The Libyan conflict started nine years ago. It has been violent, and it destroyed most of the economy and livelihoods, as well as the State administration, which was already weak before the crisis. It also had a major impact on the region, as it contributed to increased insecurity in the Sahel. In the circumstances, the announcement this afternoon of a ceasefire, by both key players in the conflict, should be received with some degree of optimism. It came as a surprise, that is a fact. But the positive reactions expressed by Libya’s neighbours and friends, and by the Arab League, are very encouraging. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to comment on the declarations with any type of cynicism. I know it will be difficult to build peace. But the main question this evening is about building peace. How can the partners of Libya help to make sure that the ceasefire holds and that some stability and inclusiveness is created?
Friday, 21 August 2020
Wednesday, 19 August 2020
Europe meets on Belarus
The leaders of the European Union met today to discuss the situation in Belarus. They agreed that the presidential elections of 9 August were not credible and therefore the results announced by the country’s electoral authorities cannot be accepted. That is a good statement. But it is not enough. The leaders should have called for new elections to be held as soon as possible. They put a lot of emphasis on dialogue between the dictator and the opposition. That dialogue should be about the electoral process to be followed when organising new elections.
The
leaders have also expressed support to the possible role the OSCE (Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) could play in Belarus. I found it a bit
strange as we all know that this Vienna-based entity is in a crisis mode. All its
key leadership positions are filled by officers-in-charge. They have no
political clout to facilitate any dialogue in Belarus.
In
the end, the most important thing the EU can do is to send a clear message to
Alexander Lukashenko that his legitimacy is not recognised and personal responsibility
for human rights violations will not be forgotten. Dictators love strong
messages. Brussels must realise it.
Tuesday, 18 August 2020
Mali and its blind partners
The serious political situation Mali is going through raises in my mind some fundamental questions about the political performance of the key external partners of the country. Basically, what I mean is that we cannot keep supporting national leaderships that are not appreciated by the vast majority of their people. We might feel comfortable with them. But what is the value of that if they are not accepted by their own citizens?
In
this case, France, other European countries, and the UN have been supporting a regime that has not implemented the peace agreement they have signed with their
own rebels and that has closed their eyes in an attempt not to see the rapid
deterioration of the security and poverty situations. The partners played the
same game.
And
now, several years down the line, we have a much graver national crisis, that
has grown into a regional one as well. And we see that the image of the
external actors has also been seriously damaged. That is a sure way of
undermining the role of the UN and of some key Western countries.
Sunday, 16 August 2020
Lukashenko is on his way out
My crystal ball is out of order. Therefore, I cannot see what is next in Belarus. But I have looked at the pictures of the crowds that came to the streets every day since the election last Sunday. I have all seen the reports about today’s rally against the dictator, the fraudster Alexander Lukashenko. I concluded that he keeps losing ground, including within his administration and the police forces. People have shown a tremendous amount of courage. They are determined to get him out of power. He has lost the support of the factory workers, which he thought would keep their loyalty towards the regime and his person. He thinks he can count on the police and the army, plus the support coming from Russia. He might be wrong. My reading is that his position is very fragile. Any intervention coming from Putin’s side will make things worse. And Putin knows that as well.
Saturday, 15 August 2020
Lebanon and the international freezer
Translation of today’s opinion piece I published in Diário de Notícias (Lisbon). 15 Aug. 2020
From Lebanon to the conflict freezer
Victor Angelo
The
district of Beja in Southern Portugal and Lebanon have the same territorial
area. But the comparison ends there. If on one side we have around 153 thousand
inhabitants, on the other there are seven million, who live in one of the most
unstable regions of the globe. And they are an extremely fragmented social
mosaic, full of rivalries, which subsists at the expense of precarious
balances, always ready to be broken. Each segment of society pulls the embers
to its sardine. The respective bosses corrupt the system and capture the
institutions of governance. To the emergence of more honest leaders, the bosses
respond with murder or intimidation, to shut up or push into exile anyone who
questions them.
This
explains why a country of entrepreneurial people with a high cultural level
went through a long civil war, from 1975 to 1990, and has been experiencing a
deep national crisis for years. The situation entered an acute phase in October
2019, with thousands of citizens protesting regularly in the streets. The economy
and the financial system ceased to function. The central government has become
a prisoner of the fierce rivalries that exist between the 18
political-confessional groups that make up the country and which serve as chess
pieces in the game of tension between the regional powers, especially Iran and
Saudi Arabia.
The
situation became catastrophic after the explosion in the port of Beirut. Since
then, the country has made the front page of the news and the priority list of
the usual powers, thanks in particular to the efforts of Emmanuel Macron.
Lebanon will remain on this list as long as international attention is focused
on its crisis. Sooner or later a new tragedy will appear somewhere and the
country, like others that are also experiencing recurrent national conflicts,
will move to the shelf of the forgotten, in the world freezer where so many
unsolvable crises are stored and kept frozen.
In
the meantime, emergency humanitarian aid has been announced. It is vital that
this aid arrives quickly and is delivered to those who are in a very precarious
situation. Here the role of the United Nations organisations is to ensure the
credibility of the distribution of humanitarian goods, which must be channelled
through Lebanese NGOs. We must avoid political exploitation of this aid, either
by internal factions or by donors. That is why I do not think it is too much to
remember that humanitarian action aims to save lives, with transparency,
without corruption. It has nothing to do with possible changes in the political
spider web.
It
is true that Lebanon needs to change its political labyrinth. In recent days, a
series of proposals have emerged that would place this burden on the shoulders
of the international community. Some have suggested a new mandate regime. The
country was under a French mandate until 1943 and there are many people in
Lebanon, at the grassroots level, who would like this to happen again. That, even
with adaptations to the realities of modern politics, would be a thing of the
past. It does not correspond to the current vision, which puts the
responsibility for change in the hands of national political agents.
Nor
do I think it is possible to send a United Nations contingent with a political
mission approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
This part of the Charter allows for the use of military and police force, which
would theoretically make the mission more efficient. In reality, it only works
if there is a strong enough national political will to change the way the country
is run, which seems to be very difficult to achieve in Lebanon. One could use
the functions of mediation and facilitation of political dialogue, a role that
is increasingly central to the United Nations menu. I just do not believe that
Lebanese politicians are ready for such an effort.
So,
while some humanitarian aid is being provided and internal political cooling is
expected, I fear that Lebanon will join the group of countries that the
Security Council's inertia regularly puts in the freezer of conflicts.
Thursday, 13 August 2020
How to deal with Erdogan?
The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming very tense. Turkey is doing oil mapping at sea, in waters that are contested by a fellow NATO Member State – Greece. The oil vessel is escorted by several Turkish warships. And now France has responded to a Greek appeal and is sending navy assets to the region. This situation can easily escalate and become an open conflict. It must be dealt with by the NATO and European authorities immediately.
The
truth of the matter is that Europe does not have a clear line of approach
towards Turkey. Delaying the accession negotiations or approving a light
package of sanctions against the regime in Ankara is not an effective policy
line. A firmer position is required. The European leaders must understand that
President Erdogan is a major threat to the stability of Europe. In addition,
they must realise that someone of his calibre does not understand a soft
approach. He knows about force and can get the message if the message is
forceful.
Monday, 10 August 2020
Aid to Lebanon
There have been some discussions about the conditions to be attached to the humanitarian aid to Lebanon. I would like to clarify that such aid should only have one provision: it should reach those in need. There is no other political condition when it comes to saving lives. The political dimensions belong to another sphere, not to the humanitarian one.
Saturday, 8 August 2020
Writing about security and democracy
Translation of today’s opinion piece I published in Diário de Notícias
(Lisbon)
Questioning the obsession with security
Victor Angelo
The
European Commission has got into the habit of producing strategies. It is a
good practice, as it allows to move forward the reflection on priority themes
and to draw the attention of the different governments to the need for
coordination and joint actions, when appropriate. However, it is a pity that
these documents are only to be known in the European District of Brussels and
in certain specialised circles, and are not debated in national parliaments and
by the public opinion in the various Member States.
The
Commission has just outlined another, what it called the Security Union
Strategy 2020-2025. It has been developed under the baton of the Vice-President
for the Promotion of the European Way of Life, Margaritis Schinas, who has the
task of ensuring the link between the external and internal dimensions of
security. In other words, an almost impossible job, as there is no harmony of
interests about foreign policy, not even regarding neighbouring Russia. Nor is
there the courage to act against those states that pose a threat to Europe's
internal stability, such as Turkey, among others.
The
new security strategy is, above all, an exercise in enumeration. It provides an
exhaustive overview of ongoing initiatives, including those concerning cybercrime
and intoxication and misrepresentation campaigns from outside - without any
reference to the internal actors who serve as a sounding board for these lying
messages. It is all very technical, based on the intervention of police and
criminal investigation bodies. It lacks the link to the Global Strategy,
approved in 2016, and the Common Security and Defence Policy. It is as if the
Commission is just adding another silo to the European political edifice. That
is bad. It also lacks an analysis of the vulnerabilities of certain categories
of citizens according to age, gender, place of residence, social and economic
fragility, ethnic or cultural belonging. That is even worse.
Anyone
who is patient enough to read the document gets the impression that at the end
of the reference period, the year 2025, we will have a Europe in which every
step of every citizen will be recorded and can be scrutinised. It is easy to
get the impression that we will then arrive at an extensively watched society,
with gigantic databases storing every detail of our lives. The strategy shows,
moreover, that the process has already begun and that it will be accelerated by
the progress of digitisation and Artificial Intelligence. The prevention of
terrorism and hybrid attacks, which may jeopardise key infrastructure, and the
fight against financial crime will be three of the lines used to justify close
surveillance, which seems to be inspired by the Big Brother imagined by George
Orwell.
Even
when it is said that the ultimate goal is the defence of the rights and
freedoms of European citizens, we cannot fall into the trap of omniscient, omnipresent,
and omnipotent security. The reason is simple. A security state is always one
step away from slipping into an oppressive and manipulative state. Past
examples show that political leaders easily fall into the temptation to divert
security functions to ends that have nothing to do with consolidating the
democratic regime and the real tranquillity of citizens.
Those
who do not share this temptation are so often unable to exercise democratic
oversight of security institutions. Most parliamentary oversight committees for
intelligence services have reduced mandates, limited access, and unsatisfactory
results. The strategy now formulated is silent on the alternatives that should
be considered so that independent, non-partisan powers, outside of
parliamentary disputes, can effectively curb possible security abuses. The issue of balanced control of the
potential excesses of those who observe our daily lives is, however, essential. And this is because security obsessions are
like witches. There are those who do not believe in them, but they are around,
for sure! Even in European democracies!