Guterres writes about the dramatic financial situation of Peacekeeping missions worldwide

 

10 October 2025 | Worldwide | Secretary-General

Contingency Plan Letter to Staff Members Dear Colleagues,   I am writing to update you on the financial status of United Nations peacekeeping operations and what it means for us all.   Our peacekeeping operations are facing an extremely difficult financial situation. The current liquidity crisis is the direct result of arrears and the non-payment of assessed contributions in full and on time. Over the past few years, we have actively engaged with Member States to find solutions to this growing challenge. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly in 2019 and 2022 approved some measures that have enabled us to deal with the operational impact of late or non-payments. However, while the level of peacekeeping budgets has been steadily declining, the outstanding contributions have increased significantly, especially in recent months. At the start of this peacekeeping budget cycle on 1 July 2025, arrears amounted to US$2.066 billion. Our collections for the financial period may fall short by about US$880 million, putting a further strain on our liquidity situation.   In addition to actively engaging with Member States, we introduced measures in 2024 to restrict spending and align it with cash inflows. Thanks to these measures, and your dedication and commitment, and the generosity of troop- and police-contributing countries, we have managed to carry on. The troop- and police-contributing countries are, in effect, financing the system, waiting many months and sometimes over a year for reimbursement of their personnel and equipment costs. This is unsustainable. The margin of manoeuvre gained from earlier liquidity measures approved by the General Assembly, as well as our own spending restrictions, is now exhausted. Despite recent positive news that a sizeable amount from a major contributor will be entirely available to distribute flexibly across the peacekeeping missions and to establish a reserve for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the reality remains: the overall shortfall is grave.   In a context of deep uncertainty and a worsening cash position, I asked all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to prepare contingency plans based on possible reductions of 15 to 25 per cent of their expenditures. Troop- and police-contributing countries were also informed, together with the relevant host countries. I am grateful to our missions for working hard over the past few months to prepare these different scenarios.   Based on our current financial estimates and after a careful review, I have decided to request all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to implement their contingency plans for a 15 per cent reduction in expenditures, the lower of the two scenarios. These reductions will affect all areas: uniformed components, civilian personnel and operations. Separately, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) will be required to achieve a 25 per cent reduction in expenditures within the current fiscal year, reflecting unique budgetary pressures that will need to be addressed in close coordination with the African Union.   These reductions must now be achieved within the remaining nine months of the budget period. Therefore, the impact on the reduction of capacities — and thus on operations and mandated activities — will be proportionally greater. The consequences will be painful. With the exception of UNSOS, we will need to repatriate around 25 per cent of the uniformed personnel and their equipment in the coming months. Peacekeeping operations — together with the Department of Peace Operations and other relevant departments — have carefully identified the contingents and individual uniformed personnel that should be repatriated.   On 7 October 2025, I briefed the members of the United Nations Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries on the contingency plans. We will continue to update them on the implementation and impact on our operations.   Repatriating around 25 per cent of troops and police in the space of a few months will be a major and complex logistical exercise.   The impact on civilian, international and locally recruited staff and affiliate personnel will be significant. Some separations will be inevitable, and missions will soon need to invoke the downsizing policy to reduce their civilian staffing, in consultation with staff representative bodies. I know the impact on affected staff, personnel and their families will be enormous, and I want to acknowledge the personal toll such measures entail.   The work of identifying which contingents and individual personnel will be repatriated has been carried out with care, weighing mandate priorities, operational requirements and, above all, the safety and security of those who will remain. While our missions carry out their contingency plans to address their funding shortfalls, they will continue to implement their mandates to the extent possible under these financial circumstances. The protection of civilians, the advancement of peace processes and support to fragile communities cannot and will not be abandoned. However, given the magnitude of the problem and the challenging context in which our missions operate, it is difficult to predict the impact on the ground. We have planned for this scenario and our staff in the field and at Headquarters will continue to work with dedication and professionalism. But this is a situation that the Organization has never faced before, and the impact remains uncertain.   I want to express my deep appreciation to all peacekeeping personnel for their service and sacrifice. I deeply understand the concerns that carrying out these plans raises, and the impact it may have on missions and personnel. Unfortunately, the Organization has no choice but to move forward with the implementation, despite the difficult impact it will have. I am determined to continue advocating for peacekeeping as a collective and shared responsibility. Without the support of Member States, the Organization cannot function properly. I will continue to appeal to all Member States to pay in full and on time so that our peacekeeping operations can remain a strong and dependable instrument of the United Nations. I remain hopeful that we will be able to resolve the current liquidity crisis, and I will work tirelessly towards that end.   I want to, once again, thank you for undertaking your essential work with enormous strength and resilience under these very difficult circumstances. You have continued to serve in some of the world's most difficult and dangerous situations, not for recognition, but for the cause of peace. That spirit is the heart of this Organization. Together, I am confident that we can take on the challenges, uphold our values and create the opportunities needed to address our unstable and uncertain world.   Yours sincerely, Antonio Guterres

EU and its challenges

 European Union

• The EU faces major challenges due to instability in its two largest member states, France and Germany. This comes at a time when the EU must deal with external threats (Russia, China, US trade tensions), support Ukraine, manage debt, and strengthen its own defence.
• The rise of far-right and populist parties across Europe is reshaping the political landscape, threatening the unity and stability of the EU.

France, Germany and the European Union challenges and responses

 From France to Germany, and across the EU, the risks are enormous and the challenges must be won

Victor Ângelo

France is experiencing a very serious political crisis. The dissolution of the National Assembly, decided on 9 June 2024 by President Emmanuel Macron, was a gamble that surprised the political class and proved to be a mistake. Since then, four prime ministers have already come to power. The latest, Sébastien Lecornu, formed a government on Sunday night and resigned the following morning. An absolute record, which clearly shows the deadlock the country is in.

The political elites are grouped into two extreme camps: Marine Le Pen’s party and a coalition of more or less radical left-wing forces, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the leading figure. What little remains, the centre, is fragmented around half a dozen politicians who cannot agree. Several of these personalities, as well as Le Pen and Mélenchon, are convinced they could succeed Macron as head of state. They want Macron to resign from the presidency of the Republic without delay. Officially, his second term should end in May 2027. Now, due to the seriousness of the crisis, even his political allies are saying that the solution to the deadlock would be for the president to leave office early.

I do not believe this will happen. Macron may not want to admit that his popularity is at rock bottom. This week’s poll found that only 14% of the French support his policies. It is a catastrophic percentage. Macron believes, however, that he has the constitutional legitimacy to continue.

In a deep crisis like the current one, and if Macron were to opt again, in the near future, for early parliamentary elections, it is possible that Marine Le Pen’s far-right could win the most seats. Her party appears, to a significant part of the electorate, as more stable than the left, which is a fragile patchwork of various political opinions.

In any case, whether it is early presidential or new parliamentary elections, France is on the verge of falling into the abyss of deep chaos, caught between two ultra-radical poles. This time, the risk is very serious. The most likely outcome is that France, one of the two pillars of the European Union, will be led by a radical, ultranationalist party, hostile to the European project, xenophobic, and ideologically close to Vladimir Putin.

The other pillar of Europe is Germany. Friedrich Merz, chancellor since May, is in constant decline with public opinion. Only 26% of voters believe in his ability to solve the most pressing problems: the cost of living, housing, immigration, and economic stagnation. The German economy contracted in 2023 and 2024, with sectors such as construction and industry falling back to levels of the mid-2000s. The engine of the economy, the automotive industry, is about a third below its peak 15 years ago and has returned to levels close to the mid-2000s, reflecting a loss of competitiveness and profound structural changes in the sector.

In a recent discussion with German analysts, I was told that the unpopularity of Merz and his coalition is paving the way for the far-right to come to power in 2029 or even earlier. This year, the AfD (Alternative for Germany, a party led by Nazi nostalgists) came second, with almost 21% of the vote. The growing discontent of citizens, competition with the Chinese economy, tariffs and restrictions imposed by the Americans, spending on aid to Ukraine, Donald Trump’s blatant support for German right-wing extremists—who sees the AfD as a way to seriously undermine European unity—, the growing propaganda against foreigners living in Germany, all these are factors that reinforce the electoral base of this racist and Nazi-inspired party. Not to mention that the AfD maintains privileged relations with the Kremlin.

The crossroads in which both France, now, and Germany, in the near future, find themselves represent two enormous challenges for the survival of the EU. They are incomparably more worrying than the consequences of Brexit or the sabotage by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico. They come at a time when the EU faces a series of existential problems of external origin.

The external enemies are well known. Fear and concessions are the worst responses that can be given to them. Enemies and adversaries must be dealt with with great strategic skill and reinforced unity, only achievable if EU leaders can explain and prove to citizens the importance of European unity and cohesion.

The international scene is much bigger than the USA, Russia, or China. The expansion of agreements with Japan, Canada, Mercosur, the African continent, and ASEAN should be given priority attention. This list does not seek to exclude other partners, it only mentions some that are especially important.

The future also requires resolutely reducing excessive dependence on the outside in the areas of defence, technology, digital platforms, energy, and raw materials essential for the energy transition. Debureaucratising, innovating, and promoting the complementarity of European economies is fundamental. All this must be done while combating extremism. To think that extremists will play by democratic rules once in power is a dangerous illusion. Exposing this fiction is now the urgent priority in France, and the constant priority in all Member States, including Portugal.

2025 Nobel Peace Price: Maria Corina Machado, a decision I support

 My former UN/UNDP Senior colleague Amb. Francis M. O'Donnell sent me the folowing text about Maria Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace.

"I asked AI three questions: "(a) Is the Nobel Peace Prize now drifting from celebrating peace achievements towards rewarding social/political activism? ; (b) How deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize is María Corina Machado? Has she not aligned with fascism, islamophobia, and Trumpism? (c) what is her her human rights record and values explicitly pronounced?"

Here is the response:

QUOTE: 

(a) Nobel Peace Prize Shift Toward Activism: The Nobel Peace Prize has increasingly pivoted from honoring traditional diplomatic achievements to recognizing social and political activism, reflecting a response to global democratic erosion. Historically, awards like those to Willy Brandt (1971) for East-West reconciliation or Desmond Tutu (1984) for anti-apartheid work blended diplomacy and activism. Recent laureates—Malala Yousafzai (2014) for education rights, Nadia Murad (2018) for survivor advocacy, and Maria Ressa (2021) for press freedom—center grassroots resistance against systemic oppression. Critics argue this shift strays from Alfred Nobel’s vision of “fraternity between nations,” pointing to controversial awards like Barack Obama’s (2009) for unfulfilled promises or Abiy Ahmed’s (2019) before Ethiopia’s civil war. Supporters counter that activism confronts modern threats—authoritarianism, disinformation, and inequality—directly tied to peace. The 2025 award to María Corina Machado for her nonviolent fight against Venezuela’s dictatorship exemplifies this, prioritizing civilian-led democratic struggle over elite negotiations. This trend underscores a broader definition of peace, embracing human rights and democratic resilience amid global autocratic surges. 

(b) Deservingness of María Corina Machado: María Corina Machado’s 2025 Nobel Peace Prize is well-earned for her relentless, nonviolent campaign against Venezuela’s authoritarian regime. Winning 92% in the 2024 opposition primaries, she unified a fractured opposition, mobilized millions for free elections, and faced severe repression—expulsion from parliament, campaign bans, and hiding from arrest. Her resilience embodies Alfred Nobel’s ideals of fostering democratic fraternity. Critics cite her virtual appearance at the February 2025 “Patriots for Europe” summit, alongside far-right figures like Marine Le Pen, as fascist alignment. Yet, Machado’s speech focused solely on Venezuela’s democratic crisis, not endorsing the summit’s anti-immigration or “Reconquista” rhetoric, which fueled Islamophobia accusations. Her praise for Trump’s sanctions reflects strategic support for external pressure on Maduro, not ideological Trumpism. These associations, while divisive, are pragmatic outreach in a desperate fight, not evidence of extremist ideologies. Her nonviolent leadership remains a beacon for democratic restoration. 

(c) María Corina Machado’s Human Rights Values and Policies:  María Corina Machado’s human rights stance is rooted in democratic restoration and individual liberties, shaped by Venezuela’s crisis under Maduro’s regime. She advocates for free elections, press freedom, and judicial independence, emphasizing nonviolent resistance to authoritarianism. Her Vente Venezuela party promotes a liberal democratic framework, prioritizing free speech, property rights, and economic freedom to counter socialist policies that fuelled Venezuela’s collapse. Machado has consistently condemned state violence, including arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings, demanding accountability for regime abuses documented by the UN. She supports humanitarian aid access to address Venezuela’s 80% poverty rate and mass migration crisis. While her economic liberalism and U.S. sanctions support draw criticism for aligning with Western interests, her focus remains on empowering Venezuelans through transparent governance and civic participation. Her policies reject divisive ideologies, focusing on unity and democratic resilience, aligning with universal human rights principles. “UNQUOTE

Putin and his acts of sabotage: a summary

 This article by Victor Ângelo, published in Portuguese on 3 October 2025 in Diário de Notícias, argues for a firm and aggressive response from European democracies and NATO to what he describes as hybrid warfare orchestrated by Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Key Points of the Article

• The Threat: The recent swarms of drones over military/airport installations, alongside cyber-attacks and political interference, are viewed as hostile acts of hybrid aggression by Russian special services aiming to create chaos, weaken alliances, and divert resources from Ukraine. The attacks are considered to be an escalation beyond mere "tests" of European resolve.

• Indictment of the Kremlin: While these attacks lack a "made in Russia" label, the author asserts that all evidence points to the Kremlin as the instigator of this "disguised, cunning" aggression.

• Proposed Diplomatic Response: The first phase of firmness must be the imposition of more restrictive diplomatic measures against Russia, including:

  • Reducing the number of accredited Russian diplomatic personnel.

  • Limiting their movement to the metropolitan areas of capitals.

  • Tight surveillance of their activities.

  • A protocolary demotion for Russian ambassadors.

  • The aggravation of EU sanctions.

• Proposed NATO Military Response: The Atlantic Alliance must enhance its counter-threat capabilities by:

  • Intensifying patrols and air/maritime defense on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea.

  • Increasing technological capacity for identification, jamming, and electronic disorientation of enemy craft, including expanding the use of lasers.

  • Developing low-cost means to destroy invaders, leveraging Ukrainian war experience.

• Violation of Airspace: The author advocates for a strong reaction to serious airspace violations, such as the one over Estonia. While acknowledging the sensitivity, he suggests formally warning Moscow that non-NATO vessels considered a real threat will be shot down, arguing that ambiguity is seen as weakness by Putin.

• Warning to Portugal: The article concludes with a specific warning to Portugal, stating that it is not outside Moscow's orbit. Portugal's vulnerabilities include exposure to espionage, lack of resources to protect its maritime area (used by Russian submarines), and a political class that often underestimates the dangers.

Responding to Putin's threats

 

Respond with Firmness to the Drones, Sabotage, and Threats of Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

The swarms of drones that have recently been flying over military installations and airports in certain Western European states are hostile acts carried out by enemy forces. They should be viewed in parallel with cyber-piracy actions against highly relevant economic infrastructure and as complementary to attempts to interfere in the political life and electoral campaigns of European democracies.

The scale and complexity of these attacks leave no doubt as to their authors. They can only be organized by special secret services, at the behest of a leadership that intends to weaken, create chaos, and shatter our defense alliances and our value systems. They are a threat to the stability of all of us and a cause of great concern, especially for the populations of Eastern and Northern Europe. They are also aimed at diverting attention and forcing the expenditure of resources that could be allocated to supporting Ukraine's legitimate defense.

These aggressive provocations and interventions come with no label or tag that says "made in Russia." But the targeted countries and their allies have every reason to indict the Kremlin's leaders. This is the political stance that must be adopted. Any analysis of the facts inevitably leads to the inescapable presumption that Moscow is launching a disguised, cunning, and hybrid aggression against democratic Europe. We are facing a series of subtle military offensives that, if not met with an adequate response, could lead to an escalation. These are not mere tests to gauge our firmness. We are already in another phase.

The first phase of the response should involve the imposition of even more restrictive diplomatic measures against Putin's Russia. These measures should include non-accreditation of Russian diplomatic personnel beyond a minimum number of officials, the limitation of their scope of action to the metropolitan areas of European capitals, excluding any authorization to circulate outside the capitals, and tight surveillance of the activities carried out by these diplomatic or ostensibly diplomatic agents. Russian ambassadors should face a protocolary demotion in their contacts with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in our countries. Political dialogue with the Kremlin's representatives is of little or no use, except for Putin.

These restrictions would complement the sanctions imposed by the European Union, which, by the way, need to be tightened. Furthermore, the Atlantic Alliance must deepen its capacity to combat these and other threats and provocations. Here there are three fundamental concerns: intensifying air and maritime defense patrols and means on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea region; increasing the technological capacity for identification, jamming, and electronic disorientation of enemy vessels, including a significant expansion of radiation beam emitters—"lasers"; and destroying invaders with appropriate, low-cost means. The production of these means must be done on a large scale, in cooperation among member states and taking advantage of the knowledge dramatically developed by Ukraine. There is much to learn from the Ukrainians, even before it becomes necessary to spend fortunes on missiles.

The use of missiles is, however, justified when it comes to violations of NATO airspace by armed Russian fighters. It is an extremely sensitive issue, no doubt. But the 12-minute overflight of Estonian airspace, as happened on September 19 with three MiG-31s, requires an energetic reaction. This time, the Italian air force escorted the intruders out of the Atlantic Alliance's space. But more will be needed: formally and appropriately warning Moscow that new violations of this type will be treated as offensive acts and that, therefore, vessels alien to the Alliance, if considered a real threat, will be shot down. Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary-General, opted for a more generic and ambiguous statement. Perhaps he was right, but ambiguity, in Putin's case, is understood by him as an attitude of weakness.

It is possible that we will continue to see an intensification of attacks without a label or signature against us. Dictatorships are a form of madness, and dictators consider themselves invincible geniuses.

It is advisable not to conclude without adding that it is a mistake to think that Portugal is outside Moscow's orbit of action. The Kremlin wants us to think that way and knows our weaknesses: the existence of vulnerabilities to enemy espionage operations; the lack of resources to protect our maritime area, which can be used for the circulation of Russian attack and sabotage submarines; and the predominance of a political and intellectual class that does not understand or does not want to take seriously the dangers facing democratic Europe. Putin forgets, however, that Portugal counts on the cooperation of its allies, within the framework of NATO.

Thoughts and paths: a wider view of some geopolitic dimensions

Victor Angelo's public interventions address the intricate and rapidly evolving landscape of global geopolitics, underscoring the imperative for enhanced, authoritative, international mechanisms to manage crises rooted in human security, justice, and democracy. His views try to elucidate the transformation of conflict dynamics post-Cold War and the paramount importance of key values --cooperation, trust, dignity and human rights -- in global affairs.

Global Challenges Surpassing Responses: The swift and complex changes in geopolitics have created a disparity between global challenges and the capacity of existing international mechanisms to address them effectively. Leadership's Impact on Crises: Ethical and competent leadership is essential for peace and stability, with leaders acting as agents of change or contributors to conflict, highlighting the need for principled diplomacy that balances national interests and universal values. 

Centrality of Human Security: Human security, which integrates national protection with human rights, democracy, and economic opportunities, emphasizes empowerment and civic participation in crisis contexts.

Shift from State-Centric to Individual Focus: Post-Cold War conflicts have transitioned from interstate to internal, with individuals becoming central to international affairs paradigms. However, we are witnessing at the same time a return to interstate conflicts. This time they combine classical means of war with hybrid, digitally based attacks and sanctions of different nature.

Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Civil Society Organizations and community groups have become indispensable partners in conflict resolution, although international bodies continue to struggle with effectively engaging local and traditional authorities. Good Governance and State Fragility: Good governance, encompassing accountability, human rights, and political pluralism, as well as social progress and full respect for the nature, is crucial to preventing crises; failing states lose control of core key sovereignty functions, thereby risking instability and conflict. For the first time since 1945, developed states are also entering in a political and social downwards spiral.

United Nations' Pivotal Role: Despite criticisms, the United Nations remains the central institution for legitimizing and managing peace and security efforts, with the Security Council supposed to play a key role through resolutions and mandates. Challenges in Peacekeeping Mandates: Security Council mandates are often broad and challenging to implement, with issues such as host nation consent and mission coherence complicating peacekeeping effectiveness. Complexity of Modern Conflicts: Contemporary conflicts are asymmetric and multifaceted, necessitating coordinated multidimensional responses that consider political, military, and economic factors, including the economic drivers of conflict.

United Nations: I spent decades working inside the system

 

I’ve Worked Inside the UN. Here’s Why I Still Believe in It.

By Victor Ângelo

Every September, I find myself watching the United Nations General Assembly with a mix of hope and frustration. It’s a ritual I know well — not just from the outside, but from within. I spent years working under the UN flag, in places where diplomacy wasn’t just a word, but a lifeline.

And yet, each year, the same question resurfaces: Is the UN still relevant?

It’s tempting to say no. The speeches can feel repetitive. The Security Council often seems paralyzed. And the world, frankly, looks more chaotic than ever.

But I’ve come to believe that pessimism about the UN is not only misguided — it’s dangerous.

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🛠️ The UN Needs Help — But Not Abandonment

I won’t pretend the UN is working as it should. The Security Council, in particular, is stuck in a post-World War II time warp. Power is unevenly distributed. Vetoes are wielded like weapons. Reform is overdue.

But here’s the thing: we don’t fix global problems by walking away from global institutions.

When I was in the field — in conflict zones, post-crisis regions, places where the UN was often the only international presence — I saw what it meant to have a neutral actor, a voice for peace, a mechanism for dialogue. It wasn’t perfect. But it mattered.

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🔄 What We Can Do

If we want the UN to work better, we need to:

• Reform the Security Council to reflect today’s geopolitical realities.
• Give the UN teeth — the ability to act, not just talk.
• Support multilateralism, even when it’s slow and messy.
• Hold leaders accountable for how they use the UN stage.

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🌱 Why I Still Believe

I’ve seen the UN at its worst — bureaucratic, slow, sometimes painfully ineffective.

But I’ve also seen it at its best — bringing food to starving communities, mediating fragile peace talks, offering hope where there was none.

That’s why I believe in it. Not blindly. Not naively. But because I’ve seen what happens when it’s not there.

Pessimism is easy. It lets us disengage. But optimism — especially the kind rooted in experience — is a choice. And it’s one we need to make if we want a better world.

The English AI translation of today's opinion piece.

 

Pessimism About the UN is a Mistake

By Victor Ângelo

Following tradition, Brazil was the first state to take the floor at the opening of the high-level segment of the United Nations General Assembly this week in New York, and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's speech was one of the most notable. He spoke for 18 minutes—a little over the 15-minute rule that almost no one respects. It is worth watching the video that recorded his address.

If one had to limit his words to a couple of lines, one would say it was a firm voice representing the Global South, the countries that are defining a new power chessboard in the international order and that seek to be heard more in global institutions. Lula defended the role of the UN, the sovereignty of states within a framework that reinforces multilateral cooperation and condemns the arbitrary interventions of the strongest. He highlighted three of the fundamental issues on the global agenda: the regulation of digital platforms, to protect the most vulnerable and prevent manipulation without restricting freedom of opinion; climate change; and the fight against poverty, particularly hunger. He took a correct position regarding the tragedy in Gaza. The passage about Ukraine should be considered a serious blemish on his communication. Lula was vague and deferential to the ears of Moscow, failing to use the words invasion and aggression or refer to the conflict as he should have: an indisputable violation of the UN Charter by Russia. On this matter, Lula showed that he dances to Putin’s tune.

The second Head of State to intervene was the President of the USA. There was enormous expectation about what he would say, including about the future of the United Nations. He spoke for almost an hour on the most diverse topics, but always with his own person at the center of the monologue. In summary, one might say that Trump spoke about Trump. It was a bad speech, full of false claims and erroneous political positions, from past eras and long since defeated by historical and scientific evidence. While Lula and other leaders almost always sought to look to the future, reinforce cooperation for the joint solution of major global problems, and underline the need for UN reform, Trump challenged many of the fundamental issues for the survival of our Planet. He directly attacked the policies of many states, including old US allies, and the absence of initiative from the Secretary-General on conflict resolution. He treated the community of nations with paternalism and arrogance, and the UN as a nullity.

In reality, Trump delivered only three messages: that there is not, nor can there be, a better or wiser world leader; that he should be seen as a peace builder, deserving all honors, from the Nobel Prize upwards; and that he is the sovereign of the world's strongest country, which he believes gives him the natural right to dictate the international agenda.

But the impression that emerged from the General Assembly hall seems to be different: Trump represents a debasement of American politics, he is an embarrassment for Western democracies and, moreover, a danger to global stability, alongside some other leaders who, like him, live in the past, in a personality cult, or survive thanks to dictatorial regimes.

Emmanuel Macron and several other speakers underlined the importance of cooperation, exercised primarily through a strengthened UN capable of reflecting the current international political landscape. This reform of the United Nations must have as its first act the restructuring of the Security Council and the modernization of its rules of procedure, particularly with regard to the use of the veto. Macron mentioned a list of countries that, in his opinion, should be added to the Council's permanent members—Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, and two African states. Unfortunately, it is unthinkable that all this can happen in the near future.

The Security Council has become an arena of confrontation between the US, Russia, and China. That is primarily what it has served for since the middle of the last decade. None of these powers wants to accept a new composition that could undermine their strategic interests and geopolitical alliances. The main weakness of the UN political system lies in the current Security Council. And so we will continue. And we will simultaneously witness the division of the international scene into various groupings, some more effective than others.

This does not mean, however, that the main functions of the UN—I exclude here the specialized agencies, which have their own rules of operation, governance, and financing—are doomed to disappear. The world continues to have problems that justify the need for global cooperation, from the issue of poverty to those related to human rights, the protection of nature, climate and humanitarian challenges, the response to the accelerated growth of Artificial Intelligence, organized crime, or civil wars. Therefore, it is essential to insist on the capacity for initiative of UN leaders, starting with the Secretary-General, and on the timely payment of dues owed by each State. In other words, there is no reason for pessimism, nor is there reason to sit back and do nothing.

Published in Portuguese language in today's Diário de Notícias. 26/09/2025

Sobre a Assembleia Geral da ONU, com uma referência ao Sul Global e ao monólogo de Trump

 https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/o-pessimismo-sobre-a-onu-%C3%A9-um-erro

O meu texto de opinião no Diário de Notícias de hoje 26/09/2025.

https://lnkd.in/e-yi3Ybt