The French malaise

When generals write open letters

Victor Angelo

 

A poll released this week by IFOP, the prestigious French public opinion institute, tells us that 86% of the French consider internal security as a central issue, which will influence the outcome of the May 2022 presidential election. On the other hand, in July 2020, 71% of the adult population considered that France is going through a process of decline. Decline is a vague concept, open to various interpretations. But it reveals a feeling of social malaise, which gave rise to the "yellow vests" and has been slyly exploited by the extreme right, especially by Marine Le Pen.

Another opinion survey conducted by the Jean-Jaurès Foundation, an institution with links to the Socialist Party, revealed that a good number of French citizens believe that there is too much disorder in the country. More specifically, 82% think that France needs a strong leader, capable of restoring public order and the authority of the state. President Emmanuel Macron must not have found any comfort in these opinion polls. The images that remain are of a nation mired in political indecision and sensitive to the narrative of the far right.

It is in this context that a few days ago an open letter appeared, signed by 24 reserve generals and a hundred or so senior officers and more than a thousand military personnel of other ranks, with one or two still on active duty and the rest retired. The letter, published in the ultranationalist magazine Valeurs Actuelles, seemed to be intended as leverage to strengthen the positions of the radical right. It was viewed by the government and by many with amazement and as a call for a hypothetical coup d'état.

The text is an attack on what its authors call the lack of courage of the political class to face the existing "chaos". They further state that this weakness may lead their active military comrades to an "intervention to defend the civilizational values" of France. The word intervention does not allow for ambiguity. This is the most explosive part of the missive, which has left the defence minister and many democrats on the boil. In Europe in 2021, such a suggestion is unacceptable, even more so coming from such a large number of officers who were only recently serving in the ranks.

"The hour is grave, France is in danger, is threatened by several deadly risks." So opens the document, in the well-worn style of those who paint chaos to then claim that it is time to save the homeland. The authors refer to what they call the disintegration of French society, to what they consider to be a spreading of hatred among various sections of the population, and attack "Islamism and the hordes of the suburbs," that is, immigrants of non-European origin who live mainly in the poor dormitories that are the outskirts of the big cities. Immigration is in fact one of the great battle horses of the national-extremists, in France as in other European countries. It is an issue that concerns people with lower incomes and pensioners with small pensions the most. References to immigration bring electoral dividends. Marine Le Pen knows this. It is moreover in these social categories, who once voted left or in popular movements, that she finds a good part of her support. The IFOP data shows that 40% of workers and other low-wage earners support Le Pen.

The issue has been little talked about outside the French hexagon. It is true that the pandemic, Russia, the EU sofagate, soccer, and concern over Cristina's TV ratings decline leave no room for other news. But the letter, revealing the political turmoil in France, has a dimension that goes beyond national borders. If next year Emmanuel Macron were to lose the presidential election and the far right were to take over power in Paris, the impact of that political earthquake on the future of the European project would be incalculable. So weakening Macron, as some are doing here and there, is a very serious mistake.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Spain getting deeper involved in Arica

Spain wants to race in Africa on its own track

Victor Ângelo

 

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, was recently in Luanda and, on his return, in Dakar. The trip marked the start of the action plan approved by his government under the title "Focus Africa 2023". The plan is a bet on African prosperity. Spain wants to be a major partner in the development of a set of countries designated as priorities. The list includes, in the North, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, leaving out Libya and Tunisia - a nation to which Europe should pay special attention. It also includes all West Africa (ECOWAS) and countries from other regions - Ethiopia, the triangle that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania form, South Africa and, closer to Portuguese interests, Angola, and Mozambique. This dispersion of efforts seems to me to be a weak point.

The plan is based on reinforcing embassies and trade delegations and expanding bilateral cooperation, including in the areas of culture, security, and defence. Beyond the political intentions, it opens the door and protects Spanish private investments in the selected countries. It is an intervention with two complementary fronts, the political and the economic. Arancha González, who headed the International Trade Center, a UN body, and is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, had the opportunity to see what China, India and others are doing in Africa. This experience has allowed her to design a strategy that is current, attractive, and capable of responding to Spanish nationalism. It serves, on the other hand, the personal agenda of the minister, who dreams of great flights on the international scene.

The declared ambition is to turn Spain into an indispensable player in African matters, within the European Union. In this way it will increase its relative weight in the universe of Brussels. The document clearly states that Madrid wants to lead EU action in Africa. Spanish politicians and businessmen know that Europe's relationship with the African continent will be, for several reasons, a central theme of European foreign policy. They are positioning themselves to make the most of that future.

Spain does not have the sub-Saharan experience that other EU countries have accumulated throughout history. But it shows political determination. It will be able to develop more objective relations, without the shadows of the colonial past and the misunderstandings that arose post-independence. It would be a mistake, however, not to seek to take advantage of the connections and knowledge that France, Belgium and Portugal in particular have acquired. The challenge is too great for an incursion without partnerships. That is the second weak point of this move.

The visit to Angola made it clear that it is about occupying the largest economic space possible, from agriculture and fisheries to transport and energy. There are more than 80 Spanish investment projects already underway or in the start-up phase. There also seems to be the intention of counting on Luanda to help Madrid normalize relations with Equatorial Guinea, which was the only colony that Spain had south of the Sahara and is now part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). These moves appear to be in direct competition with Portugal's interests. However, knowledge of the complexities of Angola and Equatorial Guinea would rather recommend a joint effort on the part of the two Iberian states.  

In Senegal, the problem is different. It has to do with clandestine migration. The country is a hub for those who want to enter Europe via the Canary Islands. The Senegalese are in second place, after the Moroccans, when it comes to illegal arrivals in the Spanish archipelago. It is also through the Senegalese beaches that many others pass, coming from countries in the region. For this reason, Spain has deployed 57 police officers in Senegal to help dismantle the trafficking networks and prevent people from embarking on a very dangerous sea crossing. The other dimension of the visit to Dakar is that Senegal remains the political centre and an anchor of stability in West Africa.

From all of this, I must say that running on your own track in the vastness of Africa is a challenge that I would not even recommend to a giant.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Putin and our side of Europe

The infinite Vladimir Putin

Victor Angelo

 

According to official figures, for what they are worth, the constitutional revision now enacted by Vladimir Putin would have received the approval of 78% of voters in July 2020. The opposition considered the referendum a sham full of pressure and manoeuvres, but the president will always stress that the revision deserved popular support. We all know how results like that are achieved in opaque and authoritarian regimes. In any case, it is estimated that nearly two thirds of Russians go along with the president, despite the economic doldrums, social dissatisfaction and obstacles to freedom. This level of acceptance - or resignation - is due to the regime's incessant propaganda of the leader, showing him to be a resolute and deeply nationalistic leader, the personifier and protector of Russian identity. The population still remembers the chaotic governance that preceded his coming to power in 1999. Putin means for many stability and public order.

Autocracy favours corrupt practices. That is one of the regime's weaknesses. The campaign against Putin's absolute power involves unmasking high-level corruption. Attacking him based on the aberrations inscribed in the new constitution will not have much impact. It is true that the new law allows him to remain president, if life gives him health, until the age of 84 in 2036. That is the most striking aspect of the new constitutional text. It is a cunning move that aims to allow him to leave the scene when he sees fit, without losing an inch of authority until the final moment. The other relevant changes are the lifetime impunity granted to him and his sidekick Dmitry Medvedev, and the ban on homosexual marriages.

Seeing the Russian people condemned to another number of years of oppression makes anyone who knows and cherishes the value of freedom angry. But the problem is fundamentally an internal issue, which will have to be resolved by the Russian political system and citizens' movements. Our space for action is limited to insistently condemning the lack of democracy and the attacks that the regime makes against the fundamental rights of every citizen, starting with Alexei Navalny. But it is essential not to be naïve about the danger Putin represents in terms of our stability and security. When we talk about dialogue and economic relations we do not do so out of fear or mere opportunism. We do it because that is the way to treat a neighbour, however difficult, in order to have peace in the neighbourhood.

One of the most immediate problems relates to Ukraine's aspiration to join NATO. This is an understandable ambition. It should be dealt with according to the membership criteria - democracy, the rule of law, peaceful conflict resolution and guarantees for the proper functioning of the national armed forces, including the protection of defence secrets. Kiev and Brussels do not need to ask Moscow for permission. Vladimir Putin and his people will not be at all happy when it comes to formal negotiations. However, they have no right to oppose a legitimate foreign policy decision by an independent state. However, it is important that everything is done without burning the midway points and with the appropriate diplomacy to prevent an acceptable process being exploited by the adversary as if it were a provocation.

Another area of immediate concern: the cohesion of the European Union. Putin has long been intent on shattering European unity. He sees the French presidential election of 2022 as a unique opportunity. Marine Le Pen has, for the first time, a high chance of winning. She is viscerally ultranationalist and against the European project. Her election would pose a very serious risk to the continuation of the EU. Putin knows this. He will do everything to intervene in the French electoral process and ruin anyone who might be an obstacle to the victory of the candidate who best serves his interests. It is essential to put a stop to this meddling and, at the same time, to bear in mind the lesson that the Russian leader reminds us daily: vital disputes between the major blocs are no longer fought only with a sword and rocket fire.

   (Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

Mozambique and the Northern challenge

Mozambique: a complex crisis

Victor Ângelo

 

 

Following last week’s terrorist attack on the town of Palma, eighteen civil society organisations sent an open letter to the President of Mozambique. In addition to condemning the acts of violence, the letter expressed concern and reminded President Filipe Nyusi that a crisis as serious as the present requires more and better public communication from national leaders.  The recommendation means that the leadership of the country does not pay due attention to the obligation to keep the citizens informed. The practice of playing down the problems is the norm. We cannot be surprised. Opacity, arrogance, and detachment are three of the characteristics that have traditionally defined the political culture of the elites in power in Maputo.

It is also noticeable that citizens do not understand what the government's strategy is, beyond the use of the armed forces, which, by the way, have shown that they are not entirely prepared for the challenge. NGOs do not believe in the national military capacity and know that there is no time to wait for the training of special forces in sufficient numbers. It is true that training special troops is essential. The willingness expressed by the Portuguese government to do so is to be commended. But the situation is urgent, for humanitarian and other reasons. What has now occurred in Palma, and what had already happened in Mocímboa da Praia and other district headquarters in Cabo Delgado province, may spread along the northern coast, especially to areas where Swahili is the lingua franca. NGOs recommend that the authorities ask the Southern African Development Community and the African Union for security assistance. I do not think they will. They do not want critical eyes around or to give the impression that the problem requires regional involvement.

It is clear, however, that this is a more serious conflict than has hitherto been thought. The offensive against Palma was planned in a professional manner. One of the conclusions that must be drawn is clear: behind all this there is an organising hand. It is essential to unmask this hand, which seems to me far more sophisticated than a vague jihadist connection.

Apparently, the central objective is to prevent the gas megaproject, which is being launched in the region, from going ahead. The price of natural gas on the international markets is at an all-time low and the trend is for it to remain that way. It is of no interest to the big gas producers for new competitors to appear, especially one that could have enormous impact. Mozambique's reserves are in third place in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria. When they will start to be extracted - which will only happen if security is restored in the province - they will be in direct competition with Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which are respectively the world's third, fourth and eighth largest producers. I am not pointing the finger at anyone, but geopolitics recommends that we look at data like this. Especially if we take into account that future demand for gas could stagnate for reasons of the fight against climate change. International public opinion is less and less favourable to investments in hydrocarbons.

The fundamental point, beyond the clean-up of Palma, humanitarian aid and technical-military assistance to Mozambique, is to try to understand the roots and dynamics of this terrorist offensive. To minimise, to ignore the realities of social exclusion or to insist on stereotypical explanations - including those referring to alleged links to the so-called Islamic State - would be a mistake. We are facing an insurrection capable of serving certain interests and easy to promote. These are fighters who know how to survive with little, without the need for elaborate logistics. The weapons come from desertions, from previous ambushes, now from the attack on Palma, and from the illegal markets for military equipment in East and Central Africa. They do not want to occupy land, but to shoot the representatives of power and generate insecurity in areas with economic interest, but with a weak State presence. They are therefore highly dangerous individuals. They need to be taken seriously, but without simplistic approaches.

   (Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)