Looking at Afghanistan's future with great sadness

Afghanistan: So many sacrifices, for what?

Victor Ângelo

 

Coming in like a lion, and then, exiting like a baboon. Perhaps this popular expression does not fully apply to the withdrawal of the American troops and their NATO allies from Afghanistan. It is, no doubt, an inglorious exit after almost twenty years of enormous human and financial efforts. The way in which they abandoned their main military base in Bagram, about an hour north of Kabul - in the dead of night, leaving behind an indefensible and unmanageable situation, namely a prison with more than five thousand prisoners linked to terrorism - has a dramatic symbolic value. It signifies impasse, retreat, and abandonment of the Afghan government and people to their fate. In a word, defeat. With Taliban fanatics gaining ground across the country, the withdrawal will allow them to reach Kabul before the rigours of winter. This is the ideal time of year for military campaigns in Afghanistan and the way is open for the assault on power.

There are many possible reflections on all this. At this moment it is especially important to understand the reasons for the American pull-out. Afghanistan has lost the strategic interest it held for years, when the fight against Islamist terrorism was considered a priority in Washington. The United States now thinks it is sufficiently protected against such threats. This is where they have a huge difference with their European allies. The Europeans continue to see terrorism as a major danger and view the Taliban offensive with great apprehension. But the Europeans in NATO had no choice but to uncritically align themselves with the American position.

For Washington, Afghanistan has come to be seen as an endless war and as a distraction from the new and now far more important focus: China. And it sees the rivalry between the two superpowers as resolved in the region where Afghanistan is located. This is why it does not want to waste any more time and resources in this geopolitical space where China already has the subordination of the two countries that matter most: Pakistan and Iran. The China-Pakistan economic corridor, which ends at the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea, is perhaps the most relevant project of the New Silk Road. In Beijing's eyes, it is guaranteed. On the other hand, Iran signed a long-term economic agreement with China in March 2021. Chinese investments are expected to reach $400 billion in the coming years. It is Iran's passage into China's orbit. In the middle will remain the Afghanistan of chaos and radicalism, but without the capacity to harm Chinese interests in the region. The Taliban are dependent on these two neighbours, especially Pakistan, and should not act against their interests.

But beyond the strategic games, there are the people, victims of a cruel conflict, poor but resilient and dignified. They are deeply concerned, as are many of us here in Europe. First, because a regime based on a primitive vision of life in society has no regard for human rights. It treats all people, starting with women and girls, in an incredibly oppressive and inhuman way. We cannot remain indifferent to the extreme suffering that is looming for millions of Afghan citizens. Second, because potential terrorists in Europe will find in the resurgence of Taliban tyranny a new balloon of oxygen. Third, because radical killers operating in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa, in countries that are part of our historic alliances, will be able to gain new opportunities for support.

One lesson that will be drawn from all this is that you cannot count on support from Westerners. That support comes and then disappears, in the dark of night, according to convenience, the direction of the political wind and the priorities of those who live far from the problems.

To think that these are some of the outcomes of the long and painful Western intervention in Afghanistan can only leave us desolate. Above all, we are left with a bitter feeling of failure and impotence. Of a Europe that is submissive in foreign and security policy, in a world where it weighs little and counts for less.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Our strategic fragility: a key example

Taiwan so close

Victor Ângelo 

Taiwan is part of our everyday life. This is because the company that produces almost all of the chips used in electronics, mobile phones, robots and cars is Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). An omnipresent but discreet colossus, worth twice the GDP of Portugal on the stock exchange. And it is pertinent to write about it this week, when there is so much talk about China.

Since TSMC produces over 90% of the latest generation of microprocessors and is located in Taiwan, it is at the centre of the Sino-American rivalry. This is a major critical point. If there were a conflict over Taiwan tomorrow, the worldwide availability of chips would plummet. This would mean the immediate paralysis of motor vehicle factories, computers, mobile phones, highly sophisticated financial operations, and everything related to the use of micro and nano transistors. In other words, it would be economic and social chaos.

Analysts looking at these things say that TSMC is the invisible shield protecting Taiwan. It may be, to some extent. And TSMC is betting on it: it plans to invest, over the next three years, $100 billion in expanding its scientific and technological capacity. More chips, infinitely tiny and of an extraordinarily more powerful artificial intelligence. The figures give an idea of what is at stake. They also show that national defence policy involves the development of an ultra-modern economy that creates strategic dependencies in other parts of the world. 

It is therefore neither in the interest of Beijing nor of others to destabilise Taiwan. At least not for the next seven to ten years. But this absolute dependence on a single company is also the greatest exponent of the fragility of the major global balances. It is the result of decades of ultraliberalism and the relocation of production, all of which is out of step with what should be geostrategic concerns. The prevailing philosophy led us to believe that commercial interdependence would erase the rivalries between the great blocs of nations. We now know that this is an illusion. The biggest wars of the last 100 years were started by self-centred madmen who did not take into account the economic - nor the human - impact of their decisions. I do not think Xi Jinping falls into that category, despite the words and tone he used yesterday about Taiwan at the Chinese Communist Party's centenary celebration. But it is also true that it would only take a highly sophisticated hacker attack against one section of TSMC to bring thousands of production chains that are dependent on the availability of chips to a halt.

Joe Biden understands that the United States cannot, in this vital area, remain totally dependent on Taiwan and on one company alone. The industrial plan he has just proposed envisages an investment of $50 billion to stimulate domestic chip production. To that will be added many billions from the private sector. The truth is that much of the scientific design work in this field is done by world-renowned American companies - for example, Intel Corp, Nvidia Corp, Qualcomm or Cisco Systems Inc. But separating design from production has led to extreme vulnerability. It is a bit like designing highly effective weapons and asking others to manufacture them and then supply us.

The European Union must follow a similar path. One of the starting points should be to build on what ASML Holding NV already represents. This Dutch company is dominant in the production of the machinery needed to manufacture semiconductors. The ambition is to produce in Europe as early as 2030, in addition to the machines, at least 20% of the new generation of semiconductors. This is a modest target, but it will still require huge investments in Europe's digital industries. The amount currently foreseen - around €150 billion - is insufficient when compared to what TSMC and South Korea's Samsung - the second largest chip producer - have in the pipeline. However, European sovereignty, including its defence, requires a decisive presence in the industries linked to digitalisation. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

Reflecting about democracy

 Democracy cannot be make-believe

Victor Ângelo

 

In the most developed societies, we are witnessing an acceleration in the digitalisation of all dimensions of citizens' lives. The pandemic has contributed enormously to this digital revolution. But more is coming.  The ability to process millions of pieces of information through new methods of artificial intelligence and advances in automation will allow the control - and, in many cases, manipulation - of people in a way never seen before.

The new digital age brings numerous challenges, and even threats, for democracy. Think, for example, of the role of robots in the multiplication of propaganda, fake news, and the creation of echo chambers, which give the impression of massive political support for some, and build around them all sorts of illusions, alongside the harassment of others, the opponents, with thousands of hostile messages from fake profiles. But the most immediate aspect concerns participation in the electoral act. If a citizen can pay his taxes or renew his identity card while sitting at the kitchen table, why is he not allowed to vote by computer link-up, also from home? Going to a polling station, going through crowds of people, queuing up and wasting time seem like procedures from another time, even if people like Donald Trump try to discredit electronic voting.

Already this week, the French have thrown another challenge into the debate. The abstention rate in the regional elections reached a record high. Two-thirds did not vote. Worse still, around 9 out of 10 of 18–24-year-olds were not ready for the hassle. They just ignored the election calls. Analysts were baffled. In discoursing on the reasons for such indifference, they fell into the same simplism that Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and other political personalities had already shown on election night - it would be the fault of the citizens, who found the inconvenience not worth it. And they launched cries to the heavens to lament that such a trend could lead to the death of democracy.

All that is television talk. People - especially young people - do not vote because most of the political class doesn't mean anything to them, doesn't inspire them, has no new ideas, is just more of the same, with too much hubris and too few ethics. This is what is happening in France and other European countries. The main threat to democracy does not come from apathy among citizens. That is the consequence. The cause lies upstream, in the political parties - there are always exceptions - which are generally nothing more than a club of opportunists or fanatics, enlightened by short-sightedness.

The question of democracy is also on the agenda of the European Council meeting that has been held since yesterday, marking the end of the Portuguese presidency. The big question, which has been a long time coming and so far, unanswered, is what to do about the authoritarian governance currently practised in Hungary and Poland. The leaders in these two countries have long systematically violated Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which defines the fundamental values on which the EU is based - freedom, democracy, separation of powers and human rights. The lack of an adequate response to these violations is another fuel to the fire that is consuming away the citizens' confidence in democracy and politicians.

Less talked about, but equally important for the vitality of democracy, is having a capable system of administration of justice that is independent of politicians. Citizens need to have confidence in the speedy and efficient functioning of the courts, as a means of defending their rights and correcting injustices. In the age of "digital totalitarianism" this is even more essential. In member states where justice is slow, ill-equipped, and inefficient, we have a problem almost as serious as the authoritarianism that exists elsewhere. Those states have a lame democracy. They should also be the subject of criticism in the European Council. Without effective justice, democracy is an illusion. And the citizens, as the French have now shown, are no longer so easily deceived.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

Summits and dangerous choices

The turmoil they want us to get into

Victor Ângelo

 

The UN General Assembly is today expected to re-elect António Guterres for a second term. The first one was not easy, for various reasons, including the fact that Donald Trump has been president of the United States four of the last five years. Trump had not the slightest interest in multilateralism. He was, moreover, unpredictable and oddball in matters of international politics. To appear to be going against his theses would be a kind of political suicide. This greatly reduced the Secretary-General's room for manoeuvre. Guterres then focused on four major areas: the parity agenda, particularly within the organisation, where he successfully implemented a policy of promoting women to senior posts; climate change; humanitarian response; and finding solutions to crises in countries where it did not clash with the permanent members of the Security Council. He also carried out some internal reforms, notably of the UN's organisation chart and representation at country level.   

The second mandate will be even more difficult. The summits of the last few days - G7, NATO, US-EU, Biden-Putin - have shown that we have entered a very complex phase in the global power games. Several conclusions can be drawn from what has been said. None of them puts the United Nations where it belongs, as a platform for convergence between opposing interests. At these summits, certain players have adopted a confrontational line, and others have allowed themselves to be dragged along. Even when the tone is calm, as was the case at the meeting between Biden and Putin, we cannot fall into illusions: each maintains his positions and sees the other as the hostile side. It is a new era of distrust and direct conflict between the superpowers, outside the established international order.

More specifically, bringing the rivalry with China into the military field and openly including it in NATO's agenda is a mistake. It is true that the two paragraphs dedicated in the final communiqué to relations with China are softer than the messages disseminated before and during the meeting. But in essence, we are giving Beijing reasons to strengthen defence cooperation with Moscow and to increase its participation in joint military exercises with the Russians, including in regions close to the European Union's borders. If we have criticisms to make, in the areas of human rights and freedom, of unfair commercial competition, or even when China pushes certain countries into excessive debt, with investments in infrastructure that serve, above all, its own interests, let us make them in the appropriate political forums. 

When you gamble, as you have done all week, on confrontation and bloc politics, you are almost irretrievably compromising the functioning of the United Nations Security Council. The veto then becomes the standard practice. The result is the weakening of the UN and the marginalisation of its leaders, starting with the Secretary-General. And all this is in contradiction with the repeated promises to strengthen multilateralism, which appear in the documents approved at the G7 and NATO meetings.

Soon after his investiture, Biden decided to bring his country back to the United Nations Human Rights Council, as an observer and to make it more relevant. This is a wiser decision than going ahead with the intention of convening a conference of democracies, an issue that was again on the table during summits with allies. Such a conference, which should include the good guys and exclude the bad guys, according to Washington's criteria, would further divide the international community and put the UN in an extremely delicate situation. To help the multilateral system and help defuse the turmoil looming on the horizon, the European Union should not support such an initiative. Nor should it be towed along by any superpower. It is precisely to avoid this that there is a common project and so much talk of deepening European sovereignty. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

Writing about the G7 Summit

A very special G7 summit

Victor Ângelo

 

The G7 summit number 47 starts today in the UK. Although the British Prime Minister will be the host, the biggest star will be Joe Biden, who chose the occasion to make his first trip abroad. He will spend a long week in Europe, thus showing that the European continent remains an important stage for diplomacy and the strengthening of American foreign alliances.

This has everything to be an outstanding summit.  The statements made in the last few days confirm the concerns that I have already expressed here in this newspaper a month ago, at the time of the preparatory meeting of the foreign ministers. Biden's intention seems to be to transform the G7 into what the UN Security Council cannot be: a platform for understanding between the great liberal democracies, able to give a coordinated response to universal issues and to face up to China's global ambitions and the threats posed by Russia. In essence, it is about seeking to safeguard American hegemony, not in an isolated way as Donald Trump advocated, but with the USA's most solid allies.

To make this alliance more effective, they associate South Africa, Australia, South Korea, and India to the group. This addition is strange and incomplete. It leaves out many important states. It is true that this is not the time for vast face-to-face meetings.  It is also true that the decision on who comes to sit at the table is up to the host. But the other members would also have a say in the matter. Nobody insisted that Mexico, Brazil, or others be invited. The reading that can be made leaves little doubt: Latin America is in crisis and counts for little more than nothing on the international stage. It is, in any case, in the North American sphere of influence. It would not need to be heard.

Africa was represented at previous summits by three or four countries. This time it was almost left out. The presence of Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African president, can be seen as the British lending a hand to maintaining stability in South Africa in order to reassure certain sections of its population. The rest of the continent is of lesser concern. Incidentally, the UK was the only G7 country that decided to cut its cooperation budget on the pretext of the pandemic. The cut is £4 billion. It will have a considerable negative impact at a time when the least developed countries need exceptional support.

Regarding the Middle East, nobody wants to hear anything about Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the general in charge in Egypt, let alone about Recep Erdoğan or Mohammed bin Salman. From the perspective of the G7, the Middle East is losing strategic relevance. On the other hand, Iran has moved into China's orbit - on 27 March, a mutual cooperation agreement for the next 25 years was signed, thus opening a way out for the Iranians, who have become freer from American and Western sanctions.

In Asia, the big bet is centred on India. It is, however, a complex and risky gamble. Narendra Modi is a radical Hindu nationalist who is dragging the world's largest democracy into an intense civil crisis. He is also a protectionist, unwilling to open the economy to foreigners. He does, however, offer one illusion: that he could become an important counterweight to China. 

China is, moreover, the main concern that Biden has in his baggage. He wants to turn the G7 into a dam against Chinese expansionism. We will see if he succeeds, apart from the mention in the final communiqué. As for Boris Johnson, the banner that would allow him to present the meeting as a success would be a resounding declaration of support for vaccination campaigns in the poorest countries, so as to have 60% of these populations vaccinated by the end of 2022. If there is a commitment to that, then this G7 will have been useful. Leaders will be able to sing victory, even though December 2022 will mean another year and a half of uncertainties and restrictions. In that perspective, helping others as quickly as possible is in the vital interests of us all, starting with the G7.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Lowering the tension between Russia and the West

Russia and us: maximum prudence and lots of diplomacy

Victor Angelo

 

There are some intellectuals out there with a broken compass. They have shown again this loss of reference points in the way they have reacted to the criticism made to Alexander Lukashenko, the post-Soviet relic who controls the destiny of Belarus since 1994. A character who meets all the requirements that characterize a dictator. He will not have the stature of Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, nor the madness of Kim Jong-un, or a strategic vision that goes beyond the simple obsession with perpetuating himself in power. He is a tiny tyrant who, at his manner, ruins the freedoms and the lives of his fellow citizens. This evidence escapes some. With their gaze fixed on the past, they play at being progressive and see in him a heroic survivor of the communist era, a would-be resistor to the imperialist designs of the West. And they swallow all the falsehoods that this variant of Salazar, a version with a moustache and a brute, invents to justify his actions. In particular, the criminal action against the Ryanair commercial flight, and the lies built around Roman Protasevich. They ignore, at the same time, everything that the European leaders have said on the subject. 

The same has been true of the propaganda coming from the Kremlin. For some of our bewildered people, Putin is always right, when he attacks our part of the world. The explanation is the same, although in a strengthened dose, that the Kremlin has a more symbolic meaning and touches the soul of those nostalgic for the Soviet Union more than Minsk.

The truth is different, however. Putin is a threat. Like other despots, his power strategy is to create an external enemy, so as to allow him to appear, in the eyes of his own, as the defender of the homeland, its traditional values, and its nationalist projection as a great power. In this plan, everything that emerges as internal opposition, and that could jeopardize Putin's future, is accused of being at the service of foreign powers and pursued with all ferocity.

The external target par excellence is NATO. And the rhetoric from Moscow, which some here faithfully echo, attributes to the Atlantic Alliance the design of wanting to camp along the Russian borders. It is the alleged eastward expansion of NATO. There are four member states that share border lines with Russia: Poland and Lithuania, which are neighbours of Kaliningrad, a highly militarized Russian enclave, plus Latvia and Estonia. These countries joined NATO by their own will and because they meet the conditions required by the organization: a democratic political system, based on a market economy and respect for people's rights; and the existence of an effective defence structure duly framed by a legitimate political power. It is essentially about democracy and sovereignty. It is this sovereignty - the ability of each country to decide freely on its foreign alliances - that Putin does not want to accept being practiced by Georgia and, above all, Ukraine. Since he has no such right, he uses intimidation, trickery and, when necessary, force as an alternative. 

Those who live in an outdated ideological labyrinth do not understand these things. They pay no attention to the voices coming from the European camp, even though our leaders have the democratic legitimacy that dictators lack. Nor do they care that our side has unsuccessfully sought to revive the NATO-Russia Council, an essential consultative body for détente. The last meeting of that Council took place in July 2019. Further, Russia was invited to send military observers to the allied exercise SteadFast Defender 2021, which is taking place across Europe and with a special focus on the Black Sea. It did not respond to the invitation.

The current conjuncture is worrisome. Tension between the two sides of Europe is as it has never been in the last 30 years. In such a context, the summit planned for June 16 in Geneva between the American and Russian presidents is going to be very difficult. It is urgent to defuse the existing dangerous situation, so this meeting will require maximum diplomacy and prudence.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Lukashenko flies low and will crash

Lukashenko in choppy flight

Victor Angelo

 

For some states, the repression of dissidents knows neither limits nor borders. Anything goes when someone is considered an enemy of the regime. Even when he or she lives abroad, convinced that it is safer. One may not be, however, if one is considered a target for the criminals who control power in the home country. Some dictatorships have an awfully long repressive arm. They have no qualms about operating on foreign soil and conducting murders, kidnappings, or making frivolous or unsubstantiated accusations in order to force Interpol to issue international arrest and repatriation notices. In other cases, they brutally intimidate family members who have remained in the country, with the aim of silencing the opponent in other latitudes.

The atrocious execution in Istanbul of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 was the most visible case in recent times. But it is not only Saudi Arabia that violates international law in this way. In a recently published report, the reputable NGO Freedom House took inventory of individual cases of transnational repression and the regimes that practice it, with total disregard for the sovereignty of other states and the norms of political asylum and refugee protection. In addition to the Saudis, the list includes China, Iran, Rwanda, Russia and Turkey. It would be easy, unfortunately, to add a few others. North Korea, for example, which organized the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother at Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. And as of this week, we have to include Lukashenko's Belarus.

The Belarusian dictator, who is not cleared of the well-founded suspicion of having rigged the August 2020 presidential elections in his favor, is afraid of his population and of those who lead the opposition against his regime. Therefore, it follows the old methods of dictatorships, that is, it represses the street demonstrations with all brutality, creates a generalized situation of fear, and decapitates the organizational summit, the leadership that is capable of making the popular masses move. Lukashenko, who has been in power since 1994, did not go to KGB school like his protector Vladimir Putin, but that does not stop him from acting in "special operations" mode.

That is what he did, by forcibly and cunningly diverting the Ryanair commercial flight from Athens to the Lithuanian capital. The interception violated all international standards related to civil aviation safety. It was also a serious affront to the European Union because it was an air link between two Schengen capitals, and a total disregard for political asylum rules. But it allowed him to kidnap and put out of action an important activist in the fight for democracy in Belarus, the young journalist Roman Protasevich.

The political costs of this criminal act are high. The European Council was expeditious and unanimous in its condemnation and response. The airspace Lukashenko controls is no longer on the route for European flights - and not only that, as several Asian airlines have followed suit - and the national airline of Belarus will have to suspend its connections with destinations within the EU. Moreover, the economic sanctions will be extended.

Some will say that these kinds of penalties have little effect on a country that depends primarily on its relations with Russia. They also add that such measures will increase Lukashenko's political subordination to the Kremlin. It is hard not to recognize the merit of these remarks. Experience shows that sanctions against third countries do not lead to major political transformations, except when they directly hit the ruling clique and the sectors vital for the country's economic survival. It is not yet known which will be the new personalities and which activities will be added to the existing sanctions list. But in these matters, the symbolic dimension is equally important. The political and diplomatic isolation of Alexander Lukashenko, and his people, must be made very clear. It serves as a lever. It is up to the Belarusian democratic opposition to do the rest. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

Europe and the world: what must be done

Europe's strategic autonomy

Victor Ângelo

 

Tianjin is a port city, a little more than a hundred kilometres southeast of Beijing. When the European powers established concessions in China, since the middle of the 19th century, this was one of the localities chosen as a gateway, with the advantage of being close to the capital. Today, it is a metropolitan zone that covers an area larger than the district of Beja - imagine the entire Baixo Alentejo urbanized, a landscape of skyscrapers with more than 15 million inhabitants. In 2025, Tianjin should have an economy two and a half times the size of Portugal.

The Tianjin example shows how important it is to see the world with realism. China is an unstoppable giant. It has in its favour the size of its population, authoritarian centralism of power, political will, and massive investment in science, technology, and the acquisition of raw materials. In this context, what future can Portugal, or any of most European countries, have in the global balance of power? Fortunately, there is the European Union. The productive integration and the pooling of political efforts allow the member-states to carry some weight in international economic relations and in the geopolitical chess game. If there were no other reason to justify the deepening of the EU, this alone would be enough.

This is where the question of Europe's strategic autonomy arises. It is part of the ritual of the speeches now in vogue. But it needs to be deepened and transformed into an action plan. That is why I will address three aspects of the subject today, leaving the defence and security dimensions for another time.

In this decade, the first major step towards the affirmation of Europe is the strengthening of the euro as an international means of payment as well as a monetary reserve currency. The European currency is already the second most used in global transactions, well above the Japanese yen and the Chinese renminbi, but it is still far behind the US dollar. It is essential, to allow autonomy in other areas of sovereignty, that there be the political will to accelerate the use of the euro in economic and financial relations with the most diverse regions of the globe. This discussion must get on the agenda of European political leaders. This is not a mere technical problem or a question of waiting for the dynamics of the markets. It is a strategic priority.

The second line of intervention concerns foreign policy. At present, except for the climate issue, Europe's position on major issues is defined by two negative features: subordination to the conveniences of the United States and fragmentation, a consequence of the individual interests of the Union's member states. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represents little more than himself. The current holder of the post, Josep Borrell, although more experienced than the two previous holders, does not show the ability to push a proactive and cohesive agenda. This is not the way for the EU to have a greater voice on the global stage. This is another issue that cries out for a new kind of agreement at the level of European political leaderships.

The third course of action became more evident when the pandemic highlighted the importance of self-sufficiency in the production of cutting-edge goods and services. European economies must continually invest in scientific, technological, and digital innovation, and in the training of citizens. The Social Summit held in Porto recognized the need for lifelong learning. This is the new way to look at the competitiveness of our economies. It remains to be determined which sectors should be considered key, in addition to health, the expansion of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and energy. 

Strategic autonomy does not exclude interdependence and cooperation between us and others. And it cannot be just talk. It requires clear ideas and appropriate policies. 

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

The future of Europe requires a thorough debate

Europe and the Coming Turbulence

Victor Ângelo

 

The launch of the Conference on the Future of Europe took place this week in Strasbourg, at the official seat of the European Parliament. The symbolism of Strasbourg is enormous. It represents reconciliation, peace, democracy, and solidarity among Europeans. These four desiderata are still as relevant today as they have been during the last seven decades, a period of continued construction  of the European political edifice. It is therefore important to remind ourselves of that, to recognize where we have come from and to define where we want to go in the next decade.

That is the aim of this initiative, which is due to be completed in March 2022. It would be a mistake to make a cynical assessment of the conference. However subtle it may seem, cynicism is the knife of the bitter and the downbeat. What is called for is a citizen's reflection that combines realism with idealism, that is a critical but constructive view. It is a matter of going beyond the rhetoric or the usual elucubrations.

The conference is a different test, which will allow us to measure the strength of citizenship movements. In fact, the biggest challenge facing the EU is precisely that which stems from the gap of ignorance or indifference between politics and the European institutions on the one hand, and people's daily lives on the other. Even in Brussels, people who live a few blocks away from the European district seem to be as disconnected from the EU as any family living in a small village in Portugal. A political project that is not understood by ordinary mortals is fragile. It can easily be jeopardized by its enemies.

The nine axes for reflection about the future ignore this disconnection. The topics are important: climate change and the environment; health; the economy, employment, and social justice; the EU's role in the world; rights and security; digital transformation; democracy; migration; and education, culture, sport, and youth. But it is a mistake to take citizens' support for the European project for granted. This is a fundamental issue. After an absolutely exceptional year, we find in European societies a lot of frustration, confusion, impatience, and a more pronounced individualism. We also have a set of internal and external enemies ready to exploit vulnerabilities and bring down the EU. That is why the discussion about the path to 2030 must begin with an analysis of weaknesses and threats.

A forward-looking assessment of the coming years shows us that we will be impacted by three major shock waves. The first comes from the accelerating use of cybernetics, in particular artificial intelligence, which will turn many Europeans into digital illiterates and redundant labour. If not properly addressed, it will further exacerbate social inequalities and job insecurity.

The second will result from new waves of uncontrolled immigration and the exploitation of this phenomenon by certain forces. It will not only be Viktor Orbán or Jarosław Kaczyński, or even Sebastian Kurz, who will divide Europe on this issue. The chances of Marine Le Pen gaining power in 2022 or of Italy being ruled by a coalition of ultranationalists in 2023 - in an alliance of Matteo Salvini with neo-fascist leader Georgia Meloni, whose Fratelli d'Italia party already mobilizes 18% of the national electorate - must be reckoned with. A front that brings together such politicians in several member states would cause a potentially fatal fracture for the continuation of Europe.

The third strategic shock - something to be avoided at all costs - could come from a possible armed conflict between the United States and China. Such a confrontation, which can by no means be excluded from the prospective scenarios, would have a devastating effect. European stability and prosperity would go down the drain.

The message, now that the debate has been opened, is that there can be no taboo subjects and no incomplete scenarios that do not consider the internal and external complexity in which we will move. Already, one fact is certain. There are years of great upheaval ahead of us.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

 

Comments on this week's G7 meeting

A Very Combative G7

Victor Ângelo

 

The G7 brings together the largest liberal economies, that is, in descending order of size, the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada. Together they represent about 50% of the world economy. The leadership of the G7 in 2021 falls to the British, who held a meeting of foreign ministers this week in preparation for the summit scheduled for June.

They have gone two years without meeting. The pandemic and the malaise caused by Donald Trump's presidency explain the long hiatus. Now the realities are different. Control of the pandemic seems possible, thanks to vaccination campaigns. And the policies pursued in Washington are no longer unpredictable. Still, it was necessary to decide between a face-to-face meeting or not. After a year of virtual conferences, it was concluded that when it comes to diplomacy, face-to-face contact is by far the most productive. Many of the videoconferences held between politicians during the pandemic turned out to be a mere formal exercise in which each one read the text in front of him  or her, without an exchange of ideas, an analysis of options or a personal commitment. We are now safely back to face-to-face discussions.

Another aspect concerns the list of countries outside the G7 but invited to the meeting. It was limited to South Africa, Australia, South Korea, and India, as well as two supranational organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. The political reading of this choice is easy to make. There is a clear preference here, and not just from the British. The economic and geopolitical focus is on Asia, on strengthening relations with countries that can stand up to competition from China.  Latin America and the Middle East were simply ignored.

China was in fact a dominant concern. The consultations among the ministers started there. The US is pursuing a very complex policy line in relation to China. They seek, in the main, to combine antagonism with cooperation. Hostility in general and agreement, in certain concrete matters, for example in the area of climate change or on Iran. This line will not work. The message received in Beijing from Washington can be summed up in one word - confrontation. And the Chinese will respond to that perception club in equivalent currency.

The Europeans themselves - and this has been shown in the statements made by Germany and France - think that the American position with regard to China is excessive. They agree with Washington when it comes to human rights, Hong Kong or Xinjiang, or the protection of intellectual property. But they believe that Europe has much to gain if the relationship with China is based on respect for established rules and the pursuit of mutual advantages. Japan prefers to follow a policy similar to Europe's, despite pressure from the Biden administration.

Russia was also high on the agenda. The Kremlin is now seen as a threat to the European and American democracies. In this matter, the harmony between the two sides of the Atlantic is clearer. The issue of defending democratic regimes, including the fight against the spread of false or biased information, was a major theme.

The American Secretary of State went to London to propose a new strategic approach. Antony Blinken argues that the group cannot just be a coordination mechanism for the big capitalist economies. It must become a platform for political intervention by the most influential democracies. This is an expression of a belief prevalent in the current American administration that the US has a mission - that of saving the democracies. For some of us here in Europe, such a proposition generates three kinds of uneasiness. One, related to the increasing marginalization of the UN's political role. The other, with the worsening polarization of international relations. The third, with the weight that a phantom named Trump may yet exert in American politics.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)