough supporters for a virtual option. In fact, the lack of enthusiasm for digital screens has revealed that there are significant differences between Europeans and Africans regarding the future of mutual relations, i.e., there is still no agreement on a common strategy.

If all goes well, the summit will take place during the Portuguese presidency of the EU in the first half of 2021. I hope there will be no further postponement. In the second half of the year, it will be Slovenia that will be in the chair, a country that does not give Africa the attention that we give. It is not yet known which head of state will be at that time leading the AU - he will be one from Central Africa - but I hope that Ursula von der Leyen's counterpart will still be the Chadian Moussa Faki Mahamat. Elected president of the African Union Commission in 2017, Moussa Faki is a noble, intelligent, and balanced politician.

We should take the extra time to try to resolve the differences. The priorities in the strategy proposal are too broad, they have everything. Moreover, they give the impression of being a European agenda and not a meeting point between the visions of one side and the other. They deal with the environmental and energy transition; digital transformation; sustainable growth and employment; security and governance; and migration. The African side's reading is that Europe continues to think in terms of aid and dependence rather than economic partnerships, investment, and free trade. The European concern seems to be, above all, to put a brake on migration from Africa to Europe.

Defining a strategy that responds to the concerns of the parties, when we have 55 African countries on one side and 27 European countries on the other, is not easy. For example, the realities that exist in the western region of Africa are quite different from the challenges that Southern Africa faces. A strategy for the relationship with such a diverse continent must stay on the broad lines, define only the objectives and general political principles. It must then be completed by more operational agreements, region by region - as defined by the AU. The strategy needs to recognize the complexity of the African continent. The same should happen with Europe. Certain European countries have a closer connection to Africa than others. Speak of Africa in Poland or the Baltics and you will get a distant comment, quite different from what you hear in Lisbon or Paris.

The strategy also needs to be clearer in recognising what the common problems are and how each side should contribute to solving them. At the moment, the draft strategy suggests that the problems are in Africa and that Europe's role is to help solve them. This is an old-fashioned way of looking at it. It does not serve to build partnerships among equals. Portugal would make an innovative contribution by proposing the discussion of shared challenges and the way to respond to them together.

There is also the problem of the great elephant which, although present in the room, Europeans prefer to ignore: China. Now, China is a major actor in Africa. The African leaders, who thought that a virtual summit with Europe would not be advisable, made one with the Chinese leadership, to discuss the impact of covid 19 and the possible areas of future cooperation, in the framework of the post-Pandemic reality. This initiative should open two new avenues for Europeans to reflect on, which need to be considered before the 2021 meeting. First, to recognize that the strategy needs to be revised to take into account the weaknesses that the pandemic has revealed. Second, to analyse the role of China in Africa and define a European political position on this increasingly decisive presence. Closing one's eyes so as not to see China's massive intervention in Africa may be comfortable, but it is a bad strategy.  

 

 

Monday, 25 May 2020

Africa Day 2020


Africa Day 2020 was ignored in Europe. The pandemic pushes everything else out of the screen. In past years, today’s celebration would be part of the news in various countries of Western Europe. Now, we are so focused on our surroundings that I get the impression we have forgotten that the world is bigger than our small neighbourhood.

Well, let me congratulate my friends in Africa and wish them a better governed and more united Continent.


Wednesday, 8 April 2020

The African situation


My friends all over Africa tell me that the pandemic is gaining ground in several countries. There are lockdowns in place in some cities. The big problem is that the national health structures have very limited capacity to deal with Covid-19. It all starts with the means of testing. And then, the treatment, the conditions in the hospitals, the shortage of medical staff at every level. There have been some figures about the number of cases. But the tally is far from being reliable.

Leading people in those countries are looking in the direction of China. For them, China could be a model and a source of help. They are also very surprised as they see European nations, developed societies, struggling to respond to the challenge. They can’t understand the difficulties the Europeans meet. They thought that a situation of that type would never happen in Europe. The European image is losing sharpness and light in the African circles. That is one of the consequences of the pandemic.

The ordinary African citizen, particularly those in the big metropolis, have very little space for social distancing. That notwithstanding, I have seen pictures of empty cities throughout the Continent. People know what is at play. And they try to take it as seriously as their living conditions allow them to do it. I have a deep admiration for them. They are, in many cases, the poorest of the poor, they must fight every day for their own economic survival, but they are showing a good measure of responsibility.

One of things that must be placed back on the agenda, once we start getting out of these troubling times, is the relationship between Africa and Europe. Both sides have a lot to gain from a stronger partnership. And, as I said several times, we can include the Chinese in the equation. They will gain a lot as well, if we are all together.

Saturday, 7 December 2019

Europe and Africa: looking for a renewed cooperation


Ursula von der Leyen, the new European Commission President, travelled to Addis Ababa to meet the Chairman of the African Union, Moussa Faki. This is a great political gesture. It shows the priority she wants to give to the cooperation with the African institutions.

I am sure Moussa Faki appreciated the move. He is a very fine politician and knows that it is in the advantage of both sides to deepen the cooperation. It has also to become more strategic. Von der Leyen’s message was basically that it is up to the Africans to propose the agenda.


Tuesday, 20 August 2019

Zimbabwe and the regime's savagery


In the afternoon I was on the phone with a Zimbabwean friend based in Harare. We discussed the recent human rights violations and the police brutality. All that is unacceptable and shows that President Mnangagwa is not able to respond to the deep crisis the country is in. Old habits die hard. And the President is going back to what he has known all his life, under the leadership of Old Robert: violent repression of popular discontent. That can only bring more suffering and misery to the country. It is very sad. I add my voice to the condemnation of such acts of tyranny and to the lack of respect for the people of Zimbabwe.


Thursday, 21 March 2019

Again about Europe and Africa


My presentation of yesterday at the European Political Strategy Centre, a think tank directed attached to the President of the European Commission, was about the future of the partnership between Europe and Africa. The conference room filled up. Very senior people from the Commissioners’ Cabinets and from the External Action Service and Development Cooperation attended and asked questions, at the end of my long introductory speech. 

I could notice that there is a genuine interested in establishing a more constructive rapport between the Continents. I think I can say these key people understand that both regions will continue to be closely linked, for good or for bad, notwithstanding the heavy presence of new players in the African scene. In that case, it is better to deepen the cooperation and do it along strategic lines and with goals that respond to the interests of Europe and Africa. For this, a frank process of dialogue, at different levels of authority, is essential. The question is not whether one is hopeful or pessimist about the future. The point is to be very much aware of the immense challenges that both sides face and see how they can be addressed through shared values and joint action.

Monday, 21 January 2019

On the situation in DRC (Congo)

Regrettably, chaos and misery are the two words closely associated with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A good part of this enduring disaster comes from the political leadership in Kinshasa. They manipulate the institutions and fire up the instability and the divisions for their own corrupt gain.

The presidential electoral process has very much been an illustration of all the ills associated with such leaders. As a process, it is not credible at all. But it has brought a ray of change. And that, for now, seems enough to keep the people tranquil. The Congolese wanted, above all, to get rid of Joseph Kabila and his henchmen. The announced outcome of the election, as disputed as it can be, might also be a step in that direction. A very timid step, it’s recognised, with a rather weak new President, but still, at the eyes of many, a step forward.

That’s why the friends of Congo, both in the region and elsewhere, ought to be very prudent in their approach to the current situation.


Friday, 30 December 2016

To say thank you to Ban Ki-moon

Ban Ki-moon has left the UN Secretariat building today, at the end of his second mandate.

He spent the last ten years at the UN helm. I worked directly under him during a few years and can´t let him go without saying that he has always tried to do his best as Secretary-General.

People have criticised his low profile style, his communication skills, and his indecision in some critical moments, and so on. But they have forgotten he comes from a very different cultural and civilizational background, one that is more inclined to pursue dialogue and harmony instead of our Western way that puts a premium on personal confrontation. And many have also been blind to his tremendous efforts on climate change, on improving the work of the Security Council, on gender, the protection of civilians, and on enhancing the coordination with the regional organisations, such as the African Union, the EU and NATO. He has managed to keep the bridges open with the key members of the UN Security Council and that´s in itself a major achievement.

We should be mindful to the fact that the UN is an extremely complex organisation. It is the meeting point of all the national interests as the member States perceive them. The Secretary-General is caught in that dense web of narrow interests. He has immense authority, it is true, but it is also seen by the States as their top international civil servant. That´s not a very easy position.

I think it is fair to say goodbye to Ban Ki-moon on a positive note.




Saturday, 27 August 2016

Africa meets Japan

Just to note that today the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told African leaders that his country will commit $30 billion over the next three years in public and private support for infrastructure development, including power generation, education and healthcare expansion in the continent. The Japan-Africa Summit took place in Nairobi. More than 30 heads of state and government from across Africa attended the meeting.

There are a number of reasons for the Japanese renewed interest in Africa, well beyond the nice and diplomatic words that were said at the Summit.


In addition, the current African Union Chairman Idriss Deby, who is the President of Chad, urged Japan to contribute to the recent established African Fund Against Terrorism. This fund was set up by the Kigali AU Summit last month. It shows that security is a major priority concern for the African leaders. 

Tuesday, 9 February 2016

We decided to ignore South Sudan

South Sudan has now joined the list of the forgotten crises.

The country was the darling of the international community three or four years ago. In the meantime, it experienced a very serious civil war, hundreds of thousands of displacements and a plunge into political chaos. In many ways, such violent crisis could have been prevented if the UN and the key partners of the country had played a more courageous supporting role.

Now, South Sudan is trying to move out of violence. The needs are huge. Including, to start with, the ones related to basic humanitarian assistance. But the donors are not responding. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator has just revealed that the humanitarian appeal for South Sudan remains outside the radar screen, nobody is paying attention to it. Indeed, he stated that only 2% of the required humanitarian funds have been raised so far.

It is time to be a bit louder about South Sudan again.


Friday, 20 November 2015

African Union

I am just back from meetings at the African Union in Addis Ababa. 

And I should add that I was impressed by the clarity of the messages I got from the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. He and his team have a clear understanding of the challenges at hand. They have also the right approach when it comes to dealing with them.

 The point is that the African response capacity remains weak. It should therefore be strengthened by the external partners to Africa. That strengthening would be in the interest of stability and human rights in Africa, but it would also serve the long term interests of Europe and others outside Africa. 

But for it to work it has to be part of the AU priorities and advocacy efforts. 

Saturday, 19 September 2015

Burkina Faso must return to the democratic path

Burkina Faso is one of the better educated countries in West Africa. And its population is young and dynamic. There is in addition a good sense of national identity and cohesiveness. It is therefore unacceptable to see the Presidential Guard take over the executive power, stop the transition to democratic rule and try to bring back the former President, Blaise Compaoré. The coup d´état, carried out a couple of days ago, must be condemned firmly by all the friends of such an interesting and promising country. It would be a serious disservice to Africa if France and others in the EU would be seen as hesitating in their condemnation of the coup. 

Tuesday, 21 July 2015

Somalia is out of the international radar

I was in contact today with a former UN colleague who is now serving in Somalia. And I became deeply worried, as we reviewed the situation in the country.

Al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization that operates in Somalia, remains a major threat. As the situation deteriorates once again, the soldiers from the AU expeditionary force are paying a very heavy toll. They are in Somalia, with a UN-supported mandated, to help in restoring peace but they are the target of repeated vicious attacks. Many African soldiers – recently the Burundians and the Ethiopians lost a good number of military personnel – have been killed. The UN staff, who are basically confined to their compound at the airport, are also in very serious danger.

There is no hope in the air once more.

Somalia is one of those forgotten conflicts that the international community keeps out of the radar. It is out of the news, because it is in many ways an unmanageable and unsolvable conflict. It is also less important for the world powers at present because the piracy issue has been successfully addressed. Therefore, the country is no longer a menace for the interests that matter and its unmeasurable drama can obviously be relegated to a darker corner at the end of the list of priorities. 

Monday, 15 June 2015

Bashir´s travels

Omar al-Bashir is an old desert snake. He is pretty strategic and astute. And he has also been a key player against the interests of the UN and its image, including in the peacekeeping area.

Once more he has managed to strike another blow against the prestige of the UN. In this case, the loser is the International Criminal Court.

But it is also the South African government. The authorities were caught in a dreadful dilemma: either to arrest Bashir and risk a serious row with Sudan and many other African governments; or let him leave South Africa, notwithstanding the court order, and risk further criticism at home.


They opted for the let-go option. I think in the end that was the only reasonable decision they could take. Politics is about deciding and the lesser evil is quite often the better decision. Now they should have the courage to explain the decision. Politics is also about telling the story in a way that makes sense and considers public opinion as a very serious issue. 

Friday, 12 June 2015

Africa´s security: a collective and national effort

The issues of national and people´s security remain a core problem for several African States. 

Boko Haram is the most visible example of a country´s weak security systems. Nigeria has large military and police forces and services. It has been one the most assiduous participant in UN peacekeeping operations. But when challenged by a domestic group of extremists and fanatics it became obvious that big numbers do not mean effectiveness. 

Nigeria and many other countries will have to reform the armed forces and ensure a better coordination between the military and the police services. The reform includes a greater emphasis on professionalism, discipline, good management of the resources and better links with the citizens.

 Better security is also related to a regional response. The cooperation within the framework of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities calls for an acceleration of the current efforts and a greater commitment to collective defence. 

Tuesday, 18 November 2014

Rethinking peace operations

I spent the end of last week in Oslo at the invitation of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The aim was to review their support to peace operations during the past years and to reflect about future assistance. Norway is a small country but a big player in areas of peace and conflict resolution, as well as a very committed supporter of bilateral approaches. They are particularly keen in strengthening the African Union´s peace machinery and also the UN´s.

But peace operations, as they are implemented by those two organisations, are under serious stress. The new types of menaces, the nature of conflict in many parts of the world, the challenges the West is facing in non-Western societies, are some of the key issues that call for a rethink of the deployments. The models followed up to now are no longer suited for the violence we meet today, be it in the Central African Republic, in Nigeria, in the North of Africa or in the Middle East.

The discussion is ongoing. But it can´t take long. The crises call for quick responses, early results and smart political processes. 

Sunday, 2 November 2014

Africa´s development priorities

I wrote an opinion piece today to emphasize how important is for the international community to focus on the development challenges of Africa. This should be one of the top priorities in the global agenda for the next two or three decades. And the key areas of intervention have to be, as I see them, the following: governance, energy development and agricultural change. Resources, both from Africa and from elsewhere, should go first to these three sectors. That will be the only way to address the compound problems of extreme poverty, population growth and chaotic urbanisation. 

Tuesday, 29 April 2014

Peacekeeping and peace building in Africa

Thoughts on Peacekeeping within an African background
Victor Ângelo



1.       Introduction

On 10 April 2014 the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), to be known as MINUSCA. Resolution 2149 (2014) defines MINUSCA´s contextual parameters and objectives. The starting date for the mission will be 15 September 2014.
With another five months to go, that date looks far away. This is especially the case when the serious turmoil in the CAR since late 2012 is taken into account. And this timeline becomes even more problematic when repeated warnings from senior UN staff are recalled – that the situation was out of control and it was clear that the country was sliding into genocide.

A brief comment on the timing of the resolution that has just been adopted would emphasise the absurdly slow decision-making pace of the Security Council. If the premier international body responsible for peace and security – which basically means safeguarding human life and preventing severe violations of human rights – takes such an incredibly long time to respond to a not-so-complex crisis like the one in the CAR, what can we expect from the Council in more intricate situations?

“Not much indeed”, would be tempting to answer.

However, the issue is more intricate than this reply suggests. The slow response to the situation in CAR shows that there are a number of serious problems related to UN’s peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in an African setting and in a region that is not directly linked to the strategic interests of the major global powers.

This is a very serious issue that requires urgent attention. Peacekeeping must be effective, fast-moving and people-centred. The UN remains the key player in matters of peacekeeping. In the end the security question that is so often raised is the security of the ordinary citizens, in particular the most vulnerable among them.  
There is no other international or inter-governmental institution that is in a position to play a comparable role, not even the African Union (AU), notwithstanding all of efforts the African leaders have made over the last 15 years to strengthen this kind of capacity within their regional organisation. The AU´s African Standby Force (ASF) is still work in progress, even in the East African region, where the preparatory work has gone further. At this stage, it is extremely optimistic to believe that the ASF will be fully operational in 2015, as was recently recommended, in the December 2013 assessment, which further recognised the many delays this undertaking has suffered so far.

Outside Africa, NATO has been mentioned as a possible actor in the areas of peace enforcing and peacekeeping. However, the Atlantic Alliance has no vocation to play an international peacekeeping role. It could, in some cases, be used as a rapid response solution, as an entry force. But in the current circumstances, notably after the Libyan expedition and the deep-rooted tensions with Russia on the Eastern European front, it is highly improbable to have a UN Security Council request addressed to NATO. The same is true as far as the Russia-inspired Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is concerned. CSTO countries already established a peacekeeping architecture at the end of 2010. But the force is yet to be seen on the ground. To date, no operation has been assigned to CSTO. And it is difficult to foresee this organization playing any out-of-area active role in the medium term. However, both NATO and CSTO should be included in the wider debate about the future of peacekeeping.

There should be no doubt at this stage that the way forward is to strengthen the UN´s capacity to respond. As that happens, it should not be forgotten that Africa is the continent where most peacekeeping missions are deployed. Recent missions, in South Sudan, Mali and now in CAR, have been approved in response to African challenges. In this context, as the UN should address some of its key shortcomings in peacekeeping, African leaders should also be encouraged to continue strengthening their own capacities. The goal here, in parallel to the reform of the UN apparatus, is to create an African capacity to respond to violent crises within the continent´s five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In the foreseeable future, the RECs must be able to put together their respective Standby Forces, harmonise operational abilities and develop their regional machinery to deal with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political transitions.

But, at this stage, it is important to focus on some of the key issues related to UN´s peacekeeping, whilst taking into account African experiences and needs. What follows are some brief observations that should be considered in terms of advocating for the urgent need to sharpen the UN´s tools.


2.       Faster deployments 

UN peacekeeping deployments take too long to materialise. This has now been a key issue for the last seven years or so. This is particularly the case in Africa, but is more generally so in non-English speaking countries.
Large scale Troop-Contributing Countries (TTCs) are overcommitted, in view of the demands coming from huge missions that are still in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Cote d´Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and elsewhere. Take the case of Mali, for instance. Only 55% of authorised military personnel have been deployed so far, despite the fact that the mission was established almost a year ago. Many of the troops that were fielded by the preceding African-only mission in the framework of a regional response – in this case ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) troops plus Chadian soldiers who were already on the ground before the UN military presence – could not be re-hatted and transferred to the UN because they did not meet the standards the UN requires for its contingents.

This will certainly be the same in the CAR. The 6,000 MISCA soldiers –troops from neighbouring countries belonging to the Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) – will face the same difficulties in terms of their eventual re-hatting as blue berets. For many months there will be a poorly staffed MINUSCA trying to stretch itself in order to fulfil its mandate. Most likely, when the first period of the mandate comes to an end on 30 April 2015, the number of soldiers will be well below the 10,000 that the UN Security Council resolution 2149 authorised.

The same is valid for the police component. MINUSCA should have 1,800 police personnel, most of them gendarmerie. This component is critical in a mission that basically has to respond to issues of law and order in a society in chaos. However it is unlikely that the UN will be able to mobilize the required numbers. In general, states that participate in peacekeeping operations have no spare police capacity that can be made available. This is one of the big differences between police services and military forces – availability. The number of soldiers waiting for a job is much higher. And only a handful of countries have gendarmerie services. In Africa, this is the case mainly in French-speaking countries. Very often those gendarmerie forces are not fully prepared to serve within a UN mission. Like their military counterparts, their standards of training do not meet the minimum requirements for a UN assignment.

All of this has an impact on the timely fulfilment of operations´ mandates as well as the effectiveness and the image of the UN. As they try to emerge from traumatic crises and find any opportunity to make their living, people in the host nation will see many UN military convoys arriving over a long period of time, a never-ending flow of troops and highly conspicuous equipment. They will contrast this with very low levels of security operations. Before anything else, newly arrived soldiers will be busy with their own installation, building their infrastructure. This actually can easily be exploited by those in the country that are not in favour of an international military presence. Experience has shown that heavy and slow-paced deployments can undermine the political consent, which is critical for the mission.

Any crisis that is followed by a peacekeeping deployment must be able to show quick wins. And the easiest problem to turn around in the initial phase of a deployment has to do with the security environment. It might take long to address its most critical dimensions. But it is possible to improve the popular perception related to the low intensity security threats. This is where the priority should be. It has an immediate impact on the lives of the citizens. Changes to the security situation are among the first expectations. An improved situation is a winner, it terms of gaining people´s support. But doing so requires faster deployments, troops that can hit the ground running. This is not the case today, in most of the situations.


3.       Effectiveness 

The countries providing brigades and vast numbers of police personnel are generally African (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, etc) and South Asian (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). They are oversubscribed in terms of UN peacekeeping commitments. Very often, however, politically they do not want to recognise this, as the international assignments are an important part of their armed forces’ expectations. Rather, they tend to make promises and accept engagements without being sure they will have the capacity to deliver on time and with the necessary standards of quality. Also, the personnel they might be able to mobilise are general purpose infantry troops and street police officers. The force enablers and multipliers as well as air and ground mobility assets are generally insufficient and sometimes inadequate for the terrain in which they have to operate. Without them, the effectiveness of a field presence is very limited or even non-existent.
Complexity calls for more focussed deployments, highly trained men and women and more specialised military personnel. Missions now require many more Special Forces and intelligence officers – both for people-based and signals information collection and analysis – than just sentinels and patrolmen. The Council is still caught up in an approach that tries to respond to generic skills, poor performance and low standards by increasing the numbers of soldiers. This way of doing business needs to change.

For sure, this is an area where developed countries must be more forthcoming. During the last two decades they have been moving away from engaging troops in UN peacekeeping operations, with one or two exceptions, like the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. It is time to see European and North American troops and police officers back in UN missions. The developed world must be a more active part of the peacekeeping equation. They must unequivocally demonstrate that global responsibility for peacekeeping is not shared out along the lines of money: those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace. It also does not take into account that the developed countries would have a greater chance to advocate for their values and interests if their soldiers could be found shoulder to shoulder with uniformed men and women coming from other regions of the world.  Moreover, richer countries have and can spare the specialised personnel so much in demand. They also have the specific, highly efficient logistics capabilities that peacekeeping operations in remote areas around the world require.  

The second move that more developed member states should make concerns training for defence and security personnel. The military training programme the EU is implementing in Mali is a good example and it should be replicated in the CAR. As it has just been decided for Mali, after a long hesitation, it must also include the gendarmerie and the police, not just the armed forces. Investing in the development of human resources and institutions is critical to help a country overcome chronic crisis. Richer nations must be much more committed to security sector reform and the development of defence, police and penal institutions in countries coming out of a deep national crisis. The capacity building packages must also include revamping justice systems –without forgetting the relevance of traditional methods of administering justice – as a means of combating impunity and contributing to national reconciliation and long-term stability.

A cautionary note though. Training national forces and reforming national defence and security institutions in a post-crisis country must be accompanied by a plan for financial sustainability. Experience has shown that African officers trained in the best US and European academies often feel a high degree of professional frustration when they return to their national army corps, because those units are underfunded. Indeed, because of lack of resources, most units are unable to go beyond a collection of “barefooted” armed men, dressed in uniforms of fortune and flea market camouflage. They have no real means to operate. They can easily become the breeding ground for the future wave of discontent and crisis, as we have seen in Mali in 2012. The issue of the financial sustainability of modern armed forces and police services in a number of African countries requires an honest debate.


4.       Strong political mandate


The effectiveness of any UN peacekeeping mission is clearly related to its political mandate. This mandate must be realistically defined.

In terms of the African-based missions, there is now a tendency to attach to mandates an array of concerns and objectives. They are certainly important but they are generally more related to long term development goals than to keeping the peace and creating the conditions for political transition and basic human security. It will be wise to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and the core objectives of peacekeeping. Focus would make the mission stronger. It would therefore increase the chances of success.

Mandates should above all aim at creating the political and security foundations on which peace building and development should rest. Actually, an area that requires greater attention, both in terms of knowledge and identification of the practical lessons learnt so far, is the one related to the connections between peacekeeping and peace building. But those links cannot be a pretext for unworkable mandates.

Next to focus, the political role of head of mission is critical for deep-rooted change, for the move from crisis to institutional, representative democracy. It is therefore indispensable to make sure the mission leadership gets the full political support of the Security Council and the relevant regional organisations (the AU, for instance, and the affected REC).
In addition, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) must be better prepared to exercise their respective backstopping roles. For too long, the state of mind in both departments has been inspired by the arrogant attitude and detachment that comes from working at headquarters and too far away from the realities of the daily life in the field. In particular DPKO has shown, on many occasions, to lack the skills and field experience necessary to provide the right type of advice to the missions that fall under its responsibility and to serve as a permanent channel between the field and the key countries in the Security Council. The rotation of staff between headquarters and field needs to be effectively implemented.

Leadership issues are crucial in all complex situations, particularly in countries that have gone through major national upheavals. Those issues are not only about the quality of the mission leadership or the sorts of diplomatic interventions carried out by regional leaders. Leadership is fundamentally about daring to create the domestic conditions for a renewal of the national political elites in the post-crisis situation and allowing for the right type of leaders to emerge, including at the local level. New times call for new leaders grounded on accepted political practise. Leaders with legitimacy. In this context, proper electoral processes, at the presidential, national and local levels, are critical elements of an exit strategy. They call for continued support by the best technical teams available within the international peace machinery. But they should not be considered the absolute benchmarks. To complete successful elections cannot be seen as the indicator that the mission has done its job and can leave. Nonetheless, fair elections do make the transition process more sustainable and open the door for an earlier exit of the international presence.

The emphasis on national and local political leadership cannot ignore the role of civil society. A strong the civil society is essential for stability, reconciliation and democracy. Peacekeeping missions must give the example and fully accept civil society as a critical partner in the transition process. That will send a clear message to the new political elite that will emerge after the crisis. Expertise on civil society relations must be part of the mission´s skills.


5.       Reducing costs

UN peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours. A mission like the one just approved for the CAR might require a billion US dollars a year. This is undoubtedly a lot of money. Its financing is mandatory for the UN member states once the mission has been authorised by the Council. At a time of continued cost restraint and belt tightening, governments in key capitals, those that carry the main budgetary burden for UN operations, become very hesitant when it comes to this level of expenditures. This is a basic reason why approval of the resolution on CAR was delayed. Finance ministries have the first word when it comes to deciding about new international operations. Moreover, the Council knows when a mission will begin but has no clear idea about when it will end.  

It is therefore critically important to look at ways of containing costs. Not only should the mission objectives be clearly articulated, they should also be attainable within a reasonable amount of time. It is also imperative to build the national capacity to take over as soon as possible. The ultimate responsibility for peace and security in a country rests within its national borders, with its authorities and its citizens. Financial considerations make this principle more present than ever.

A further cost related question pertains to the exit strategy of the mission, which should be incorporated from the very beginning as a primary component of the mission design. It is essential that the Security Council asks DPKO and the head of the field mission to devise a reasonably defined plan focused on the gradual but steady transfer of responsibilities to the national and sub-regional authorities as soon as it is feasible to do so. Feasible means that peace can be sustained without direct intervention by the international community. A plan that would be both a road map to guide the peace keeping mission and serve as a blueprint for its exit strategy.


6.       Moving ahead

UN peacekeeping has achieved some notable results in the past. Sierra Leone, in Africa, and East Timor in the South Pacific, are just two recent examples of major successes in the recent past. UN peacekeeping has also changed a lot for the better over the last decade. Those who saw peacekeeping in the Balkans during the 1990s and then observe today´s operations notice that the UN has come a long way in terms of integration of different dimensions and creating a balance between the military and the civilian components of missions. There is now much greater emphasis on law and order and policing, justice, local administration and conflict resolution at the community level, as well as on gender equality and human rights. The UN has also accumulated extensive experience in terms of logistics supply and sustainment, air and ground mobility and support to humanitarian emergencies. 

But times keep changing. Conflicts are increasingly about basic natural resources and survival, differences in religious practices and faith-based behaviours, terrorism, wide spread banditry and criminality, and the collapse or limitations of state administration, living vast areas ungoverned. At the same time, violent conflicts tend to have deep and complex root causes, which necessitate time to be resolved. But the attention span of the international community has become shorter. And so many of us have acquired the fever of impatience, we live at the speed of the TV screen or even the social media, shaped by the 140-character approach. We want to see results before too long, if not immediately. Protracted conflicts tend to disappear from the public eye if they become too static or nothing happens. As they lose prominence, they receive less political and financial support. Their prolonged budgetary costs become more difficult to justify.

Sixteen missions are deployed in different parts of the world, nine of them in Africa. The defence sector has also been under review in several key developed countries, prompted by the need to adapt to contemporary threats and be prepared to respond to new international settings. This is therefore the moment to reflect again about the peacekeeping challenges as it was done almost 15 years ago, when the Brahimi report was issued.  Time and circumstances make it advisable to review and update the recommendations of that important and influential report.

It is also the time for the EU and the AU to reflect, in house and in their joint consultations, on what can be reasonably done by both parties to complement the UN peacekeeping work. This is a debate that should take place without further delay. It should be linked to the next evaluation of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) and its transformation into an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Africa, the doubling of APF resources over the next three years, recently decided at the IV EU-Africa Summit, is encouraging and certainly appreciated. But there is a need to go beyond resources, as important as they are, and look at the substance of what really needs to be funded and how that can be integrated in a long-term strategy of greater African self-reliance. This about Africa´s capacity to sort out its own conflicts.

This debate would also benefit from the long experience the Norwegians have acquired in the implementation of their Training for Peace programme (TfP). The programme, funded by the government of Norway since 1995 and managed by African institutions, has been able to evolve over time. It is now particularly attentive to training in the areas of African civilian capacities and police personnel for peacekeeping, as well as focused on the need to support applied research. In this, the EU has a good source of inspiration when designing the new generation of training missions. Such missions should take advantage of the Malian experience – the EU Training Mission –, be civilian led and as inclusive as possible.  

The way forward should further consider the experience of coalitions of the willing and the role of small groupings of countries as suppliers of peace enforcing and peacekeeping tasks. But this is a discussion for another time. However, it cannot be brushed aside and ignored. Nor should China´s ambitions to support peace and security operations in Africa be forgotten. Here, the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, approved in 2012, is worth noting.

All this calls for a very direct question: Who is going to lead the debate on renovating peacekeeping? It must be an institution that is in a position to bring all of the stakeholders together, including the EU, for sure, but above all, the African institutions that have the responsibility for peace and security throughout the continent.
The answer seems obvious.



April 2014