Can we compare the CIA with the Russian Secret Services?

 https://victorangelo1.substack.com/p/the-illusion-of-deterrence-what-cias

The Illusion of Deterrence: What CIA’s Moscow Trip Has Achieved?

Please read the text in my Subsack

The CIA Director goes to Moscow: what for?

 https://victorangelo1.substack.com/p/the-cia-in-moscow-why-spies-not-diplomats

The geostrategic soup: USA, Russia, Europe and the near future

Putin and his acts of sabotage: a summary

 This article by Victor Ângelo, published in Portuguese on 3 October 2025 in Diário de Notícias, argues for a firm and aggressive response from European democracies and NATO to what he describes as hybrid warfare orchestrated by Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Key Points of the Article

• The Threat: The recent swarms of drones over military/airport installations, alongside cyber-attacks and political interference, are viewed as hostile acts of hybrid aggression by Russian special services aiming to create chaos, weaken alliances, and divert resources from Ukraine. The attacks are considered to be an escalation beyond mere "tests" of European resolve.

• Indictment of the Kremlin: While these attacks lack a "made in Russia" label, the author asserts that all evidence points to the Kremlin as the instigator of this "disguised, cunning" aggression.

• Proposed Diplomatic Response: The first phase of firmness must be the imposition of more restrictive diplomatic measures against Russia, including:

  • Reducing the number of accredited Russian diplomatic personnel.

  • Limiting their movement to the metropolitan areas of capitals.

  • Tight surveillance of their activities.

  • A protocolary demotion for Russian ambassadors.

  • The aggravation of EU sanctions.

• Proposed NATO Military Response: The Atlantic Alliance must enhance its counter-threat capabilities by:

  • Intensifying patrols and air/maritime defense on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea.

  • Increasing technological capacity for identification, jamming, and electronic disorientation of enemy craft, including expanding the use of lasers.

  • Developing low-cost means to destroy invaders, leveraging Ukrainian war experience.

• Violation of Airspace: The author advocates for a strong reaction to serious airspace violations, such as the one over Estonia. While acknowledging the sensitivity, he suggests formally warning Moscow that non-NATO vessels considered a real threat will be shot down, arguing that ambiguity is seen as weakness by Putin.

• Warning to Portugal: The article concludes with a specific warning to Portugal, stating that it is not outside Moscow's orbit. Portugal's vulnerabilities include exposure to espionage, lack of resources to protect its maritime area (used by Russian submarines), and a political class that often underestimates the dangers.

Writing about Iran

Iran: the next day

Victor Angelo

 

 

In 2018, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh became known when Benjamin Netanyahu accused him of being the scientist at the head of the Iranian nuclear programme. Fakhrizadeh was murdered on the outskirts of Tehran a week ago. There are contradictory accounts of the crime. What is certain is that the ambush was conducted by a reasonable number of agents, at least ten of them, and in a professional way - the wife, who was travelling with him, came out of it unharmed, she was not part of the objective. I have no doubt that the ambush was carried out by special forces, with perfectly trained executioners, who had at their disposal the information, logistics and means necessary for a high-risk mission. It is peaceful to conclude that it was not the work of the internal Iranian opposition. It had all the characteristics of an operation planned, organised, and carried out by a state hostile to Iran. And I cannot help but think of the regime's three main enemies: Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Donald Trump's United States.

Those who know these things point in the direction of Israel. It is true that the secret services of that country, in particular the legendary Mossad, have already demonstrated an incomparably greater ability to penetrate Iranian official circles than any other espionage service. One example of this ability, with the trial of the indicted currently taking place in Antwerp, is the following: it was Mossad that made known to the Belgian authorities the terrorist attack the Iranian government was plotting in 2018 against the National Council of Iranian Resistance in exile. The European intelligence services where the plot was being prepared - the Belgians, the French, and the Austrians - had not noticed anything. 

Israel can never admit the slightest hint of responsibility for murders of this kind. Such an admission would open the door to prosecution in the International Court of Justice in The Hague or in the jurisdiction of a United Nations member country. International law is clear. An extraterritorial, summary, and arbitrary execution, promoted by a State outside a situation of armed conflict is a crime which violates international human rights law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. Moreover, the United Nations Charter expressly prohibits the extraterritorial use of force in times of peace.

For all these reasons, the paternity of what has now happened to Fakhrizadeh will remain unknown for the time being. We will have to be contented with the suspicions.

The assassination has shown that the Iranian system of internal espionage and counterespionage, which terrifies the population, has very serious flaws. The powerful Ministry of Intelligence is more concerned with the repression of the growing internal opposition than it is prepared to identify the most sophisticated threats from outside. This is not new. In early July, for example, the security services were unable to prevent an explosion at the Natanz nuclear power plant, nor were they able to avert the sabotage of missile-making programmes. All these actions were handled by a foreign country.  

A fundamental issue is to try to understand the central motive for the assassination. What seems more obvious, which would be to strike a major blow capable of further delaying the regime's nuclear programme, makes no sense. The country already has several teams of scientists capable of enriching uranium. The attack on Natanz and the sabotage have already delayed the plans. The real reason must be different.

If we look upstream, we will see that the Israeli government is on the brink of collapse and that Netanyahu will need convincing campaign arguments again. The presumption of a strong hand against the ayatollahs will certainly bring a good number of votes. Looking further ahead, we see that the new Biden administration is in favour of reopening a negotiating process with Tehran. This would be more difficult if the clerics responded to what happened to Fakhrizadeh in a violent manner. The old leaders of Iran are fanatical and backward. But they are astute in international politics. They must look at the assassination as an attempt at political provocation. And they know that waiting patiently for Joe Biden to take office may be the best response to the challenge they were given days ago.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Kim Jong-un keeps smiling

Today’s news is that Kim Jong-un is back. There has been a lot of speculation about his health. Now, thanks to the photos made available by the Korean Central News Agency, we know he is alive and smiling. He is also a bit fatter. That might be the result of some good time at his holiday villa, by the Sea of Japan. His sister, Kim Yo-jong, who is a powerful figure in the political landscape of mysterious North Korea, could tell him he should do some dieting. She appears in one of the pictures just next to him. That shows her importance and influence, I would dare to say.

In any case, Kim Yo-jong, who is a young person – age 32 years –, is now being studied and followed by several special people in the West. She might have a future in tomorrow’s North Korea. The country remains a family business.

About the intelligence work

During my professional life I had to interact with intelligence personnel. Most of them were very bright people, others were just good at collecting information but not particularly skilled at transforming that information into intelligence, meaning, into proper assessments and sets of assumptions. But the most important thing I have learned is that intelligence is a line of work that requires independence. The staff must feel they are not pressurised in any direction. They must come to the best conclusion they can produce. If the analysis and assumptions are influenced by partisan considerations, they no longer are fully credible. They lose value and can only be used to justify political mistakes and biased decisions. Unfortunately, that happens quite often, thanks to the interference of the political leaders.

The right question

I have always admired those who are good at asking the pertinent questions. For me, that proves they are intelligent people. A well-formulated question is powerful. The other side can feel deeply challenged. And that's what we want politicians to feel. 

The Special Operations and the Special One

The recent American operation against the leader of the Islamic State must be recognised as a major success. In addition, I would mention three facts that are also of great import.

First, it was once again clear that the US Intelligence machinery is the best in world. They know how to establish information collection networks and they have the means and the capacity to achieve results in very hostile environments.  

Second, the US Special Operations Units are also top performers. They prepare well, train extensively the scenario they might expect and have the determination and the courage to undertake very risky operations.

Third, the President is a political disaster, whatever the prism you may use to look at him. The way he told the story was most embarrassing. He couldn’t go beyond his own self and was unable to give the moment the seriousness it deserved. He is just a poorly informed amateur. Fortunately, behind him, there is an intelligence community and a military establishment that know what they are supposed to do.

Deception and intent

We should always remember the wise aphorism about politics. It goes like this: in politics everything could mean the opposite of what it is said or done. Our job is to try to find out what is behind the words or the deeds. Like asking, what is the point? Sharp minds do that.

New approaches to the Armed Forces

This week, we were engaged in a discussion about the future shape and configuration of the armed forces in contexts such as those we find in Europe. The starting point was that tomorrow’s defence will be very different in terms of means and personnel from what we have seen in the past. We should not be preparing for future conflicts the same way we have been doing during the last twenty years or so. Tensions and hostilities will be much more complex than they have been in the past.

I will not go into the details of the discussion this time. I just want to mention that one of the issues was about the participation of the armed forces in domestic security patrolling. Something we saw in recent years in France, above all, but also in Belgium and elsewhere, soldiers walking side by side with the Police – or on their one, no Police personnel being around – in the streets and shopping malls of our cities.

This remains a major point of disputation. I am not in favour. I do not think military personnel should be doing routine patrols that are very much within Police’s territory, unless there is a special emergency. But several senior military officers are for it. And some politicians as well, for reasons that have more to do with political gain than with increased levels of security.

The debate is not closed.

Assange and the legality of some cover operations

Julian Assange’s predicament leaves no one indifferent, in our part of the world. He has scores of supporters. Also, plenty of detractors. His personality, not just his deeds, is deeply controversial. I will not enter that discussion.

However, I recognise that, thanks to his initiative, it has been possible to demonstrate that a good number of actions taken by powerful Western governments, under the cover of national security and defence, surpassed the limits of what can be considered legitimate. Basic rights and values have been shaken by such actions.

And that brings back a fundamental question that remains unresolved in our democracies. The systems in place do not ensure a proper democratic, ethical and legal control of some undercover operations carried out by special military forces, or by specific police and intelligence services within the security apparatus. It has become obvious that our parliaments are not prepared to exercise such oversight. They intrinsically lack the competence and the political strength to carry out that role. And the justice machinery is basically in the same position of weakness.

I think it is time to envisage the creation of a constitutional body that would bring together a small number of elders, a group of sages who have reached the end of their professional ambitions and careers, and have behind them an immaculate life history, a public image of great credibility. This would be a top-level group mandated to oversee and assess complex legal and ethics practices as carried out by special government agencies. Such independent panel would report to an appropriate parliamentary committee.

This move would certainly respond to some key interrogations that we ought to deal with, based on what Assange and Wikileaks have revealed.  

EU's collective defence

The issue of collective defence is again a major concern for many European countries. It has to take into account a good number of major new developments. A more assertive Russia. A new level of foreign policy coordination between Russia and China, a policy that is clearly in competition with the Western interests and approaches. The fake news, the political interference and the funding of populist and far-right radical movements. The growing political gap and related tensions between Europe and Turkey. The situation in the Middle East and the Northern part of Africa. Terrorism. The US unprecedented new official policy towards defence cooperation with Europe. And the very hesitant, ambiguous views of the citizens regarding military expenditures.

And I would add one more, that is often left aside: the inept political direction provided by the EU leaders, particularly when it comes to articulating defence and security, military forces, intelligence and police services.

Intelligence and balance

President Trump said today that the US intelligence chiefs are “extremely passive and naïve” and that “they should go back to school”. The President is indeed sui generis. Uncommon, and odd, to be clear.

These remarks he made are unjustified. That’s how we see it, from this side of the Alliance. The people that are currently in charge of the US national security are actually very experienced and balanced. These might be the characteristics the President has serious difficulties to identify with. They talk based of facts and assessments. The other side talks based on political instincts and emotions, and on a view that places him at the centre of the universe. Power blinds and disturbs quite often those who see themselves as above the crowd.

As an additional note, let me add that the American people and we in Europe are lucky enough to have such kind of professionals in charge of a key State function. And we encourage them not to feel undermined by unjustified and prejudiced remarks. They should keep playing the serene role that is theirs and is so crucial to avoid immature and irrational strategic decisions.

There is fog in the land

I accept the accusation made by the British government against the Russian leadership. Those leaders are most likely behind the chemical attack against the Skiprals, father and daughter. But there is a fundamental question that has not be attended to. What is the reason for the attempted murder? And I could add two more interrogations. Why now? Was the father still active in matters of intelligence?

If these questions get no answer - and probably they will remain unanswered – then we will be just trading in fog and obscurity.

Let the intelligence people do their work

The most dangerous mistake regarding North Korea could result from erroneous intelligence. It´s a real possibility. I know from a number of examples that intelligence agencies, even the best resourced and the most experienced ones, tend to make mistakes on critical matters. That´s particularly the case when they are under serious political pressure, as it is the case.

If the relevant intelligence people come to the conclusion that the North is about to launch some kind of nuclear or other threatening device, our side might then decide that the time for pre-emptive action is upon us. In these matters, decisions are taken fast.

Once they have been taken, it might be too late to contain and mitigate their multiple consequences.

Therefore, the first point in such a delicate situation as the current one is to make sure the intelligence work is carried out as professionally as possible, outside any type of political compulsion. Secondly, it is essential to fully consider the regional leaders ´opinion. Particularly, the South Korean ones, who are at present at the end of a decisive presidential campaign for an election scheduled for May 9. This is their region and in the world of today, their views are of paramount importance. 

A comprehensive view of criminal behaviour.

The assailant that yesterday attacked the police officers on duty at the Champs Elysées had a long past of criminal behaviour. He spent many years in jail. And all those who knew him a bit agree he was a deeply deranged fellow.

 As we take these facts into account, we must raise a number of questions about the workings of the penitentiary system, the failures – or at least, the limitations – of the re-education programmes, the inefficiency of the back-to-society policies and also the way our institutional arrangements miss the target when it comes to deal with extremely violent people. 

All these matters need to be seriously thought through, and challenged, if we are indeed committed to making our environment safer.

It´s not enough just to speak about terrorism.  

On domestic security matters

The concept of “war against terrorism” is not appropriate for our European societies. We are not at war. We have a very serious challenge in terms of domestic security. But it is a security issue to be dealt with by the police and the internal intelligence services. War would mean a major disruption of normalcy. We want to keep the same routines and be convinced that the security services are indeed equipped to match the challenge. They might of course be supported by the armed forces. But that support has to be much smarter than just placing a few soldiers in shopping malls and other public spaces. The politicians need to understand that the military can do much better things than just standing out there.

EU´s debate on security and defence

The on-going debate about the future of EU security and defence is excessively focused on the military dimensions. It is also incomplete in terms of understanding the meaning of European security and the complementarity links – and the differences as well – between both concepts. Furthermore, many of the responses that are put forward do not match the new nature of the risks and threats our Europe is confronted with. The understanding of the intents that move our adversaries and enemies is good. But the proposed set of actions are too conventional and too narrow. On the opposite side, we see the enemies playing complex hybrid packages against us. Actually, their main lines of intervention go far beyond the hard military means. They also go far beyond the traditional diplomatic adversarial politics. They are multidimensional, subtle and very often take advantage of our own internal divisions. We should not limit ourselves to military options. That would be in deep contradiction with what we have been talking about during the last six or so years in terms of a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

But there are other points that are also missing. First, the strengthening of national police services. Second, the call for greater cooperation between member States in matters of police investigation, information sharing and joint detailed analysis and interpretation of the data collected. Third, the augmenting of national intelligence resources, which are extremely limited in some of our States, including in those that have recently experienced terrorist incidents. Fourth, the sharing of information between the military and the police intelligence services.

Spying on friends

Friends do not spy on friends. No government, including the US, is authorised to tap the communications of its allied nations’ leaders. This is a very basic principle of healthy alliances.

Keeping this in mind, I fully understand the anger President François Hollande has expressed today when he learned that he, and those before him at the Elysée Palace, have been spied upon by the intelligence services of the US.

Let´s also hope that France is not doing it elsewhere as well. 

Security cooperation

In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo drama, there will be a high-level meeting in Paris on Sunday on internal security in Europe. I have not seen its agenda. But I believe it will have to discuss two basic things: improve intelligence and expand the exchange of information among the different police services of the EU countries. This means, in different words, more resources for prevention and a more cooperative approach among States. Both seem quite obvious. But they have not been very easy to implement. And I am afraid they will continue to face the same type of challenges.