Who is next at the United Nations? What for?

 

An Impossible Job? The Succession of Guterres in a World Adrift

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor and former UN Under-Secretary-General/ SRSG

Published: 17 April 2026

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Within a few days, on the 21st and 22nd, the UN General Assembly will interrogate the vision and proposals of each candidate for the position of Secretary-General. António Guterres concludes his second and final mandate at the end of the year. Who will be his successor?

One candidate is Michelle Bachelet, who served as President of Chile twice—from 2006 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018. Bachelet can also claim significant experience within the United Nations. She held several roles and served as the High Commissioner for Human Rights until 2022. However, Human Rights is a highly sensitive field, where conflict with various offending States is frequent. Consequently, the American President and the newly inaugurated president of her own country do not view her candidacy favourably. Although she is, in my opinion, the most qualified candidate, she faces a virtually impossible challenge.

Rafael Grossi, the Argentine who has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019, is also in the race. Grossi gained visibility due to the crises surrounding nuclear power plants in Ukraine and Iran. His name is clearly associated with nuclear issues. He has demonstrated courage and initiative. The support of his country's president, Javier Milei—an eccentric who maintains a special relationship with Donald Trump and has moved closer to China (stating in Davos this year that China is a major trading partner)—will aid his candidacy. The problem may come from Moscow: Milei supports Ukraine, albeit with fluctuations dictated by his alignment with Washington. What impact might this position have on Grossi’s ambitions?

Rebeca Grynspan, the former Vice-President of Costa Rica (1994–1998), is also on the list of official candidates. Grynspan earned credit as one of the officials responsible for the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia regarding maritime security in the Black Sea. She is currently the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the UN agency that seeks to promote international trade within a framework of sustainable development. She was recently in Baku for an international meeting annually promoted by the President of Azerbaijan, which gathers hundreds of figures active on the international stage. Afterwards, she travelled to Moscow, where she met with Sergey Lavrov. I am told the visit was cordial. However, Russian diplomacy is very shrewd and will only show its hand at the final moment.

Grynspan is, at the outset, the candidate with the greatest chance of success. In addition to her diplomatic qualities and her experience in the field of global economics, she hails from a country of little controversy and is a woman. Furthermore, there is an enormous political campaign in several influential circles pressuring for the election of a woman—an unprecedented feat.

Finally, we have Macky Sall, the former President of Senegal (2012–2024) and the African Union (2022–2023). In performing these roles, Sall demonstrated an ability to dialogue with the great powers independently, without geopolitical alignments. He is a moderate voice of the Global South. He faces, however, a major challenge: the geographic rotation of the Secretary-General position. According to this principle—an unwritten but decisive understanding—the next UN Secretary-General must come from the group of countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean. The only Secretary-General from that region was the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who concluded his mandate on the last day of 1991. Thus, it is almost certain that Guterres will hand over his place to a Latin American or a Caribbean—and I am convinced these national designations should be written in the feminine.

We shall see how the hearings of 21 and 22 April unfold. The delegations present at the General Assembly are preparing to raise a wide range of questions. The most delicate will certainly be those linked to the reform of the United Nations, starting with the composition and representativeness of the Security Council. Clarifications will also be sought on how each candidate intends to deal with the veto-wielding States whenever they embark on clear violations of the UN Charter and International Law. This is an all too current issue. Great powers now shamelessly violate the principles and protocols that they themselves and the international community approved over the decades. They tear up the UN Charter when it suits them and protect client-States led by war criminals.

How can each candidate respond to such questions? It will not be easy.

The political dimension of the UN is undergoing a period of accelerated weakening and marginalisation. International relations have ceased to be aligned with the search for solutions to global problems. Today, as in a past thought never to return—prior to 1945—confrontations and wars of aggression matter more than diplomacy and solidarity between peoples. What can the Secretary-General do to reverse this trend?

Put another way: is there still political space for an organisation whose mission is the maintenance of peace between peoples? The answer lies in the various capitals across the world. It is not in the building in Manhattan, in the area known as Turtle Bay. Therefore, the new Secretary-General—be it one of the four mentioned above, or a "wild card" appearing at the final hour with the blessing of the five veto-wielding members—must be a "moving turtle." A pilgrim of peace in permanent transit between capitals. Direct contact with peoples and with the most diverse leaders, including those who pretend to believe in multilateralism, diplomacy, and respect for International Law: that is the master key to the rebirth of the United Nations.

Some comments regarding my text about Guterres's succession

A World Adrift: The UN’s Leadership Crisis and the Fragmentation of Global Order

The debate over António Guterres’s successor as Secretary‑General of the United Nations unfolds at a moment when the international system is experiencing its deepest crisis of coherence since the end of the Cold War. 

My column of yesterday in Diário de Notícias (1)—a sober reflection on the “impossible job” awaiting the next UN leader—captures the structural paralysis of multilateralism. Yet when juxtaposed with the rest of the day’s DN coverage, a broader picture emerges: the UN’s leadership vacuum is only one manifestation of a world in which state‑centric power politics have decisively eclipsed institutional governance.

This contrast between my institutional lens and DN’s event‑driven reporting reveals a deeper truth. The crises dominating the headlines—Middle Eastern escalation, energy insecurity, and domestic political fragmentation—are precisely the types of challenges the UN was designed to manage. Their prominence, coupled with the near‑absence of UN‑related coverage outside my column, underscores the organization’s declining relevance in shaping global outcomes.

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The Candidates and the Constraints

My analysis of the four declared candidates—Michelle Bachelet, Rafael Grossi, Rebeca Grynspan, and Macky Sall—highlights a paradox at the heart of the UN system. Each contender brings a distinct diplomatic pedigree, yet all are constrained by the same immutable forces: the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members, the unwritten rule of regional rotation, and the political preferences of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

• Bachelet, arguably the most experienced, is penalized by her human‑rights professional record—an asset in normative terms but a liability in a system where major powers increasingly reject scrutiny.
• Grossi carries the weight of nuclear diplomacy, but his candidacy is entangled in the triangular dynamics among the U.S., Russia, and Argentina’s unpredictable foreign policy under Javier Milei.
• Grynspan, whom I see as the frontrunner, benefits from geopolitical neutrality of her country of origin (Costa Rica) and gender‑representation momentum.
• Sall embodies the aspirations of the Global South but is constrained by the Latin America–Caribbean rotation expectation. It is almost impossible to have an African candidate as the winner of this year's race.

The common thread is clear: the next Secretary‑General will be selected not for their capacity to lead but for their acceptability to the powers most responsible for the UN’s paralysis.

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A System Under Strain

While I emphasize the current institutional fragility, DN’s broader news cycle paints the operational landscape in which the next Secretary‑General must operate.

Middle East Escalation

DN’s coverage of ceasefire negotiations, U.S.–Iran mediation, and the risk of regional spillover illustrates the erosion of diplomatic norms. These crises unfold largely outside UN frameworks, with major powers preferring ad hoc coalitions and bilateral channels. The UN’s role is reactive at best, symbolic at worst.

Energy Insecurity

Reports on Europe’s jet‑fuel shortages and declining U.S. reserves highlight the geopolitical weaponization of energy. These dynamics—once central to UN‑led discussions on global economic stability—now play out in markets and national capitals, not in multilateral forums.

Domestic Political Fragmentation

DN’s focus on Portuguese political tensions, IMF warnings, and governance challenges mirrors a global trend: domestic politics increasingly dominate foreign‑policy bandwidth. As states turn inward, multilateral commitments weaken.

Together, these stories reinforce my thesis: the UN is being marginalized not by irrelevance but by the deliberate choices of states that no longer see multilateralism as a vehicle for advancing their interests.

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The Return of Pre‑1945 Politics

My most striking argument is that the world is reverting to a pre‑1945 logic—one in which power, not principle, determines outcomes. DN’s coverage supports this view. Whether in the Middle East, energy markets, or domestic politics, the pattern is consistent: states act unilaterally, institutions react belatedly, and norms erode quietly.

The UN’s predicament is therefore structural. It is not merely that the organization lacks tools; it is that the geopolitical environment no longer rewards cooperation. The next Secretary‑General will inherit a system in which the Charter’s foundational assumptions—collective security, sovereign equality, and the primacy of law—are openly contested.

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The Secretary‑General as “Peregrino da Paz”

My metaphor of the Secretary‑General as a “tartaruga em movimento”—a turtle in constant motion—captures the essence of the role in the current era. The next leader will need to be:

• perpetually itinerant, engaging directly with capitals rather than relying on institutional authority
• politically agile, navigating great‑power rivalries without becoming their instrument
• symbolically resilient, embodying the UN’s normative aspirations even when its operational capacity is limited

This is not the Secretary‑General envisioned in 1945. It is a diplomatic pilgrim, operating in the interstices of a fragmented order - that is what is required today. 

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Conclusion: A Leadership Contest That Mirrors a Systemic Crisis

The juxtaposition of my column with the day’s DN coverage (2) reveals a world in which the UN’s leadership transition is both crucial and curiously peripheral. Crucial because global crises demand coordinated responses; peripheral because states increasingly bypass the very institution designed to provide them.

The next Secretary‑General will not reverse this trend alone. But the selection process—shaped by geopolitical bargaining, regional expectations, and normative pressures—will signal whether the international community still believes in the possibility of collective governance.

In that sense, the succession to Guterres is more than a personnel decision. It is a referendum on the future of multilateralism itself.

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(1) https://www.dn.pt/opiniao-dn/um-cargo-impossvel-a-sucesso-de-guterres-num-mundo-deriva
      The English translation will be available soon.
(2) 17 April 2026

Reflecting about the new international rules: business and might

The New International Order: Business and Brute Force

By Victor Ângelo

I have many doubts about the footballing abilities—and others—of President Donald Trump, especially now that he has started the New Year with two own goals.

The first own goal was the intervention in Venezuela. It resulted in the deterioration of his country’s international image and handed points on a silver platter to Russia and China.

The UN Security Council meeting revealed the gravity of the American adventure in Venezuela. The Secretary-General, who out of prudence did not attend the meeting in person, had a statement read out which underlined that Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity had been violated. In that communication, he referred to the US military operation as a “dangerous precedent”, which seemed strange to several governments and analysts, considering that the history of the Latin American region is littered with similar interventions—Harvard University historians have inventoried more than forty extraconstitutional ruptures organised with the support or at the instigation of Washington. The most famous occurred in 1973, when President Salvador Allende of Chile was assassinated thanks to the organisational skills of the CIA.

The great difference between the military intervention of a few days ago and previous ones lies in President Trump’s admission that the current one aimed at the usurpation of the oil resources of the attacked country. Past interferences were presented with another level of subtlety, without direct references to expropriations or looting.

I note an additional point regarding Guterres’ communication. Many at the United Nations compared the statement he made following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with this one now, carried out by the USA. Guterres condemned Russia directly and was himself present at the Security Council meeting for that purpose. He addressed Vladimir Putin unambiguously, in the name of peace and political ethics. In the case of the USA, he used only generic arguments about the international order and the violation of the Charter, without mentioning Trump’s name. Let this be noted, and let it serve as an invitation to reflection.

The first own goal was favourable to the Russian Federation and China. The repeated references in Washington to the theory of spheres of influence made it more difficult to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Someone circulating in the corridors of the Kremlin sent me a provocative message, albeit with some wit and a touch of diplomacy in the style learned from old Soviet manuals. It said they were sure I would condemn, in this week’s chronicle, the unjustified aggression against the Venezuelan power and demand that the European Union impose sanctions against the mastermind of the kidnappings. A Putin's faithful joker. One might say that the Russian leaders feel happy and content with what happened in Venezuela.

As for China, which was in fact the most indirectly targeted country—Washington does not want China to gain a presence in the area of influence that the Americans consider their own—there was a kind of validation of its claims regarding Taiwan. This does not mean that Beijing is thinking of launching a military operation against Taipei in the very near future. China knows that such an offensive, should it happen, would carry high costs. But it has now received an indication from the Trump Administration that it can increase political-military pressure on the island. And use more bellicose language, which is indeed happening this week after a Taiwanese MP proposed an amendment to the “Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, a law adopted by Taipei in 1992. According to the proposal, the statute would be renamed the “Act on Relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China”. The new name and content are seen by Beijing as yet another attempt to separate the two parts and promote Taiwan's independence—something that is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

The second own goal resulted from statements by Trump and those around him, such as Stephen Miller—a hawk who serves as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff—regarding Greenland. Trump is preparing to annex Greenland, which is a territory of the European space through its connection to Denmark. The reason invoked—to create a security barrier against Russia and China—makes no sense. The USA has a military base in Greenland and can count on full Danish cooperation. It should be noted that during the Cold War, the base housed around 10,000 American military personnel. Now, it has around 150. This evolution does not reveal great geopolitical fears on the part of the USA. Not forgetting that there are several treaties between the USA and Denmark that recognise Danish sovereignty regarding Greenland.

Trump has his eyes fixed on the territory’s natural riches, on the maritime corridors that climate change will make navigable the Arctic zone, on the airspace controlled by Greenland—which has enormous strategic value—and on History: he wants to see his name added to the list of presidents who augmented the American territorial area.

He should also think about the impact that the annexation will have on the future of NATO. But for him, NATO serves to buy weaponry from the American industry. And that will continue to happen for many years, whether there is NATO or not. The Europeans are captive customers. The new reality is evident: in our day, business and brute force are triumphing over diplomacy and the international order, thanks to Trump, Putin, and others alike.

Published in Portuguese language in today's edition (09/01/2026) of Diário de Notícias. 

Are you talking about the UN reform?

 The future demands political courage, strategic vision, and a UN that is respected

Victor Ângelo

Eighty years ago, on October 24, 1945, the UN Charter came into force, having been approved four months earlier in San Francisco. That is why this date in October is celebrated annually as United Nations Day.

I am referring to the political part of the organization. The specialized agencies, such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, and all the others, emerged at different times. Each has its own history, as well as its own specific governance structures, independent of the authority of the Secretary-General (SG). Over time, special programs and funds also emerged, such as WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, and several others—a long list of acronyms. These programs and funds are headed by individuals chosen by the SG, mostly in response to pressure from some of the more powerful states. They do not belong to the same division that includes the specialized agencies.

The system is in crisis. But if the UN did not exist, it would be necessary, even in today’s confusing times, to invent it. This is a frequently repeated idea.

The United Nations exists; there is no need for any creative exercise. But President Xi Jinping, who also contributes to the marginalization of the UN and seeks to take advantage of it, now proposes an alternative system, inspired by his vision of China’s central role in the world. He had already proposed a Global Development Initiative, another on international security, and yet another called the Global Civilization Initiative. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, which took place less than two months ago, Xi completed the picture and proposed the missing initiative, on global governance. That is, on the principles that should regulate relations between states. When I say he completed the picture, I am referring to four fundamental pillars of the UN: development, peace, human dignity, and now, the political one.

Xi’s proposal on international governance is little more than a restatement of the content of the United Nations Charter in other words. The five basic principles he proposes for global governance are contained in the Charter. Xi refers to respect for the sovereignty of each state, including retrograde and dictatorial regimes; subordination to the rules of international law; defense of multilateralism and the role of the United Nations—something that China itself does not practice when it is inconvenient; the value of people, who should be the main concern in political matters; and the need to achieve concrete results in solving global problems. There is certainly no significant disagreement with these ideas. The Chinese initiative is basically a political maneuver.

The problem is that these principles are often ignored by several member states, starting with the great powers such as China, Russia, and the United States of America, and by states outside international law, such as North Korea or Israel.

Thus, the United Nations ceases to be the central forum for international relations, discussion, and resolution of major conflicts. The blame lies with certain member states, and in particular, with the malfunctioning and lack of representativeness of the Security Council (SC). The UN has been completely marginalized in the cases of Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, the end of the embargo against Cuba, and so on. However, the real problem lies with the SC: without a Council that represents the realities of the 21st century, the political UN will continue to live in the past and be doomed to decline.

The plan that President Donald Trump had adopted regarding the dramatic crisis in Gaza—a vague plan that is practically impossible to carry out in its key points—does not mention the UN or assign it any kind of responsibility. Even if it is discussed in the Security Council, which is not yet confirmed, the various points imposed by President Trump do not take into account the experience accumulated in similar situations. It is a plan that was not negotiated by the interested parties—Israel and Palestine—that is, it did not follow a fundamental procedure in peacebuilding. I fear that it will achieve little beyond the release of the remaining living hostages, the freedom of a group of prisoners held in Israel, and a temporary and insufficient humanitarian opening in the face of the absolutely basic needs of the civilians still surviving in Gaza.

The SG is trying to implement a process of organizational reform, which he called UN80. In reality, the effort is little more than a bureaucratic response to the organization’s financial crisis. Instead of insisting, day and night, that delinquent states pay their dues and mandatory contributions on time, and clearly defining what justifies the existence of the UN, the SG chose the option that goes over better with certain leaders and their finance ministries: eliminate jobs, reduce the scope and functioning of field missions, transfer services to cities where the cost of living is lower than in New York or Geneva. The refrain is “do less with fewer resources.” In fact, it should be another: “making peace and promoting human dignity require everyone’s contribution and respect for the UN’s courageous voice.” That assertion is the only one consistent with the defense of international cooperation and multilateralism. That is what I learned and applied over decades.

Guterres writes about the dramatic financial situation of Peacekeeping missions worldwide

 

10 October 2025 | Worldwide | Secretary-General

Contingency Plan Letter to Staff Members Dear Colleagues,   I am writing to update you on the financial status of United Nations peacekeeping operations and what it means for us all.   Our peacekeeping operations are facing an extremely difficult financial situation. The current liquidity crisis is the direct result of arrears and the non-payment of assessed contributions in full and on time. Over the past few years, we have actively engaged with Member States to find solutions to this growing challenge. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly in 2019 and 2022 approved some measures that have enabled us to deal with the operational impact of late or non-payments. However, while the level of peacekeeping budgets has been steadily declining, the outstanding contributions have increased significantly, especially in recent months. At the start of this peacekeeping budget cycle on 1 July 2025, arrears amounted to US$2.066 billion. Our collections for the financial period may fall short by about US$880 million, putting a further strain on our liquidity situation.   In addition to actively engaging with Member States, we introduced measures in 2024 to restrict spending and align it with cash inflows. Thanks to these measures, and your dedication and commitment, and the generosity of troop- and police-contributing countries, we have managed to carry on. The troop- and police-contributing countries are, in effect, financing the system, waiting many months and sometimes over a year for reimbursement of their personnel and equipment costs. This is unsustainable. The margin of manoeuvre gained from earlier liquidity measures approved by the General Assembly, as well as our own spending restrictions, is now exhausted. Despite recent positive news that a sizeable amount from a major contributor will be entirely available to distribute flexibly across the peacekeeping missions and to establish a reserve for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the reality remains: the overall shortfall is grave.   In a context of deep uncertainty and a worsening cash position, I asked all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to prepare contingency plans based on possible reductions of 15 to 25 per cent of their expenditures. Troop- and police-contributing countries were also informed, together with the relevant host countries. I am grateful to our missions for working hard over the past few months to prepare these different scenarios.   Based on our current financial estimates and after a careful review, I have decided to request all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to implement their contingency plans for a 15 per cent reduction in expenditures, the lower of the two scenarios. These reductions will affect all areas: uniformed components, civilian personnel and operations. Separately, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) will be required to achieve a 25 per cent reduction in expenditures within the current fiscal year, reflecting unique budgetary pressures that will need to be addressed in close coordination with the African Union.   These reductions must now be achieved within the remaining nine months of the budget period. Therefore, the impact on the reduction of capacities — and thus on operations and mandated activities — will be proportionally greater. The consequences will be painful. With the exception of UNSOS, we will need to repatriate around 25 per cent of the uniformed personnel and their equipment in the coming months. Peacekeeping operations — together with the Department of Peace Operations and other relevant departments — have carefully identified the contingents and individual uniformed personnel that should be repatriated.   On 7 October 2025, I briefed the members of the United Nations Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries on the contingency plans. We will continue to update them on the implementation and impact on our operations.   Repatriating around 25 per cent of troops and police in the space of a few months will be a major and complex logistical exercise.   The impact on civilian, international and locally recruited staff and affiliate personnel will be significant. Some separations will be inevitable, and missions will soon need to invoke the downsizing policy to reduce their civilian staffing, in consultation with staff representative bodies. I know the impact on affected staff, personnel and their families will be enormous, and I want to acknowledge the personal toll such measures entail.   The work of identifying which contingents and individual personnel will be repatriated has been carried out with care, weighing mandate priorities, operational requirements and, above all, the safety and security of those who will remain. While our missions carry out their contingency plans to address their funding shortfalls, they will continue to implement their mandates to the extent possible under these financial circumstances. The protection of civilians, the advancement of peace processes and support to fragile communities cannot and will not be abandoned. However, given the magnitude of the problem and the challenging context in which our missions operate, it is difficult to predict the impact on the ground. We have planned for this scenario and our staff in the field and at Headquarters will continue to work with dedication and professionalism. But this is a situation that the Organization has never faced before, and the impact remains uncertain.   I want to express my deep appreciation to all peacekeeping personnel for their service and sacrifice. I deeply understand the concerns that carrying out these plans raises, and the impact it may have on missions and personnel. Unfortunately, the Organization has no choice but to move forward with the implementation, despite the difficult impact it will have. I am determined to continue advocating for peacekeeping as a collective and shared responsibility. Without the support of Member States, the Organization cannot function properly. I will continue to appeal to all Member States to pay in full and on time so that our peacekeeping operations can remain a strong and dependable instrument of the United Nations. I remain hopeful that we will be able to resolve the current liquidity crisis, and I will work tirelessly towards that end.   I want to, once again, thank you for undertaking your essential work with enormous strength and resilience under these very difficult circumstances. You have continued to serve in some of the world's most difficult and dangerous situations, not for recognition, but for the cause of peace. That spirit is the heart of this Organization. Together, I am confident that we can take on the challenges, uphold our values and create the opportunities needed to address our unstable and uncertain world.   Yours sincerely, Antonio Guterres

Guterres lost the support of the staff many years back

 UN staff in Geneva yesterday passed a motion of no confidence in Antonio Guterres, UN 80 and its initiator, Guy Ryder👇🏼

The extraordinary general assembly was called by the union and attended by almost 600 staff. It adopted the following motion without opposition: “The staff have no confidence in UN80, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Under Secretary General Guy Ryder.”

This is the first motion of no confidence in a UN Secretary-General since staff in New York passed one in 2007.

According to the union's communication, support for the motion was based on:

- The lack of vision around UN 80 which has been done in a panic and with no evaluation of earlier reforms.
- The decision to present budget proposals for 2026 with 20 percent fewer posts, without any evidence that this will address the current crisis, even as other organisations approve zero-growth budgets.
- The reinforcement of the UN’s existing top-heavy structure. Most cuts are taking place at junior levels, no USGs are being cut and an instruction to cut senior positions appears to have become optional.
- The decision by the Secretary-General to extend USG contracts by 2 years, in some cases beyond his mandate, and promote his own staff, while restricting normal staff to extensions of 1 year with the intention of denying them termination indemnities in case of separation.
- The refusal to consult with staff representatives on post cuts.
- The proposal to multiply headquarters locations, which in time will increase costs.
- The impression that staff are taking the blame for the challenges of the organization, which may in part stem from the organization's lack of visibility in matters of peace and security.
- A new Secretary-General with their own vision may undertake further reforms that contradict UN 80.

The union represents staff from OHCHR, OCHA, UNCTAD, ECE, conference services, security, UNDRR, ODA, JIU, OIOS, the pension fund and UNRISD.