The Space Geopolitics

Superpowers, creative billionaires, and the dispute over outer space

Victor Ângelo 

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General Published: 5 Jun 2026

Outer space is already a paramount issue in the competition between great powers. Consequently, the deserts of northwestern China, in Xinjiang and Gobi, attract very special attention. Satellite imagery reveals vast military complexes and an extensive network of many dozens, even hundreds, of rocket launch pads, bunkers, and enormous, heavily fortified structures. Built near nuclear silos—which house China’s longest-range intercontinental missiles—this infrastructure aims to guarantee an immediate retaliatory capacity should the country suffer a first strike.

This terrestrial fortress is only half the story. The bunkers excavated in the sand are intimately linked to Chinese surveillance satellites, together forming an integrated ground and space defence system. The assets concentrated in the desert depend directly on their orbital counterparts: the Huoyan-1 early-warning satellites. These "eyes of fire", capable of detecting the infrared signature of enemy missiles immediately after their launch, open a critical three-to-four-minute window, allowing the Chinese chain of command to order the firing of weapons stored in the silos before they can be destroyed.

We are in a different world from the old space race. In the late 1950s and the subsequent decade, the focus was on the national prestige and political image of the US and the USSR. The marathon of space competition has changed. Today, it is a high-speed and high-risk race.

Space is one of the great strategic priorities of the present. Much of what resides in low Earth orbit governs our daily lives: global logistics, financial synchronization, communications, disaster response, and encrypted military operations. The country that masters the technical standards, extracts the first cosmic resources, and controls the orbital infrastructure will obtain an ambivalent power over the global economy and planetary defence, capable of serving human progress as much as military hegemony and a global disaster.

The current space arena is thus a vital geopolitical dispute, marked by four distinct political approaches. Each power runs its own race.

European priorities are concentrated on the development of space infrastructure essential to ensure strategic communications, on the Galileo (GPS navigation) and Copernicus (continuous Earth observation) projects, on the tracking of orbital debris (see the reference to Kessler below), and on research regarding robotic launches. The scarcity of venture capital and fragmentation—every country for itself—are the political issues that need to be resolved.

The United States has consolidated its reliance on public-private partnerships in the aerospace sector. Through the Artemis Accords, Washington seeks to promote international norms that favour free enterprise to maintain its supremacy, leveraging the agility and efficiency of the private sector. Artemis aims to establish a sustained human and robotic presence on the Moon, testing new technologies for the extraction of water and minerals.

China views space through a deeply integrated civil-military lens. For Beijing, it is a strategic domain subject to state control. The Chinese vision constitutes an explicit challenge to US primacy. In this context, China prioritizes the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), seeking to secure a sovereign infrastructure independent of Western systems. The exploration of the lunar South Pole has become a central objective.

Russia was once a pioneering actor. Today, despite financial constraints and sanctions that limit access to technological components, the space sector continues to be treated as a priority. It retains a highly secretive character. However, it is known to invest primarily in the research and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons, space-based intelligence, and hypersonic weaponry. This option holds considerable strategic value, both defensive and offensive.

The explosion of space business, operating on an unprecedented financial scale, is another characteristic of our era. The current US dominance is largely driven by private giants such as Jeff Bezos's Blue Origin and, most notably, Elon Musk's SpaceX. By pioneering reusable rockets, SpaceX has drastically reduced launch costs. With a capitalization that already rivals the GDP of major states, the company has rewritten the rules of orbital geopolitics.

These private companies have ceased to be mere service providers. Today, they are central geopolitical actors, wielding enormous economic weight and playing a decisive role in American defence. But, with high economic value comes severe strategic vulnerability. In any potential conflict, the temptation to blind an adversary by destroying their early-warning and communications satellites could be limitless.

An attack of this kind—or even an accidental collision between satellites in orbit—would have devastating systemic effects. There is a risk of triggering the so-called Kessler syndrome: a catastrophic chain reaction in which orbital debris collides with other satellites, generating exponentially more fragments. This would rapidly create a global crisis, with Earth's orbit saturated by high-speed debris directly impacting multiple essential systems. It would not only affect military deterrence: it could compromise the terrestrial economy and provoke a civilizational regression of incalculable consequences.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is no longer fit for an era marked by thousands of objects in orbit—a continuously growing number—and by the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The Second Space Race, which is currently underway, demands cooperation and far stricter rules—a new treaty. Space cannot be viewed merely as a competition or an extraordinary business opportunity. It is our collective survival that is at stake.

The Bear Meets the Big Brother, the Dragon: Putin and Xi Jinping

 

An Alliance Between Unequal Powers: Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

Op-ed published in Diário de Notícias on 22/05/2026

 

When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet—as happened once again this week—we witness a highly choreographed geopolitical display, rich in symbolism. They speak of a multipolar world and toast to a ‘new era’ and a ‘no limits’ partnership—the celebrated expression coined during their February 2022 meeting, just days before the launch of Russia’s inadmissible war of aggression against Ukraine. The messages they seek to send to the rest of the planet, particularly to Europe, are highly explicit, and they were repeated this week. First, that China and Russia are bound by an unbreakable alliance, indispensable for constructing the new world order they deem necessary. Second, they intend for this order to differ from the one established in recent decades by the Western world, especially since the era of the Reagan-Thatcher tandem and the period following the end of the Cold War. We are clearly facing a Sino-Russian project to reorder international relations in their own fashion.

 

It is, however, a flawed partnership, an unequal relationship—from an economic perspective, for instance. China is undisputedly the centre of gravity and the primary axis of its neighbour’s economy. It now accounts for between 40% and 45% of Russian imports. This is an overwhelming dependency. Conversely, barely more than 4% of China’s foreign trade is conducted with Russia, according to Bloomberg data. This is an insignificant percentage when compared to the volume of trade between China and other economies, be they the US, the EU, or ASEAN. Furthermore, the Chinese currency, the yuan, is the predominant tender in Moscow’s financial market. The yuan has virtually replaced the majority of transactions previously executed in US dollars, with the remainder settled in roubles.

 

Political inequality compounds this economic disparity. This is the most significant dimension of the asymmetry between the two countries. A tacit hierarchy exists that places the Chinese president at the top. One might say that Xi envisions, proposes, and makes things happen. Putin follows when he can, provided he sees that it does not jeopardise his domestic political image, where he still dictates the law.

 

Xi Jinping intends to be the architect of the new international structure, built with calmness, firmness, and time. He plays without unnecessary haste. He is entirely convinced that, before long, his country will be a rival on an equal footing with the US, and that global challenges will place China at the heart of multilateral responses.

 

Vladimir Putin, for his part, mistook pompous parades for military capability. He ended up bogged down in an intensely draining war, which he made the blunder of initiating with utter disregard for international law and with armed forces that recall the highly doubtful legend of Potemkin villages. Putin continues to believe he is a strategic giant, when in reality Ukraine is laying bare his feet of clay. Putin is likewise a stain on Xi Jinping’s international reputation. Xi finds himself forced to defend him in various political arenas, even though he knows this entails reputational costs for his regime, which wishes to be seen as the champion of peace and multilateral cooperation.

 

Xi’s strategic objectives are essentially twofold. On the one hand, to ensure Chinese dominance in the region defined by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On the other, to gain the lead regarding the technologies that are shaping the twenty-first century. Achieving this requires time, and it requires China’s main rival powers to remain distracted by other matters.

 

This is where Putin’s political blunders prove to be of immeasurable value to China. Though it is seldom considered, the endless war in Ukraine keeps a significant portion of the strategic capabilities, military resources, and diplomatic attention of China’s main rivals far removed from potential criticism and measures against Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Every crisis meeting at NATO headquarters or in EU capitals represents a tactical distraction for Washington and creates rifts between Europe and the US. All of this allows President Xi to continue the process of economically and politically subordinating Russia, while modernising the People’s Liberation Army and shielding China’s economy against potential Western sanctions. Putin is thus an excellent political distraction.

 

Xi’s greatest anxiety regarding Russia concerns the martial philosophy that continues to prevail in the Kremlin. When Moscow hinted that it might use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it was Beijing—and not just Washington—that also silently but firmly drew a red line before Putin’s intentions. Xi needs a prolonged and draining conflict that bleeds the West, but he cannot afford to permit or promote an apocalyptic escalation that would destroy the global order upon which China’s rise depends.

 

Consequently, Xi’s support for Russia has strict, albeit undeclared, limits. That is the reality, despite public assertions. China buys Russian oil and gas at a discount, in yuan, and within limits—there was no agreement on the new trans-Siberian pipeline, which deeply disappointed the delegation from Moscow. And it supplies Moscow with ‘dual-use’ goods, including military-applicable items like microchips and drone components. It does so discreetly, but in vast quantities. It denies, however, any accusation of direct lethal military aid. Why? To avoid secondary Western sanctions against its economy, which relies heavily on foreign trade. The ‘architect’ knows that a direct confrontation with the West at this juncture would derail his ambitions and imperil the authority of the Chinese Communist Party.

 

The essential thing is to understand the true nature of the relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and to respond to the serious risks it poses. Note the various agreements signed during this visit—for example, in the fields of atomic energy, space, and AI. These matters do not allow for simplistic analysis. China and Russia do not represent the same type of challenge. Yet, despite the asymmetries, a dangerous strategic convergence exists between both regimes.

Comparing sanctions regimes: Iran and North Korea

The prevailing strategy toward the Middle East in 2026—characterized by "maximum pressure," maritime blockades, and paternalistic threats of "punishment"—represents a catastrophic regression in international statecraft. This "predatory diplomacy" is not only ethically bankrupt but strategically illiterate, particularly when contrasted with the long-standing, paralyzed "soft approach" toward North Korea.

1. The Paternalism of "Misbehaviour": A Diplomatic Dead End

The current rhetoric reduces the complex, millennia-old "political DNA" of Iran to a juvenile dynamic. Terming the actions of a regional power as "misbehaving" is a fundamental category error that sabotages any prospect of a lasting settlement.

• The Iran Context: By treating Tehran as a wayward child rather than a sovereign adversary, Washington ignores the reality that Iranian strategic culture is rooted in a "resistance economy" and a deep-seated suspicion of Western diktats.

• The North Korea Contrast: While Iran is threatened with renewed strikes for "bad behaviour" despite its 14-point peace proposal, North Korea has built a nuclear arsenal under decades of "Strategic Patience." The global order is effectively telling Tehran: “Negotiate and we will suffocate you; arm yourself to the teeth like Pyongyang and we will eventually grant you a summit.”

2. The Myth of the "Surgical Strike" and "Elimination"

The political demand to "eliminate" a nation’s missile capacity through military force is a dangerous fantasy.

• The Iran Context: Military infrastructure in Iran is hardened, dispersed, and embedded within civilian hubs. A "strike" is never just a strike; it is a declaration of total war that would inevitably trigger asymmetric retaliation across the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most sensitive energy artery.

• The Failure of Force: History shows that technical knowledge cannot be bombed out of existence. Strikes on the Iranian "brain trust" only accelerate the resolve to achieve the ultimate deterrent, mirroring the North Korean path where every round of pressure resulted in a more advanced missile test.

3. Economic Suffocation: Humanitarian Crime as Strategy

The current "suffocating" blockade, which prevents even medical and basic cargo from reaching civilian ports, is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of international law.

• The Iran Context: Claiming that a blockade is "doing very well" because soldiers cannot be paid ignores the millions of civilians whose food and energy security are being held hostage for a "quick-win" deal.

• The North Korea Contrast: For years, the international community provided food aid and "Sunshine Policy" engagement to Pyongyang to avoid humanitarian collapse. Applying a total blockade to Iran while having historically subsidized North Korea’s survival exposes a glaring lack of moral consistency.

4. The Geopolitical Chessboard vs. The Oil Market

Linking peace talks to the UAE leaving OPEC or driving down oil futures exposes the true, cynical motivation of the current escalation: Resource Coercion.

• The Critique: When the US Treasury frames a blockade as a success because it might lower gas prices for Western consumers, it erodes any claim of "defending humanity." It reveals the conflict as a mercantilist war, where Iranian sovereignty is being sacrificed to manipulate the global energy market.

5. The Dangerous Erasion of the UN

Perhaps the most severe failure is the total marginalization of the UN Secretariat and the UN Charter in favour of personalized, "family-business" diplomacy.

• The Strategic Risk: By conducting negotiations through personal envoys and son-in-laws rather than the UN’s institutional framework, the current administration is building a "house of cards." Without the UN's "Blue Book" of neutral mediation and the legitimacy of the Security Council, any deal made is temporary, non-binding, and destined to collapse the moment the political winds shift.

Conclusion: The "Catastrophic Miscalculation"

The world is witnessing a " might-is-right" approach that rewards nuclear proliferation (North Korea) and punishes diplomatic overtures (Iran’s 14-point plan). If the United Nations remains a spectator while the "Big Three" treat the high seas and sovereign nations as personal fiefdoms, we are not just witnessing the end of an Iranian peace process; we are witnessing the final expiration of the post-WWII rules-based order. The result will not be a "great deal," but a era of deliberate, daily insecurity.

International dialogues at the beginning of the New Year

From nuclear power to Europe's affirmation and credibility

Victor Angelo

 

The joint statement on nuclear war prevention issued this week by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is a good start to the new year. It is the first time that China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia have pledged to avoid a nuclear conflict between them, unambiguously acknowledging that such a confrontation has no winners and therefore should not occur. They also affirm that their nuclear weapons are for deterrence only and that they will continue to negotiate to end competition between them with regard to such weapons. And they set nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal.

At a time when there are very serious rivalries between some of these countries, what value can be given to such a declaration? It is easy to answer with scepticism, given the current international situation, which includes very serious tensions around, among other cases, Ukraine and Taiwan. And which registers an enormous increase in military spending and innovation by the big three: China, the United States and Russia. Furthermore, on a global level, it is experiencing a period of unprecedented uncertainty for the current generations, with risks and dangers that could profoundly destabilise the fragile world political and economic order.

It is better, however, at this start of the year, to take an optimistic view and underline the positive side of the declaration. The agreement on nuclear danger could mean that there is understanding and realism at the level of the leaders of the great powers that continuing on the path of confrontation will bring enormous costs for all. In reality, an armed conflict between some of these countries would be a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, given the existing capacity for destruction. There are no small, controlled wars between colossuses. If a first shot were to be fired, it would always be a major war.

In a scenario of complex crises such as the present, 2022 must be a year of dialogue and reinforced international cooperation, in the most promising areas. This is what is required of those who call the shots in this world.

The negotiations that will begin next week in Geneva and Brussels between Russia, the USA and NATO do not offer much hope at the outset. Yet they are important. Several decades of work on the international scene have taught me that most negotiations start with very low expectations. Over time, they can turn into positive exercises. To get results, you have to be patient and persevering. And keep the contact at the highest level and focus on what is essential.

The European institutions complain about not being included in the talks with Russia. Especially since the discussion will be about security and stability in Europe. Also, because many in the EU consider normalising the relationship with Russia as a mutually advantageous priority.

I think it is a mistake that President Biden has not insisted on European participation. He knows that weakening the EU is one of the Russian leader's strategic machinations. Putin wants a Europe that is as fragmented as possible. He has now scored an important point.

It is not enough to say that 21 out of 27 EU members are also members of NATO and that Europe is therefore well represented. There can be no illusions here: it is the USA and a few Eastern European states that define Russian NATO policy. Nor is it an argument that the EU has no common position on Russia. The preparation of such negotiations would be a catalyst moment to advance the definition of the European position.

It is still possible to make amends. NATO's foreign ministers are meeting today by video conference to discuss the dossier. It would be appropriate for several of them to raise the issue of EU involvement. And that they continue to do so in the days to come. The affirmation and credibility of the European project would thus be strengthened.

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 7 January 2022)

China and the COP process

More solar panels and fewer nuclear warheads

Victor Angelo

 

It is true that the Chinese president did not come to the COP26 summit. But it is also a fact that Xi Jinping has not travelled out of the country since January 2020, because of an extraordinarily stiff official interpretation of what the fight against the coronavirus pandemic should be.

The American president took advantage of his counterpart's absence to criticise him openly. I think this was a mistake. Joe Biden should seek to build bridges with China rather than new fronts of conflict. There are already enough points of friction between the two countries. It is not wise to add this one.

The global fight against climate change needs everyone's cooperation. Including China, which emits about a quarter of the world's total carbon dioxide, although in per capita terms the impact of each Chinese person is half that of the average American. This reminds us, moreover, that the wealthiest are those who contribute most to global warming and that a large part of the response must be based on this observation.

It should also be added that President Xi did not ignore the summit. He sent a written communication, which I felt was relevant in several respects.

First, because he stressed the need to respect the commitments already made, both in the UN Climate Change Framework Convention and in the 2015 Paris Agreement. His statement was a clear call for the strengthening of multilateral responses through the United Nations system. It was also a call for the deepening of mutual trust between states, which is so sorely needed. This is a key issue that the UN Secretary-General could explore in order to make his role more central and more action oriented. 

Second, because President Xi mentioned the need for an extra effort by all, in particular the most developed countries. Here he referred to the aid that has been promised and should be given to the poorest countries to mitigate the catastrophic effects of climate change and significantly increase their peoples' access to renewable sources of energy.

Third, because he said clearly that the community of nations must accelerate the green transition. In his view, this means increasing investment in science and technology in order to achieve industrial transformation and the types of energy and consumption that are best suited to safeguarding the environment, without jeopardizing economic development. There is a half-truth here, based on the theory that scientific progress is the best response to environmental challenges. This position does not take into account that economic growth policies must change and that the behaviour of people in the richest countries, including China, cannot be based solely on the continued increase in consumption and material well-being.

In the final part of his communication, Xi Jinping referred to a number of measures that his government is already conducting or will adopt in order to reduce the carbon footprint. He did not say this now, but he had already informed the UN General Assembly that the official Chinese ambition is to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. To this, one could reply that China has the means to achieve this neutrality much sooner. And it should do so, taking advantage of the moment to show that China can also play a leading role in this area. The country has the necessary knowledge and means. It would be a matter of investing less in the war industries and more in energy transformation. A nation that plans to have a nuclear arsenal of at least a thousand nuclear warheads in 2030 - five times more than in 2020 - and a whole arsenal of hypersonic weapons, bombers, aircraft carriers and submarines with nuclear capability, has all the conditions to also be an example in terms of managing carbon emissions. It is time to show that the defence of the planet and peace are two interconnected issues. Global leadership should focus on this.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 5 November 2021)

 

Writing about Iran

Iran: the next day

Victor Angelo

 

 

In 2018, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh became known when Benjamin Netanyahu accused him of being the scientist at the head of the Iranian nuclear programme. Fakhrizadeh was murdered on the outskirts of Tehran a week ago. There are contradictory accounts of the crime. What is certain is that the ambush was conducted by a reasonable number of agents, at least ten of them, and in a professional way - the wife, who was travelling with him, came out of it unharmed, she was not part of the objective. I have no doubt that the ambush was carried out by special forces, with perfectly trained executioners, who had at their disposal the information, logistics and means necessary for a high-risk mission. It is peaceful to conclude that it was not the work of the internal Iranian opposition. It had all the characteristics of an operation planned, organised, and carried out by a state hostile to Iran. And I cannot help but think of the regime's three main enemies: Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Donald Trump's United States.

Those who know these things point in the direction of Israel. It is true that the secret services of that country, in particular the legendary Mossad, have already demonstrated an incomparably greater ability to penetrate Iranian official circles than any other espionage service. One example of this ability, with the trial of the indicted currently taking place in Antwerp, is the following: it was Mossad that made known to the Belgian authorities the terrorist attack the Iranian government was plotting in 2018 against the National Council of Iranian Resistance in exile. The European intelligence services where the plot was being prepared - the Belgians, the French, and the Austrians - had not noticed anything. 

Israel can never admit the slightest hint of responsibility for murders of this kind. Such an admission would open the door to prosecution in the International Court of Justice in The Hague or in the jurisdiction of a United Nations member country. International law is clear. An extraterritorial, summary, and arbitrary execution, promoted by a State outside a situation of armed conflict is a crime which violates international human rights law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. Moreover, the United Nations Charter expressly prohibits the extraterritorial use of force in times of peace.

For all these reasons, the paternity of what has now happened to Fakhrizadeh will remain unknown for the time being. We will have to be contented with the suspicions.

The assassination has shown that the Iranian system of internal espionage and counterespionage, which terrifies the population, has very serious flaws. The powerful Ministry of Intelligence is more concerned with the repression of the growing internal opposition than it is prepared to identify the most sophisticated threats from outside. This is not new. In early July, for example, the security services were unable to prevent an explosion at the Natanz nuclear power plant, nor were they able to avert the sabotage of missile-making programmes. All these actions were handled by a foreign country.  

A fundamental issue is to try to understand the central motive for the assassination. What seems more obvious, which would be to strike a major blow capable of further delaying the regime's nuclear programme, makes no sense. The country already has several teams of scientists capable of enriching uranium. The attack on Natanz and the sabotage have already delayed the plans. The real reason must be different.

If we look upstream, we will see that the Israeli government is on the brink of collapse and that Netanyahu will need convincing campaign arguments again. The presumption of a strong hand against the ayatollahs will certainly bring a good number of votes. Looking further ahead, we see that the new Biden administration is in favour of reopening a negotiating process with Tehran. This would be more difficult if the clerics responded to what happened to Fakhrizadeh in a violent manner. The old leaders of Iran are fanatical and backward. But they are astute in international politics. They must look at the assassination as an attempt at political provocation. And they know that waiting patiently for Joe Biden to take office may be the best response to the challenge they were given days ago.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Macron leads on defence

Today President Macron of France delivered a very long, dense speech to the top military personnel. The President shared his deep concern with the new international order, which is basically defined by rapports de force and not by international law and underlined once again the need for an autonomous European defence pillar, as well as his call for a strategic dialogue with Russia. But his main messages were about France as a global power and his country’s nuclear capabilities. He spent a bit of time explaining his approach to nuclear power, as a means of deterrence, a weapon that is there not to be used. France is the only nuclear power within the European Union, now that the British are outside.

But my deep reading of his address makes me conclude President Macron wants to take the lead in European defence matters. That could be part of his legacy. But he is very much aware that Germany is not ready to move too far in such field and that several other EU countries, particularly those in the East, think that the key dimension of our common defence passes through keeping the US fully engaged in Europe. 

In such circumstances, the French President wants to convince the Poles to adopt his views. That’s why he was in Poland at the beginning of the week. He also needs to convince the Polish leaders that European defence is a genuine concern, not just a screen to have France and Germany dominating the European military scene. There is a bit of a silent rivalry between Poland and Germany on defence matters.

Poland pays a lot of attention to its armed forces and it has become a key player in European military matters. The problem with Poland is that its leaders follow a political line that is very different from the one Macron promotes. And that does not facilitate a collaborative approach.